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ABSTRACT 
 
Making American: Constitutive Rhetoric in the Cold War.  (August 2011) 
Martha Elizabeth Thorpe, B.A., Baylor University; M.A., Texas A&M University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. James Arnt Aune 
 
 Constitutive rhetoric theory posits that community identity is rhetorically created.  
There are various approaches to constitutive rhetoric, though most rhetoricians have 
chosen to focus on the works of Maurice Charland and Michael McGee, whose 
approaches focus on audience so much that often the rhetor has no agency.  This project 
blends their ideas with those of James Boyd White to create works of criticism that 
highlight an increased amount of agency for the rhetor.  As examples, I have chosen four 
case studies from the year 1954: the Brown v. Board decision, the Army-McCarthy 
hearing (specifically McCarthy‘s heated exchange with Joe Welch), the addition of 
―under God‖ to the Pledge of Allegiance, and the first article in the first dated issue of 
Playboy.  Each chapter is designed to provide an example of what a constitutive analysis 
in the style of White would look like. 
 The project begins with a description of the theories and analyses, including 
constitutive rhetoric, postmodernism, and textual analysis.  The Brown v. Board analysis 
begins with a brief history of the case, moves to a rhetorical analysis, and then connects 
the analysis to ideas of constitutive rhetoric.  The McCarthy sections examines the 
―Have you no sense of decency?‖ exchange between Welch and McCarthy.  It begins 
 iv 
with a brief explanation of McCarthy‘s reputation, and then utilizes an understanding of 
conspiracy rhetoric in the rhetorical analysis in order to explain McCarthy‘s constitutive 
efforts.  The Pledge of Allegiance analysis provides a brief a summary of the 
Congressional arguments made to add the words ―under God‖ to the Pledge of 
Allegiance, then provides a textual analysis of the Pledge (with the addition), 
emphasizing the power of those words, especially given the epideictic nature of the 
Pledge.  The Playboy research focuses on the first 1954 article, which directly addresses 
the question of American identity.  The article is contextualized with Hugh Hefner‘s 
self-proclaimed Philosophy of Playboy.  Finally, all of these case studies are tied 
together again with further explanations of constitutive rhetoric, showing that White‘s 
understanding of constitutive rhetoric can be used to bolster Charland and McGee‘s in 
order to give agency to the rhetor. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Being here in America doesn’t make you an American.  Being born here in America 
doesn’t make you an American. 
-Malcolm X, ―The Ballot or the Bullet,‖ April 3, 1964 
 In fourth grade I had to go to school on two Saturdays.  Due to snowy weather, 
which my area of Texas was woefully unprepared for, we had missed enough days that 
the state required us to make some days up on the weekend.  Out of pity, or an attempt at 
goodwill, or some combination of both, Saturday school ended up being creative 
incarnations of field day and on-campus field trips.  One Saturday was deemed ―Patriotic 
Day‖ and we were all encouraged to wear red, white, and blue.  In class we talked about 
July the 4
th
 and the Founding Fathers and colored pictures of the flag and the Liberty 
Bell.  Ultimately, there was little history taught, but a great deal of emphasis on 
―citizenship.‖ 
 The culmination of the day was a school wide assembly where we would all go 
and listen to the principal talk about how great it was to be an American and sing various 
patriotic songs.  We practiced Lee Greenwood‘s ―Proud to be an American‖ for about 30 
minutes before we went to the assembly.  As we lined up, my teacher handed out small 
flags for us to wave throughout the ceremony.  Everybody got one and immediately  
 
____________ 
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began to poke and bother the person in line next to them.  Once the flags were handed 
out my teacher asked rather hurriedly ―Any questions?‖ 
 I raised my hand, and when called on, asked, ―If this is ‗Patriotic Day,‘ why are 
we waving flags that were made in China?‖  My teacher was not amused. She told me 
not to be smart, and when I protested that I really just wanted to know because I didn‘t 
understand and was not trying to be annoying, she curtly informed me that I would 
understand when I was older. 
 My teacher was right, to a degree.  What I grew to understand was that the 
meaning of ―patriotic‖ was not as universal as my elementary school activities would 
have had me believe.  I learned later in life that not everybody who was ―Proud to be an 
American‖ was actually proud of the same thing.  Being American was a complicated 
affair, and included not only the right stirring songs and symbols, but the liberal market, 
which meant that for some the most American thing to do was buy product from another 
country in order to take advantage of balance of costs and resources in order to turn a 
profit.  That lesson had been left out of Patriotic Day.  What I failed to learn at my fourth 
grade assembly is that American identity is manufactured as surely as those American 
flags that were made in China.  
American identity is not just a product of politics and economics, but also 
popular culture, art, technology, and a host of others.  My question is not ―What is an 
American?‖  The answer to such a question would differ from person to person, place to 
place, and vary depending on the point in history.  Perhaps it is an impossible question to 
answer.  My interest is in how we create American identity.  What are the things we do 
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and say in public discourse to create some idea of ―American?‖  Certainly not everyone 
agrees what is ―American‖ and what is not.  One has only to watch the news one night to 
hear people disagreeing loudly on what the ―American‖ thing to do is in any given 
situation, but we pretend that this word has some shared meaning for all of us.   
In trying to understand how we use public discourse to create American identity, 
I found that each situation is unique.  I could not make the broad statement ―Here is how 
we do it!‖ because each time the rhetor uses different means.  We constitute our identity 
in myriad ways.  What was missing from the scholarly conversation, however, was a 
way to analyze specific rhetorical texts as constitutive, while retaining the agency of the 
rhetor.  Certainly plenty of venues existed for rhetorical criticism, but the bridge between 
the act of criticism and the theory of constitutive rhetoric is missing.   
Michael Leff and Andrew Sachs describe criticism as a process in which ―the 
critic must from the discourse within its context,‖ while focusing the attention on the 
texts itself ―and the rhetorical features embedded within it.‖1  While some critics have 
applied this process to rhetoric in an attempt to illuminate the constitutive nature of 
particular texts, situating those texts within the popular theory of constitutive rhetoric as 
articulated by Maurice Charland and Michael McGee seems to strip rhetors of a certain 
amount of agency.  This project aims to address this criticism controversy by providing a 
criticism methodology based on James Boyd White‘s understanding of constitutive 
rhetoric, bolstered by Maurice Charland and Michael McGee‘s work, thereby connecting 
the theory and the actual practice of constitutive rhetoric.   
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Charland‘s understanding of constitutive rhetoric has been the basis of much of 
the scholarly conversation concerning constitutive rhetoric.  He describes it as rhetoric 
that does not just invite a member of an audience to be a part of a particular community, 
but actively creates that community as the rhetor engages with the audience.  
Constitutive rhetoric is powerful stuff in that it does not just describe the characteristics 
of a group, but involve the group in its own creation.
2
  Charland and McGee‘s work 
provide the theoretical background, but White is necessary to make this a work of 
criticism because White offers the opportunity to address how a rhetor is seeking to 
constitute group identity, while Charland and McGee tend to focus on the audience.   
White‘s approach provides a critic with the opportunity to focus on a specific text, and in 
the process implies quite a bit of agency to the rhetor.  In White‘s understanding of 
constitutive rhetoric the audience does not organically produce itself, but using a specific 
text the rhetor seeks to create identity.  White‘s approach focuses more narrowly on texts 
in the classic sense.  For him, it is the actual words of the law.  For students of Charland 
and McGee, the text is not always as narrowly construed.  The ―text‖ may be a 
movement or a group that is actively constituting, and herein lies some of the 
disagreement between the theory that Charland and McGee have established as opposed 
to the criticism-based approach of White.  White, by narrowly construing text as the 
specific words of a specific rhetorical act, is much more applicable to criticism, whereas 
often McGee and Charland‘s work stay within the realm of theory and avoid specific 
textual analysis.  
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Developing a Research Question 
During the Bush/Kerry campaigns and election of 2003/2004 I became fascinated 
with the vitriolic rhetoric that bubbled and broiled around both candidates.  
Commentators from all ends of the spectrum felt compelled to disparage politicians, 
activists, and the media for taking part in a heated campaign season that left no 
participant unscathed.  To be honest, the tone of the entire election was just mean-
spirited.  The attacks that stood out to me the most were the ones that implied there was 
something less than ―American‖ about a public figure.  John Kerry desperately tried to 
position himself as an ―American hero‖ while groups like the Swiftboat Veterans for 
Truth raked his reputation and his patriotism across the coals.  Groups like MoveOn.org 
called Bush and his administration every anti-American epithet they could think of, 
claiming that his behavior was directly opposed to everything America stood for. 
At the heart of so much of the rhetorical bullying was this idea of ―American.‖  
Nobody could decide what it meant or who had the most of it.  Was it more American to 
support the troops and the administration proudly, or was questioning authority part of 
our national character?  Pundits and politicians across the board all agreed that it was 
important to be as ―American‖ as possible, but it seemed that nobody had any clue what 
that really meant. 
My fascination with the word ―American‖ began to crystallize during that period, 
and has evolved since.  When I first began to consider my research questions, my initial 
reaction was to ask, ―What is American?‖  But that did not last long.  I knew before 
cracking a book that there was no way to answer that question.  I thought perhaps it 
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would be easier to pinpoint ―American‖ ex post facto than construct it now, and so I 
considered a historical approach thinking that a rhetorical history might satiate me.  But I 
quickly discovered that history was no simpler than the present.  At any given point in 
time there was disagreement on what the term ―American‖ meant.  The current argument 
was not new or groundbreaking in any way; it was simply a continuation of a long 
tradition of debate over the definition of ―American.‖  
What began to interest me more than the meaning of the word ―American‖ was 
how we make that up as we go along?  If ―American‖ is constitutive in that it is 
something continually reified in public discourse, how do we go about doing such a 
thing?  The answer was both simple and frustrating: in different cases groups or rhetors 
use different methods to constitute American identity.  If we agree that there is such a 
thing as constitutive rhetoric, then one might argue that there are very specific moments 
when a rhetor is trying to constitute.  That is, a rhetor may make specific choices in what 
she or he says in order to engage in the constitutive process.  If that is so, the text that the 
rhetor produces is a constitutive text. 
This is how I hope to join the scholarly conversation on constitutive rhetoric.  
Using White‘s understanding of constitutive rhetoric to bolster an understanding of 
Maurice Charland and Michael McGee I am illustrating how rhetorical criticism can be a 
part of this ongoing conversation.  I have chosen to focus on the year 1954 because it 
sets up easy parameters, and provides a number of different examples of constitutive 
rhetoric that have the same political and historical context.  I argue that rhetorical 
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criticism can be used to approach constitutive rhetoric in order to specify particular 
moments and tactics that rhetors use to create American identity. 
Other works may be classified as criticism within constitutive rhetoric, but for 
the most part, these differ because they are generally over collections of works instead of 
a singular text.  In order to get to Charland‘s ―narratives‖ most scholars have chosen to 
analyze groups of texts as opposed to argue that one text can stand alone as constitutive.  
For example, Tasha Dubriwny‘s ―Constructing Breast Cancer in the News Betty Ford 
and the Evolution of the Breast Cancer Patient‖ analyzes the way that women with 
breast cancer have been constituted by the media, but her primary sources are a 
collection of texts from 1974 to 1976.
3
  Similarly, Michael J. Lee‘s ―The Populist 
Chameleon: The People‘s Party, Huey Long, George Wallace, and the Populist 
Argumentative Frame‖ offers the argument that populism has been sustained by a focus 
on content, not the structure.  He traces this ―structure,‖ what he calls its argumentative 
frame, through the work of the People‘s Party, Long, and Wallace.  By focusing on the 
themes throughout this collection he follows the narratives that populism has woven in 
an attempt to create and ―us and them.‖  A more current example, also dealing with a 
group of speeches instead of a singular text, is Kenneth Zagacki‘s ―Constitutive Rhetoric 
Reconsidered: Constitutive Paradoxes in G.W. Bush‘s Iraq War Speeches.‖  Zagacki 
focuses on the idea of ―prophetic dualism‖ that he claims guided Bush‘s rhetoric to the 
American people in an attempt to create identification between Americans and Iraqis.  
While each of these begins to make the foray from theory into criticism, they focus on 
collections as opposed to a stand-alone text. 
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American Identity 
In 1950 David Riesman published a best-selling book that captured the attention 
of Americans from all walks of life.  The book, The Lonely Crowd: A Study of the 
Changing American Character, is still required reading for many sociology students.  
Riesman believed, and even stated in his title, that there was a quality of ―American,‖ 
and more importantly, the quality was in flux.  He wrote about character and the role of 
parents and ―normal vs. abnormal‖ in ways that made it very clear that what it means to 
be American was flexible and continually re-defined.
4
  In 1951 another sociologist, C. 
Wright Mills, wrote about the unique problems of the American middle class and how 
the treatment of the middle class was shaping American character.  Mills also argued 
that the notion of ―American‖ was changing in the post-World War II era, and that the 
Cold War was producing new and sometimes challenging definitions for the term.
5
 All 
of this is not to say I will introduce a new sociology for Americans to consider, but to 
point to the confusion that surrounds what that one term, American, means.  Riesman 
and Wright were both writing during the 1950s – the beginning of the Cold War.  
Apparently they both felt that at that point in American history the idea of ―American‖ 
was particularly important.   
Popular representations of the 1950s often portray a happy time when there was a 
healthy sense of normality and patriotism that made life easier.  Shows like Leave it to 
Beaver and The Donna Reed Show present us with images of a society based on the 
nuclear family, free from the temptations of sex and rebellion outside of deciding which 
girl to invite to the school dance.  The fifties are the proverbial ―good ol‘ days.‖  But the 
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1950s were not as homogeneous as nostalgic television would have us believe.  This was 
also the decade of Marilyn Monroe and the Beats, who were also adopted as specifically 
American icons.  Those competing representations of American life indicate that 
something was amiss – the nation was not exactly unified in who we thought we were.  
The very fact that there are competing narratives of that one decade, sex and rebellion 
vs. the black and white world of Father Knows Best, indicates that American identity 
was so plastic and malleable that we have not established what it was at that point.  It is 
easy to forget that Roy Rogers was competing with Elvis Presley for the nation‘s 
attention in the very same year.  America definitely had a split personality.   
However, this project is not an effort to define what it meant to be an American 
during the Cold War, but to analyze specific incidents that highlighted the tension 
surrounding the nebulous nature of ―American.‖.  This study is an exercise in 
methodology based in an understanding of theory, not an argument for a particular 
rhetorical construction of American identity.  I argue that constitutive rhetoric and 
rhetorical criticism can work hand in hand to discover specific means by which rhetors 
actively attempt to create national identity.  Previously, many constitutive theorists have 
shied away from focusing on singular texts, choosing instead to look at collections of 
texts, movements, or time frames.  Those who have focused on singular texts have put 
most of the power in the hands of the audience as opposed to the rhetor, creating a small 
controversy.  White‘s theory of constitutive rhetoric is the closest to a methodology that 
gives agency back to the rhetor that we have, but White wrote specifically in regards to 
legal rhetoric.  My interest is in constitutive rhetoric of a broader scope.   
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First and foremost, this study is based on the assumption that national identity is 
constructed.  The major text for starting such a discussion is Benedict Anderson‘s 
Imagined Communities.
6
  Anderson laid the groundwork for scholars to think and 
discuss nations (and other groups) as socially and rhetorically constructed.  Scholars 
such as Vanessa Beasley have spent years writing about the intersection of political 
rhetoric and national identity.
7
  For scholars of many fields this is relatively well-trodden 
ground.  The goal of this project is not to re-trace their work but to explore new 
possibilities in method by providing case studies that highlight differing ways that 
identity is rhetorically constructed.
8
 
This study focuses on the year 1954.  This work investigates American identity 
in the sense that it is a changing, not static idea.  I am not pinpointing ―identity in 1954,‖ 
but using 1954 as my example of its constant state of flux and illustrative of the way in 
which combining theory and practice can help us understand the ways in which rhetors 
actively seek to manage identity.  The case studies I have chosen all demonstrate the 
increasing tension between fractured identities and homogeneity.   
The connection between theory and practice is an important one for scholars to 
consider because, while theory may contextualize, it is in criticism that we apply theory 
and make it practical.  Rhetorical criticism is at the heart of rhetorical studies, but is 
often relegated to smaller works.  I feel combining criticism in the tradition of White 
with theory allows me to expand criticism to a point that I can use it as a tool to add to 
the ongoing scholarly conversation about constitutive rhetoric.  I will introduce the case 
studies that I have chosen and explain the contribution to scholarship that this project 
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makes.  Using the backdrop of the tension between modernity and postmodernity that 
permeated the Cold War, I will apply criticism to the theory behind constitutive rhetoric.  
While certainly each case is unique they are all contextualized similarly by the Cold 
War.  However, because they are each representative of a particular theoretical tension, 
the conflict between modernity and postmodernity, they come together to form a 
coherent picture of a nation in conflict with itself.  In rhetorical terms, each of these 
events is on some level reacting to a changing understanding of audience, which is 
important to note because it connects constitutive theory and postmodernity in this 
instance.   
Because constitutive theory deals so much with the way an audience rhetorically 
constructs itself, a change in audience has a profound impact on identity at large.  If, as 
constitutive theorists have described, a rhetor is trying to call an audience into being, 
then the tension between modernity and postmodernity creates an extra level of 
difficulty.  Marginalized groups that had once been relegated to the proverbial sidelines, 
or worse, silenced, were clamoring to include themselves in the mainstream, national 
―audience‖ while rhetors were actively trying to reconstruct it, making the constitutive 
process a road fraught with obstacles.  Rhetors engaged in constitutive rhetoric were 
trying to construct unified audiences, but the audience was becoming more and more 
decentered and fractured.  Rhetors not only had to contend with the challenges and 
vagaries of nationalism, but the changing global philosophies that organized the 
narratives we had previously used to understand the world around us.  During the Cold 
War, groups that were once marginalized were demanding to be recognized as 
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―American.‖  The notion of a universal audience was weakening as African-Americans 
and women tried to include themselves under the umbrella category of American.  New 
and powerful enemies with opposing philosophies were gaining headway and 
threatening our perceived ideological superiority.  Things at home were not as quiet and 
stable as some would have liked. 
Postmodernity 
 Max Weber‘s 1918 lecture ―Science as a Vocation‖ applauded the connection 
between progress and scientific advancement. Weber believed there was an inherent link 
to the scientific process and human advancement.
9
  Such a faith in science and progress 
was a hallmark of modernity.  Robert Latham, a political science scholar, claims that 
there were many strains of modernity and to try to define it is nigh impossible because of 
its innumerable dimensions.  One problem, he argues, is the ―sheer heterogeneity of 
modernity.‖10  He claims that ―one common element is the recognition that an important 
dimension in the making and sustaining of modern reorganization of forms of large-scale 
human agency associated with such phenomena as rational administration, mass 
movements, and scientific endeavor.‖11  That is, modernity came in many forms all over 
the world – socialist, fascist, the liberal market of the US – but each had the 
commonalities of thinking in large-scale, progressive, and international terms.  Also, 
each version of modernity presented itself as rational and enlightened.  The global 
manifestations of modernity paved the way for international turmoil because different 
nations were vying to show their version of modernity as superior. 
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 Jean-François Lyotard, who coined the word postmodern, described something 
that was not just after modernity, but a break from modern thinking.  He believed this 
incredulity is a product of scientific and technological advancement.
12
  Lyotard called 
things like capitalism, communism, and even religion, Grand (or Meta) Narratives.  He 
described these narratives as the ones that had marked modernity and most dealt with a 
rational means of perfection or emancipation from doubt.  These narratives helped us 
make sense of the world around us.
13
  They also legitimized social and institutional 
norms, so any failure of these narratives could lead to a profound change in the status 
quo.
14
  Postmodernity, he claimed, is a crisis of faith, or incredulity, in the Grand 
Narratives.  And the Grand Narratives were looking less and less assured, giving way to 
a number of smaller narratives.   
He felt that this fracturing had a profound impact on our understanding of 
identity.  He asked, ―What constitutes this we?...The question asks whether this we is or 
is not independent of the Idea of a history of humanity.‖  Lyotard felt this question must 
be asked in relation to human history and the grand narratives.  If, he argued, it was 
decided that ―human history is no longer credible as a universal history of 
emancipation,‖ then our understanding of ―we,‖ those who ask the question, must also 
be revised.  Frederic Jameson and Jean Baudrillard also pointed out the importance of 
technology in these instances.  The glut of information and media that increased with 
each new technological leap brought new questions for the Metanarratives.  As 
technology increased, there was simply more information for people to sift through, 
leading to a lack of clarity and unity in sociocultural norms.
15
  Lyotard felt, like many 
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other theorists, that language was at the heart of the crisis of modernity and the transition 
to postmodernity.  It is through language that we work out way through these questions.  
Part of this game is defining identity.
16
 
No one, not even the least privileged among us, is ever entirely powerless over 
the messages that traverse and position him at the post of the sender, addressee, 
or referent.  One‘s mobility in relation to these language game effects (language 
games, of course, are what this is all about) is tolerable, at least within certain 
limits (and the limits are vague): it is even solicited by regulatory mechanisms, 
and in particular by the self-adjustments the system undertakes in order to 
improve its performance.  It may even be said that the system can and must 
encourage such movement to the extent that it combats its own entropy: the 
novelty of an unexpected ―move,‖ with its correlative displacement of a partner 
or group of partners, can supply the system with that increased performativity it 
forever demands and consumes.   
 
In short, in order for a group of people to function they use language to forever 
move and re-define their understandings of themselves and their relationships to 
others.
17
  It is the power of words and language, the symbols we use to manipulate our 
realities, which define our identities and our relationships.  Language is constitutive, 
according to Lyotard, lending a certain amount of support to White‘s understanding of 
constitutive rhetoric. 
Finally, Lyotard explained that these games and the results came from ―the 
people.‖  He called ―the people‖ the hero of the game and claimed that the sign of 
legitimacy is the people‘s consensus.  We deliberate and we decide and we establish 
norms through narrative, law, politics, or art.  Because this process does not take place in 
a cultural vacuum we should not be at all surprised that ―the people should be at the 
same time actively involved in destroying the traditional knowledge of peoples, 
perceived from that point forward as minorities or potential separatist movements 
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destined only to spread obscurantism.‖18  On the one hand, it is the people who are 
deciding who they are and structuring their own relationships.  The people try to unify 
narratives as they progress by creating a unified identity.  On the other hand, as the 
world globalizes and science and knowledge advance, that unity becomes scarce and 
those groups that were once cast aside are given a chance to try and re-ingratiate 
themselves to the group at large. 
Lyotard‘s description of postmodernism brings together the identity issues of the 
Cold War, the importance of language in the construction of identity, and the context of 
my case studies.  Using postmodernity as a background to explain the shift in thinking 
about identity, I hope to analyze how people attempted to make the shift through public 
discourse.  As I noted before, American identity is constantly in flux.  The case studies I 
have chosen are all, on some level, symptoms of this larger issue.  As America had to 
join the rest of the Western world in re-thinking norms and values, the way we thought 
about ourselves had to be fleshed out a bit as well.  These cases simply represent various 
rhetorics that tried to address the changing understanding of American identity in the 
face of new, postmodern understandings. 
1954 
 In the period between the World Wars, America was largely an isolationist 
country.  We had discovered in the trenches and mustard gas of World War I that war is, 
indeed, hell, leaving the United States wary of involving itself with other countries in 
any way.  After the attack on Pearl Harbor there was a dawning realization that America 
could not isolate itself.  The world was getting smaller.  And the profound hope in 
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human progress that began in the Enlightenment turned into a profound horror at what 
humanity was capable of.  The more we learned about gas chambers in Europe and the 
horrors we inflicted on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in the following years, the more some 
began to question whether real progress had been made, or if as a people we had become 
something monstrous.  However, this entrance into the war and global politics did not 
engage America the way it engaged Europe.  Other than Pearl Harbor the violence of 
WWII did not touch American soil.  Our cities were not ravaged the way that much of 
Europe was.  We entered the war late and we sent our soldiers away instead of fighting 
at home, so we missed much of the horror of WWII. 
19
 
 When the war ended for Europe and Asia they had to turn their efforts to 
repairing cities and economies and burying the millions of dead.  America mourned our 
soldiers, but returned to a thriving economy and cities that were intact and growing.  
Those soldiers that survived the war came home and reaped the benefits of the GI Bill, 
the emerging suburbs, and gave us the Baby Boom.  So America remained optimistic 
about the future, while Europe began a dark re-assessment of the state of humanity.   
However, America was not without its own crises to deal with.  As international 
relationships clarified themselves, Americans found a new enemy to contend with: 
Communism.  Americans feared this foreign influence as much as any enemy from wars 
past, and spent decades keeping the perceived Communist threat at bay.  The arms race 
went into full swing, reminding the world that were there to be another war, the levels of 
destruction would reach heights unimagined by previous generations.   
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Cold War rhetoric was set up around one god term and one devil term, as 
Richard Weaver describes them: American and Communist.
20
  A singular narrative and 
solid definitions are much more efficient and rational than fragmented ideas – and 
efficiency and rationality are the ultimate goals of modernity.  Many Americans feared 
any fracturing of America‘s public face because it might weaken them in their fight 
against Communism.  America, many believed, needed a united front not only 
politically, but ideologically and culturally.  But by 1954 the country was showing signs 
that the singular narrative, a single and unified definition of American, was beginning to 
fracture.  Minorities who had fought in the war expected the full benefits of citizenship.  
Many of the women who answered the call of Rosie the Riveter discovered they enjoyed 
being outside of the home and partaking in both production and consumption.  Such 
challenges led others to push back and try to maintain balance and order by maintaining 
the status quo as they understood it.   
Many of the news-worthy events of 1954 perfectly illustrate the tension 
surrounding public understanding of the word American.  This is not to say that 1954 
was somehow more important than 1953 or 1957 or any other year.  It is, however, 
representative of an era in which ideas concerning national identity were converging and 
conflicting. 
Focusing on one year sets up clean and neat parameters for my study.  It so 
happened that in 1954 there was a good deal going on that directly addressed my 
research question, and did so from a variety of different perspectives.  Also, these 
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incidents address the idea of ―American‖ directly.  There is not a great deal of 
interpretive work necessary to connect the incidents in question to my research interests. 
Some years are simply noteworthy for the quantity of news they produce.  For 
example, I once knew an editor who claimed that 1969 would have been the best year 
ever to be a journalist simply because of the size of the stories that year produced.  In 
1969 there was the moon landing, Woodstock, and the Manson Murders, all within a few 
months of each other.  When it comes to addressing American identity, 1954 is a great 
year to study for its illustrative properties.  The challenge was choosing which incidents 
from 1954 to address.  I could easily have written on the response to Elvis, who began 
his career in 1954, or the introduction of the term ―domino effect‖ by Dwight D. 
Eisenhower.  In this project I chose to write about the first dated issue of Playboy, but I 
easily could have chosen to write about Sports Illustrated, which made its debut in 1954.  
The year simply lends itself to a discussion of American identity. 
Of course this raises the question of why I chose the incidents that I did.  Brown 
v. Board struck me as a useful beginning because it dealt with one of the most 
historically divisive parts of American identity: race.  In the first half of American 
history, race could define whether you were seen as a whole person, let alone an 
American.  In fact, the infamous ―Three-Fifth‘s Compromise‖ of 1787 was struck 
specifically to deal with that problem.  For the purposes of census and representation 
slaves would count for 3/5 of a person when tallying an area‘s population.  African-
Americans did not even count as entire human beings, let alone take part in being 
―American.‖  Then before the radical changes of the Civil Rights movement many 
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blacks were still barred from taking part in those basic rights guaranteed to all 
Americans thanks to Jim Crow legislation throughout the South.  The Brown v. Board 
case of 1954 was a public effort to address the difference between being a black 
American and an American in the year 1954.  Of all of the cases I study this one might 
be the most historically significant.  As America pushed farther and farther into the 20
th
 
century race would be an increasingly prominent issue.  Brown v. Board is one of the 
major battles in the struggle for racial equality that defined so much of the last half of the 
20
th
 century. 
The decision to include a chapter on the Welch-McCarthy incident that took 
place during the Army-McCarthy hearings took a bit more consideration.  It seemed 
clear that I needed some chapter that directly addressed the Cold War, since all of my 
chapters are products of the Cold War.  I would be remiss to discuss the year 1954 and 
not deal with the fact that America was terrified of Communism.  Ultimately, this is the 
reason for both the Pledge chapter and the McCarthy chapter.  But I felt compelled to 
include McCarthy simply because he has become a rather ubiquitous character.  We 
accuse a person whose tactics we question of ―McCarthyism‖ and his name is 
synonymous with the Red Scare that defined the first part of the Cold War.  Plenty of 
American politicians began their careers as Communist fighters.  But Joe McCarthy‘s 
career was such that when most people think of the Cold War and the Red Scare, they 
think Joe McCarthy.  I could just as easily point to Ronald Reagan or Richard Nixon, but 
Joe McCarthy‘s public antics made him a permanent fixture in an American 
understanding of the Cold War.  To date, most work in communication studies dealing 
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with McCarthy has dealt with the Edward R. Murrow‘s televised attacks on McCarthy 
and his reaction.  I chose to look at an equally important, but less studied moment in 
order to add to the scholarly conversation.  I chose the Welch-McCarthy exchange in the 
Army-McCarthy hearings because it signaled the fall of one of America‘s most 
recognizable demagogues. 
The second instance that deals with the anti-Communist furor in the US that I 
chose to address was the decision to add ―under God‖ to the Pledge of Allegiance.  
Whereas the McCarthy incident was particular to him and the men involved in the 
hearing, the Pledge of Allegiance affected a much broader swath of Americans on a day 
to day basis.  The Pledge was a much subtler weapon in the ―hearts and minds‖ 
campaign against Communism.  The Pledge is a powerful rhetorical tool not just then, 
but today as well.  It is a mainstay in public schools and one of the most explicit 
definitions of American that is acceptable across the board.  Any change in the recitation 
of the Pledge indicates an environment that was dealing with an identity crisis. 
Finally, I wanted to include a chapter that dealt with popular culture more than 
politics or law.  Popular culture is at least as important, if not more so, than politics and 
the news in understanding American identity.  Popular culture is more pervasive and 
many more Americans are literate in pop culture trivia than political news.  I chose 
Playboy not only because 1954 was its inaugural year, but few pop culture symbols are 
as recognizable (both at home and abroad) as the Playboy bunny.  Few American 
establishments have become as synonymous with American culture as Playboy.  The 
magazine has been one of the most popular American publications here and 
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internationally for decades.  The ―bunny‖ is almost as recognizable as Disney‘s ―Mickey 
Mouse Ears‖ or McDonald‘s ―Golden Arches.‖  Since Playboy has become a symbol of 
American life, I felt it sensible to include it in an analysis of the ways in which we 
construct American identity. 
Much has been said about sexism and gender construction in Playboy, and recent 
studies have provided new and provocative treatments of Playboy‘s philosophy as one of 
consumption.  However, there has not been a good deal of attention given to the 
connection between Playboy and national identity.  Ultimately, all of these things work 
together to create the final product that the world knows as Playboy.  To try and 
completely understand the magazine outside of gender or consumption or nationalism 
would strip it of its pop culture power.  However, I do not wish to re-hash well-trodden 
ground.  My work focuses on the connection between Playboy and national identity in an 
effort to create a more nuanced understanding of the work as a whole. 
I chose to focus on the first article from the first issue of 1954.  The issue was not 
chosen arbitrarily, though the content of the article is convenient enough to make it 
seems as though it might have been chosen simply for its fit with my interest.  The 
article strikes me as significant because the January 1954 issue of Playboy is a particular 
triumph for Hefner.  The issue before, December 1953, was a gamble, and Hefner had 
gone all in.  He had put his entire life into that magazine, and the January 1954 issue was 
proof that there was a possibility for a pay-off.  The December 1953 issue sold well 
enough that Hefner knew he could extend the project beyond that first magazine, hence 
putting a date on the second issue.  It was a small mark of success.  If that issue of the 
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magazine symbolized his success, then it stands to reason that his editorial choice of 
what to put as the first article is interesting, if not significant.  Hefner, unlike other nudie 
magazines, intended his consumers to actually read the articles.  So I chose to analyze 
the first thing Hefner wanted his readers to read once he believed his magazine had some 
staying power. 
Rhetorical Artifacts and Literature 
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas 
 For decades Blacks had been official citizens of the United States but did not 
have the rights that accompanied legal citizenship.  They were, for all intents and 
purposes, not really Americans.  While Brown v. Board certainly did not reverse this 
practice, it was a very public comment on the appropriateness and legality of it.  The 
highest court in the land pronounced that one of the major tools used to keep blacks from 
enjoying the benefits of being American, a second-rate education, was un-constitutional.  
This was a radical step towards incorporating African Americans completely into the 
American experience. 
 Danielle S. Allen specifically addresses how this case affected ideas of American 
citizenship in Talking to Strangers:  Anxieties of Citizenship Since Brown v. Board of 
Education.
21
  For a more legally focused treatment of Brown v. Board, Jack Balkin‘s 
What Brown v. Board of Education Should Have Said  presents of a collection of essays 
in which legal experts address the decision and how it might have been communicated or 
decided differently.  The idea in most of the essays is that the social science evidence 
should not have been a part of the case at all and it should have been decided strictly 
 23 
based on Constitutional law.  The essays present arguments that arrive at the same 
conclusion but from different topoi.
22
  Paul Wilson, in A Time to Lose attempts to 
contextualize the argument and explain it from a legal standpoint.  Wilson‘s version of 
the story is interesting in that he was a lawyer for Kansas.  Wilson‘s argument is simple 
and based solely on legal precedent.  Much of his narrative is apologetic that his case 
was not more impressive, but to him the case seemed cut and dry.  Separation was legal 
based on precedent, so there was nothing amiss.
23
   
Oliver Brown, in Argument: the Oral Argument Before the Supreme Court in 
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 1952-1955 dissects the decision in a methodical 
and legal fashion.  He gives a history of the case then takes the reader through the 
reasoning of both sides of the argument and the opinion of the court.
24
  Clarke Rountree 
provides a specifically rhetorically oriented collection in Brown v. Board of Education at 
Fifty: A Rhetorical Perspective.  While his work is useful as an example of how to 
approach legal rhetoric as rhetoric, it does not approach legal rhetoric as constitutive.
25
  
Though these works provide an excellent background and explanation of the legality of 
the decision, none of them view it as constitutive rhetoric. 
This study will analyze the decision itself, and not the public response 
surrounding the decision.  I will depend largely on the works of White who argues that 
the law is a specific form of constitutive rhetoric, and his student Lewis H. LaRue who 
extends the discussion to include Supreme Court opinions.
26
  The goal is to understand 
the way the court understood what it meant to be an American and how they made a 
constitutive argument for Blacks to be included under the umbrella category of 
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―American.‖  White explains that the law is a branch of rhetoric – it is persuasion; 
specifically, it is constitutive rhetoric, ―for through its forms of language and of life the 
law constitutes a world of meaning and action: it creates a set of actors and speakers and 
offers them possibilities for meaningful speech and action that would not otherwise 
exist; in so doing it establishes and maintains a community, defined by its practices of 
language.‖27  The language of the law helps construct our notions of citizenship.  If the 
overall question of this study is how we create identity, such a landmark case is useful 
because it directly addresses the way in which we viewed ourselves in the year 1954.  
The Brown v. Board case lead to an official (if perhaps not perfectly applied) rejection of 
the notion of ―separate but equal.‖  The court‘s decision, if viewed constitutively, was a 
radical and divergent interpretation of what an American is.  Using the court‘s decision I 
intend to examine the way in which the notion of ―American‖ began to change from the 
prevailing norm.   
The Brown v. Board case directly gets to the heart of my research interests in that 
the Court was faced with a situation in which they had to make two separate arguments: 
1) education was a right guaranteed to all Americans and 2) segregated education was 
unconstitutional because it was an infringement on the right to an education.  It was a 
bold position to take, and certainly the political and legal aftermath were history making.  
There have been countless studies of the case and the politics and legal issues that 
followed, and there have even been studies that took a rhetorical perspective when 
analyzing the case.  However, my study is the first that uses Brown v. Board as a piece 
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of constitutive rhetoric.  Using a close reading I am able to analyze the Court‘s opinion 
as a rhetorical artifact that aims to intentionally constitute American identity. 
McCarthy 
One of the most prominent public figures of the early Cold War was Senator Joe 
McCarthy.  McCarthy‘s entire career was based on defining American – specifically 
who got to be called American and who did not.  McCarthy spent years trying to parse 
out for Americans who was and was not ―one of us.‖  How he managed (or did not 
manage) to do so is critical to any understanding of the Cold War.  
Much work has been done on McCarthy‘s exchange with Edward Murrow, but 
much less attention has been paid to the Army-McCarthy hearings. 
28
 This is a valuable 
source for constitutive rhetoric, because McCarthy‘s entire career was based on rooting 
out those among his fellow citizens who were ―un-American.‖  He utilized xenophobia, 
fear of Communism, racism, and any number of other public tensions in his crusade to 
root out Communist influences in the government.   
―Flickering Images: Live Television Coverage and Viewership of the Army-
McCarthy Hearings‖ by Michael Gauger in Historian, 2005 and ―Are you Now or Have 
You Ever Been?  Opening the Record of the McCarthy Investigations‖ by Donald 
Ritchie in the Journal of Government Information, 2004, are both useful studies on the 
Army-McCarthy hearings.
29
  These works deal with media and political issues, and do 
not address the event from a rhetorical perspective, but they are helpful as background 
sources and are quite useful in understanding how far-reaching the hearings were at the 
time.  Studies more pertinent to this project include ―TV, Technology, and 
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McCarthyism: Crafting the Democratic Renaissance in an Age of Fear,‖ by Paul Achter 
and 1955‘s ―Views on the Army-McCarthy Hearings,‖ by Frederick Haberman.30  
Achter‘s study gives a brief history of McCarthy‘s career then analyzes the effect of 
television; however, Achter focuses on the Murrow exchange.  Understanding the 
atmosphere at the time and McCarthy‘s tenuous position helps contextualize the power 
of Welch‘s words.  Haberman‘s paper is an analysis of the Army-McCarthy hearings 
through a contemporary lens.  Haberman writes as a viewer at the time. 
Michael Straight also explores the effect that television had on the Army-
McCarthy hearings in Trial by Television, focusing on the same idea that some of the 
Murrow studies have.
31
  Straight believes that had the Army-McCarthy hearings not 
been televised McCarthy‘s career would have been much longer.  William Bragg 
Edwald, Jr. gives an interpretation of the trials and McCarthy‘s downfall based on 
accounts recorded during the Army-McCarthy hearings in Who Killed Joe McCarthy?
32
  
Edwald takes more than just the media into account and ascribes some of the 
responsibility to McCarthy, Welch, and Murrow themselves. 
This study will focus on the Army-McCarthy hearings in 1954.  I will analyze the 
rhetoric of the hearings, focusing on the Welch/McCarthy confrontation.  I will include 
discussions of conspiracy rhetoric and the role that it played in organizing the entire 
event.  More than almost any other public figure, McCarthy is associated with the 
paranoia of the Cold War in the American imagination.  His extreme tactics are their 
own adjective – when we describe someone as a ―new McCarthy‖ or engaged in 
―McCarthyism‖ we know that this individual is so engrossed in their own cause that the 
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general rules of ethics and good behavior no longer apply.  McCarthy is in this study 
because, for good or for ill, his name will forever be synonymous with the Cold War.   
McCarthy spent his career proverbially separating the wheat from the chaff.  He 
based his public service on setting up dividing lines between Communists and the 
quality Americans that the enemy was here to corrupt.  This moment is McCarthy‘s last, 
great failure.  His methods had already been publically questioned and some were 
beginning to doubt that he was the strident savior the American people had been looking 
for.  In this moment we see McCarthy‘s failed constitutive rhetoric.  As Michael Lee 
notes, the ―identity of the ‗people‘ is constitutive as much by their rhetorical opposite as 
by the construction of shared characteristics.  In fact, the rhetorical development of the 
‗people‘ and their enemy is a symbiotic process,‖ and while McCarthy tried desperately 
to create an ―us‖ and ―them,‖ his ultimate failure was outing himself as a sort of 
―them.‖33  The nation ultimately saw him a nothing but a bully, and his lack of 
credibility stripped him of his ability to constitute any kind of American identity.  
The Pledge of Allegiance 
The Pledge of Allegiance is one of the most important pieces of epideictic 
rhetoric in America.  Epideictic rhetoric is, by definition, supposed to affirm the norms 
and values of a culture.  It is ceremonial and involves not just a speaker in front of an 
audience, but a communal activity.
34
  A significant change in ceremonial rhetoric 
reflects some tension or crisis in that culture that required some kind of public and 
ceremonial comment on identity.
35
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  For many students each day begins with a recitation of the Pledge – and in 
previous decades this was even more common than it is today.  The whole point of the 
pledge is to emphasize American unity.  The Pledge is a description of those qualities 
that are ―American,‖ like ―liberty and justice for all.‖  The Pledge of Allegiance is 
especially pertinent to understanding ―American‖ because in 1954 the phrase ―under 
God‖ was added. 
One work of particular interest to this study is John Murphy‘s ―‗Our Mission and 
Our Moment‘: George W Bush and September 11th.‖  I point to Murphy‘s work as 
helpful in framing my argument because he makes similar connections between the 
functions of constitutive rhetoric and epideictic rhetoric in his analysis of Bush‘s post 9-
11 speeches.  Murphy uses Generic criticism to assess the way in which the president 
attempted to rhetorically bring the nation together through the power of epideictic 
rhetoric.  However, as implied by the fact that he worked with Generic criticism, 
Murphy worked with a collection of speeches as opposed to one text.  My choice to 
analyze the Pledge of Allegiance as a singular piece of epideictic rhetoric as opposed to 
part of a group sets this study apart from Murphy‘s work.36 
Richard J. Ellis‘s history of the Pledge of Allegiance is an indispensable aid to 
one wanting to study the Pledge.  It is a lively narrative of the history of the Pledge of 
Allegiance that is both thorough and enjoyable to read.
37
  Also, Patrick Allit‘s Religion 
in American since 1954: A History helps to understand the context under which the 
Pledge was changed.
38
  It describes the religious climate of the Cold War, which is 
helpful in understanding the rhetorical forces that defined American identity.  For a more 
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contextual story of American religion in the Cold War specifically, Will Herberg‘s 
Protestant Catholic Jew: An Essay in American Religious Sociology is a provocative 
study of American spirituality.
39
  However, none of these works approaches the pledge 
as a piece of rhetoric, and more specifically, constitutive rhetoric.   
While some have tried to argue that the change was in recognition of the 
―Christian‖ nature of the nation, the official argument to add the phrase was focused on 
Communism.  The Pledge of Allegiance was an affirmation of what it meant to be an 
American – and Communism, the opposite of ―American‖ was ―godless.‖  The major 
argument presented in Congress in favor of changing the Pledge was that the Pledge as it 
was originally was not specifically American.  More than one Congressman claimed 
that, if the Pledge remained unchanged, it could even be misconstrued as a pledge to a 
Communist flag.
40
  But, the proposal went, adding the phrase ―under God‖ indicated that 
this pledge could not be Communist, because the Communist government was atheistic.  
The Pledge was a daily process for millions of Americans.  School children and teachers 
began every day with a proclamation of their devotion to this symbol of America, 
complete with an explanation of that meant.  The Pledge of Allegiance is probably the 
most direct and obvious comment on the quality of ―American‖ of all of my examples 
because of its direct rhetoric and mass reach.   
As opposed to Brown v. Board‘s attempt to redefine American, changing the 
pledge was an attempt to affirm an assumed identity.  In the face of the perceived 
Communist threat the governing bodies felt it was necessary to maintain a clear notion 
of who Americans were.  As much of the Cold War was rhetorical, having a clearly 
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defined ―us and them‖ was essential.  The Pledge of Allegiance was a rhetorical strategy 
to re-affirm an assumed notion of American.  This chapter will analyze the constitutive 
nature of the pledge, specifically as a piece of epideictic rhetoric. 
Playboy Magazine 
 Playboy Magazine was in its first year of publication in 1954, and sales were 
sky-rocketing each month.  Hugh Hefner began publishing Playboy in December 1953, 
not knowing whether it would succeed, and within a matter of weeks the magazine was a 
hit.  Hefner‘s ―Playboy‖ was a man of taste and panache.  In Hefner‘s eyes a playboy 
was defined as much by his ability to consume and enjoy the world around him as he 
was by his sexual conquests. 
Lizabeth Cohen describes the relationship between consumption and citizenship 
that Hefner specifically wanted to address.  Being a true American was becoming more 
and more associated with the ability to consume.  She claims that through things like the 
eight hour work day and minimum wage more people had a fair shot at consumption, 
which seemed to correlate with full rights as citizens.
41
  Playboy offered a vision of 
American masculinity that positioned men as consumers, positioning themselves as more 
powerful in both the public and domestic spheres.  The magazine offered advice on 
clothes, cars, technology, and women.  Hefner‘s publication encouraged a certain 
amount of conspicuous consumption in an effort to cultivate the ideal man.  Once again, 
my intention is not to repeat the work of scholars that have gone before me.  Gender and 
consumption are fine avenues are study for Playboy, but I fear I could add nothing new 
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to that conversation.  However, little has been said on Playboy and nationalism and 
constitutive rhetoric. 
There are a number of works that give a history of Playboy, many of which are 
entertaining, but hardly scholarly.  Frank Brady‘s Hefner and Russel Miller‘s Bunny: 
The Real Story of Playboy are useful popular works, but if one is going to use non-
scholarly sources, the most useful was Steven Watts‘s Mr. Playboy: Hugh Hefner and 
the American Dream.
42
  I say it was the most useful because of all of the ―story of‖ type 
books about Hefner, it meshed best with more transitional titles (popular works that 
relied heavily on a great deal of research) such as Susan Gunelius‘s Building Brand 
Value the Playboy Way and academic works like Elizabeth Fraterrigo‘s ―Playboy‖ and 
the Making of the Good Life in Modern America.  They all focused on Hefner‘s interest 
in what he saw as the connection between what it meant to be a true American success 
and the importance of consumption.
43
  
 While articles like Cohen‘s and Fraterrigo‘s work ―Entertainment for Men‖ are 
useful and deal with American identity, the most useful commentary comes from 
Playboy itself.  In The Philosophy of Playboy Hefner lays out his own understanding of 
who America is, and who America is supposed to be.
44
  Viewing the magazine as 
intentionally persuasive will provide a unique view of the tension surrounding what it 
means to be American. 
 Of all of my rhetorical artifacts the opening article, a fiction piece, from the 
January 1954 Playboy was the most surprising.  The article addresses my research 
question almost as directly as the Pledge of Allegiance because the entire piece is based 
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on the question, ―What must I do to fulfill my duty as an American?‖  The main 
character asks the question in the very beginning, and spends the entirety of the story 
trying to answer it for himself.  The narrative is interesting, however, because the main 
character is exactly the opposite of what Hugh Hefner thought of as ideal.  Hefner 
employs simple narrative tactics and irony to create a picture of American in his first 
article of 1954. 
 I should note that while one might hope a chapter on Playboy might be a 
rollicking read about sex or a controversial foray into gender studies, since I have put so 
much stock into the ideas of Hefner himself, the chapter may disappoint initial 
expectations.  Hefner‘s ideas on American identity deal as much with individualism and 
consumption, or so he writes in his manifesto The Philosophy of Playboy.  Sex, Hefner 
implies, is a part of that philosophy, but not the only goal of a playboy. 
A Brief Explanation of Methodology 
This project is a textual analysis of four case studies from the year 1954 that were 
integral in rhetorically constructing the term ―American.‖ Using these cases I illustrate 
how rhetorical criticism can be useful in assessing constitutive rhetoric.  In essence, I am 
investigating how we construct identity in specific texts, as opposed to what that identity 
is.  Previous studies of constitutive rhetoric have focused on the theoretical framework 
outlined by Maurice Charland and Michael McGee.  However, by bolstering that 
understanding with James Boyd White‘s more criticism-based approach one can find an 
inlet to constitutive criticism as well as theory.  This study aims to illustrate how such a 
project would look.   
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Any study dealing with national identity must begin with Benedict Anderson‘s 
germinal Imagined Communities.  Hans Kohn does similar work in his historical study 
of the development of nationalism.  Kohn investigates the ramifications of nationalism in 
his work, asking what is the importance of a thing like nationalism.
45
  Other scholars, 
like John Armstrong, have guided the scholarly dialogue in understanding the difference 
between patriotism, identity, and history, as well.
46
  Homi K. Bhaba‘s work on ―nations‖ 
dealt with the importance of narratives in the creation of identity, which is essential in 
understanding the function of constitutive rhetoric.
47
  Priscilla Wald investigates similar 
ideas, and her work operates on a level not completely dissimilar from my own in that 
she consistently tries to connect context, structure, theory, and criticism; though she does 
so as a historiographer.
48
  Ernest Gellner‘s work on the relationship between nations, 
identity, and nationalism is similar but not so specifically focused on narrative.
49
   
Michael L. Bruner‘s Strategy of Remembrance: The Rhetorical Dimensions of 
National Identity Construction is a useful book in understanding the process of the 
rhetorical construction of identity, though his work does not deal with American 
identity.  He largely echoes the ideas of Anderson, Charland, and McGee in describing 
how a nation creates itself via politics and rhetoric.
50
  An interesting and somewhat 
unique perspective on constitutive rhetoric comes from Robert Stephen Reid in his 2004 
essay ―Being Baptist.‖  While many have focused on national identity, Reid chose to 
focus on the rhetorical construction of his religious identity, which is useful to compare 
and contrast to the more politically oriented works cited in this project.  He concludes 
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that any number of identities are shaped by rhetoric, and those constructed identities 
effect how we speak, think, and even the construction of other identities.
51
 
Mary Stuckey‘s work has been indispensible to the constitutive rhetoric 
conversation.  Her article ―One Nation (Pretty Darn) Divisible‖ provides a look at the 
function of constitutive rhetoric in a current and accessible context.  That being said, her 
work on the rhetorical presidency and her research as an American historical rhetoric 
scholar has provided invaluable guidance in how to approach the idea of constitutive 
rhetoric.
52
  Equally useful is Vanessa Beasley‘s body of work dealing with the 
construction of the people via presidential rhetoric.
53
  However Stuckey and Beasley, 
due to the nature of their topics ideas look at collections of texts, whereas this project 
positions itself as illustrating how rhetorical criticism can highlight constitutive rhetoric 
within a single text. 
Helen Tate‘s work ―The Ideological Effects of a Failed Constitutive Rhetoric: 
The Co-Option of the Rhetoric of White Lesbian Feminism‖ and Christina Morus‘s ―The 
SANU Memorandum: Intellectual Authority and the Constitution of an Exclusive 
Serbian ‗People‘‖ work within the framework set up by Charland.54  These works also 
deal with creating identity for a social movement.
55
  A social movement is a large, 
uninstitutionalized but organized collectivity, that ―promotes or opposes social change in 
societal norms and values‖ and often ―encounters opposition in a moral struggle.‖56  My 
work focuses on the Cold War, but by that definition the Cold War is not a social 
movement.  The Cold War is larger in scope.  It is more of a political event and climate.  
The Cold War is not an organized, uninstitutionalized group, and while there are a 
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number of ―moral struggles,‖ it is not organized enough to fit the social movement 
definition.  Like these, a number of constitutive works, including Charland‘s, deal with 
social movements.  My work deviates from that pattern by not only focusing on a 
singular text outside of a social movement, as few have, but by doing so in the manner of 
White. 
Charland‘s explanation of constitutive rhetoric begins with Michael McGee‘s 
concept that ―people,‖ or the identity of a people, is an imagined, rhetorical construct.57  
The identity is steeped in the values and beliefs of a culture, which are a part of Benedict 
Anderson‘s Imagined Communities.  This collective vision that the rhetor helps create is 
a political myth that requires the audience, a group of individuals, to willingly partake in 
the collective – they must become the people that the rhetor describes.58  Derek Sweet 
and Margret McCue-Enser follow in McGee‘s footsteps in calling this an ―artificial 
identity,‖ but if one takes Anderson‘s work seriously, and then identity itself is 
imagined, not artificial.  It is the clearest example of the reality of a rhetorically 
constructed identity as Charland has described: we create identity and that identity is 
true.
59
 
 Charland claims that an audience in constitutive rhetoric is extrarhetorical.  The 
members of the group do not exist in nature, but within a discursively constituted 
history.  Cynthia Duquette Smith explains that ―a constitutive understanding of rhetoric 
emerges out of a recognition that existing approaches to the ‗audience‘ in rhetorical 
studies are unsatisfying because they tend to take the audience as a given.‖60  In other 
words, to simply assume that the nature of the audience is one way and not another is 
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problematic.  Constitutive rhetoric is the tool by which those audiences become.  ―Thus, 
this rhetoric paradoxically must constitute the identity‖ while it ―simultaneously 
presumes it to be pregiven and natural, existing outside of rhetoric and forming the basis 
for a rhetorical address.‖  The audience and the rhetor must behave as if the identity 
already existed, so that there is an opportunity to fashion that identity rhetorically.  Or, 
as Sweet and McCue-Enser explained, rhetoric is an inventive act.   
Subjects within constitutive narratives are constrained by their position, and the 
endings are fixed.
61
  Constitutive rhetoric leaves the job of narrative closure to the 
constituted subjects.
62
  But first, in order to position oneself within the narrative, one 
must already be a subject within the narrative.  That is, ―one must already be a subject in 
order to be addressed or to speak.‖63  Charland explains: 
Constitutive rhetorics of new subject positions can be understood, 
therefore, as working upon previous discourses, upon previous 
constitutive rhetorics.  They capture alienated subjects by rearticulating 
existing subject positions so as to contain or resolve experience 
dialectical contradictions between the world and its discourses.
64
 
 
 In these cases the ―already‖ subject position is ―American.‖  Each of 
these rhetorical instances illustrates an attempt to define American, but not create 
it from scratch.  The Supreme Court, McCarthy, and Hefner are relying on the 
idea that the identity of ―American‖ already exists.  They are each simply trying 
to tighten that definition.  The Pledge of Allegiance is an epideictic tool that aims 
to do the same thing.  The idea is not to create ―American‖ but, by relying on 
previous rhetorics and experiences, create a very specific understanding of 
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―American.‖  This study simply focuses on specific rhetors in specific situations 
that aimed to constitute ―American‖ identity for their audience. 
Jolanta Drzewiecka elaborates on this idea of the constructed audience by 
arguing that ―we‖ (or community identity) is evolutionary, due to its constructed 
nature.
65
  Charland shows ―the degree to which collective identities forming the basis of 
rhetoric appeals themselves depend on rhetoric.‖  Community or group identities ―exist 
only through an ideological discourse that constitutes them.‖  That is, as a group narrates 
their story, they come to be.
66
  References to the ―American Way‖ or the American way 
of life in every day discourse illustrate the continually pre-given nature of identity in 
constitutive rhetoric.  Drzewiecka adds that ―although individuals are constituted as 
subjects in this process, it is important to recognize the agency and creativity of 
communities which constantly rhetorically recreate and imagine‖ their identities.  ―In 
effect, constitutive discourse creates a particular collective identity to legitimate 
particular ways of collective life by transcending individual differences.‖67  Ultimately, 
audiences are constituted as subject through a process of identification.  This identity can 
evolve.  At particular moments, constitutive rhetoric can reposition or rearticulate 
subjects.
68
   The assumed identity accounts for the group topos, but the assumed identity 
needs to be constructed as an ―always already‖ by the rhetors.  If groups, or members of 
the same group, do not share those assumptions then differing interpretation of identity 
will often conflict with each other in the public sphere. 
Theorists tend to view constitutive rhetoric as a larger narrative and not specific 
instances.  George Vitsaropoulos‘s ―Constitutive Rhetoric and Subjects of Globality‖ 
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describes these instances of constitutive rhetoric as falling within an ongoing story.  
Vitsarapoulos claims that Charland‘s famous ―White Paper‖ derives its constitutive 
power ―out of the historical account it offers to its desired audience.‖69  This is where 
understanding White‘s theory of constitutive rhetoric helps bridge the theory with the 
method.  White does not take away from Charland and others by claiming that 
constitutive rhetoric can be a matter of specific instances of communication.  
Constitutive rhetoric positions the audience as a subject within a particular historical 
narrative. By accepting Maurice Charland and Michael McGee‘s (and of course, never 
forgetting Benedict Anderson) that identity is rhetorically constructed and understanding 
their theories of constitutive rhetoric, we can use White to lead us to a methodology. 
White‘s protégé LaRue addresses the narrative in his discussion of constitutive 
rhetoric as well, but LaRue‘s work on legal rhetoric gives examples of specific 
narratives that feed into the larger narratives that define identity.
70
  When Charland, 
McGee, Kenneth Burke, and others talk about these constitutive narratives they speak in 
an almost mythic sense.  If one were going to write about national identity, for example, 
one would look broadly at that narrative in action.
71
  This study focuses on the smaller 
narratives that make up such a huge story.  Katja Thieme‘s ―Constitutive Rhetoric as 
Aspect of Audience Design: The Public Texts of Canadien Suffragists‖ is an interesting 
departure from many of the other works of constitutive rhetoric and worth noting.  
Thieme focuses on the written word, even on elements of rhetoric as particular as 
singular noun phrases.  Thieme uses a wide sample of letters and essays, but of all of the 
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constitutive analyses her work seems to move closest toward the kind of rhetorical 
criticism this project provides. 
Through rhetoric, and rhetoric comes in a variety of forms, ―individuals and 
groups constitute their respective identities, illuminate unnoticed social problems, 
reinforce long held traditions and social contracts and contest generally held notions of 
right or wrong.‖72  This was inspiration for bringing together the theory behind 
constitutive rhetoric and the application of rhetorical criticism in the tradition of White.  
Assuming an identity while trying to construct it seems a complicated and self-
contradictory act.  So I chose to do a work of criticism to discover the actual means and 
methods of said construction.
73
  If scholars accept the theory of constitutive rhetoric and 
believe that these arguments are being made in the public that sway an audience to 
believe themselves to be one thing and not another, it stands to reason scholars should 
also be comfortable pointing to one specific speech or work and deem it constitutive 
once.  Once it has been labeled thusly, understanding how a rhetor sought to create 
identity would add to the larger understanding of public discourse. Another way in 
which my project can add to the conversation is to bring the rhetoric itself fully into the 
limelight.  All of these scholars have provided a good deal of the scholarly conversation 
about the audience and how they are constructed, but by adding rhetorical criticism to 
the theory we can look specifically at how that happened.  
Charland‘s original work, on which the theory of constitutive rhetoric is based, is 
actually based on a singular text – ―The White Paper.‖  However, Charland‘s approach 
differed from White‘s approach, which lacks Althusseur‘s ideal of ―interpellation.‖  As 
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James Aune notes, constitutive rhetoric according to White ―preserves human agency‖ 
while ―effacing agency in the Althusserian tradition of interpellation and the constitution 
of subject positions.‖74  Celeste Condit notes the same tension between McGee‘s focus 
on audience as opposed to a criticism-focus on text.  She does not care for McGee‘s 
tendency to portray the audience as the primary creator of the text.  ―Creative decoding,‖ 
she posits,‖ is not eh same thing as the construction of a text of one‘s own.  A text 
implies intent to communicate – perhaps to persuade others, but at least to contact others 
in some way.‖75  Condit, like Aune, is not completely comfortable with the proclivity of 
constitutive theory to take a good deal of agency from the rhetor and give it to the 
audience. This is the major difference between the criticism approach I take in this work 
and the criticism in other works.  Without ignoring the importance of Charland (and 
Burke and McGee), White allows for a certain amount of agency in constitutive rhetoric 
that makes a singular text more worthy of study. 
Condit provides a very clear and very succinct explanation of the tension 
between the kind of work that McGee and Charland do, and the kind of criticism one 
reads from Martin Medhurst and Michael Leff.  Leff, like Charland, ―insists on reading a 
single text at a time,‖76 so one might think that she would put the two of them in the 
same camp.  However, she describes an inherent break in their approaches to criticism.  
Leff approaches the text and tends to focus on a reading in the classic sense.  He 
provides descriptions and analyses of multiple layers of the organization of a text, or 
what he calls the ―rhetorical action‖ of a text.  That is, Leff focuses on the way the text 
itself moves and functions as an argument.  McGee, on the other hand, has exhibited a 
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tendency to ―emphasize the context, in the form of the ‗audience,‘ at the expense of the 
text.‖77  So for Condit, McGee falls squarely into the same category as Charland, and 
most constitutive scholars agree.  McGee‘s work is often quoted side by side with 
Charland‘s as some of the most important texts in constitutive theory.  However, if 
Condit is to be believed, then there is a tension between the kind of text-based criticism 
that Leff does and constitutive studies such as McGee does. 
Using James Boyd White‘s understanding of constitutive rhetoric eases that 
tension.  White allows for the kind of text-centered analysis that satisfies rhetorical 
critics, without alienating constitutive understandings of rhetoric.  Condit claims that ―it 
is precisely the exacting reading of texts as they are situated in history that constitutes 
rhetorical criticism as a distinct discipline in the humanities, and as an academic 
endeavor with a unique contribution to make human understanding.‖78  But situating 
rhetorical criticism within a framework of White‘s understanding of constitutive 
rhetoric, I can build a bridge into the constitutive theory so often associated with 
Charland and McGee. 
Rhetorical criticism differs from the New Criticism of literature studies in that 
this particular criticism considers the historical context of an artifact.  Whereas in New 
Criticism a critic might be discouraged to look much beyond the text itself, in a study 
such as this context is all-important.  However, such a study considers not just history 
but elements such as word choice, imagery, and organization, as well as the development 
of the ideas expressed in the artifact.
79
  One has to understand the text itself, and the 
ways in which the text is constructed and the methods used to create it, the ―linking 
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images and metaphors,‖ but also the way in which it is a response to its time, and 
ultimately how the artifact in turn shapes its context.
80
  Rhetorical criticism must first 
ask, ―What is the argument?‖  After all, the argument is the very purpose of the text.  
However, simply assessing or summarizing the argument does not necessarily illuminate 
anything that shows us how a rhetor may or may not be successful with that argument.  
Criticism looks at not just what the argument is, but how the argument is made. 
White emphasizes the importance of this kind of study in When Words Lose 
Their Meaning.  The language we use, he claims, always constitutes.  The words and the 
language which we use to represent our ideas are actions that interact with the audience.  
He writes that ―when we look at particular words, it is not their translation into 
statements of equivalence that we should seek, but an understanding of the possibilities 
they represent for making and changing the world.‖81  That is, even the smallest units of 
communication have the potential to re-shape or even create an identity or community.  
He writes that constitutive rhetoric lies not just in a meta understanding of audience, but 
in the minute rhetorical choices a rhetor makes.  White, however, relegates his studies to 
legal rhetoric.  Since White provides an opportunity for criticism and theory to interact, I 
have chosen criticism of a specific text, as opposed to a group of texts or the texts of a 
movement, to help discover how we construct identity.  It is my goal to illustrate a 
broader application.  I will move beyond the law as epideictic rhetoric to more 
deliberative, epideictic as performative rhetoric, and even rhetorical examples from 
popular culture.   
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In White‘s Justice as Translation he describes what he sees as the connection 
between language and life, and language and identity, as reciprocal.  He claims that  
each of us is partly made by our language, which gives us the categories in which 
we perceive the world and which form our motives; but we are not simply that, 
for we are users and makers of our language, too; and in remaking our language 
we contribute to the remaking of our characters and lives, for good or for ill.
82
 
 
He further explains that this process of remaking is a collective process because 
language itself is socially constructed, creating a cyclical and indivisible relationship.  
Because of this continual pull and push within the language and identity relationship, 
both identity and language are always in flux.  Pinpointing the exact nature of that 
relationship, identity, or language proves difficult then.  It is as if the classic scientific 
principle that one cannot observe a thing without changing it applies to who we are and 
how we create our identity, as well.   
Looking at a moment in history and asking how a thing happened is more 
feasible than looking at the present and asking what is happening.  White‘s 
understanding of constitutive language and rhetoric provides excellent background for a 
study of this kind.  Using his notions of how language creates identity we can narrow our 
question to exactly how that is done, even if the definition of identity remains nebulous.  
Stephen Lucas, an expert at close criticism, posits that while criticism is different from a 
rhetorical history or biography, one cannot separate public address from its historical 
context.
83
  ―Because,‖ Lucas argues, ―rhetorical discourse occurs only within a particular 
world,‖ the identity of any given text is inextricably interwoven with its context.84  In 
other words, any text must be situated within the context that produces it.  White agrees 
and feels it is a requirement that we as critics must always ask what universe is 
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constructed in that particular discourse?
85
  He sees the relationship between a rhetorical 
artifact and its context as reciprocal.  For White, the significance of the close 
relationship between text and context is evident in an artifact‘s specific terms and the 
creation of an identity.
86
   
Michael Leff explains that the purpose of textual criticism is to move attention 
away from theory and focus on the rhetorical action within the artifact.
87
  As such, 
criticism highlights what a rhetor does in a specific text to achieve her or his ends.  In 
this study, I will be assessing how rhetors create a specifically constitutive argument.  
There are a number of formidable elements to such a study.  One must read and re-read 
to uncover the basic conceptions that organize the text, analyze the historical and 
biographical circumstances surrounding the text, and illumine the ways in which these 
relate.
88
  However, I feel that we would be remiss to completely ignore a theoretical 
framing in the cases of this project.  Taking the constitutive theory out of an analysis of 
any of these cases strips them of some of their historical and rhetorical import.  Martin 
Medhurst points out that one reason we should engage in textual analysis is to remind 
scholars that rhetoric is a cultural force that ―shaped and continues to shape the 
American experiment.‖89  Medhurst echoes White‘s idea that the very words we chose 
and use are important to understanding the world we live in and create.  And, as Lucas 
argues, a study of rhetoric must move beyond simply explicating what the artifact says 
or giving its history.
90
  White and Charland remind us that the relationship between 
artifact and rhetorical situation is reciprocal: the artifact is informed by the context, but 
because of the constitutive nature of language that artifact will, in turn, shape the 
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conversation about and around it.  This project bridges the criticism by which we 
understand texts and the theory that frames them and makes them significant.   
I have chosen four instances in which specific rhetors told very specific stories – 
but each of these stories informed the larger understanding of American identity.  
Therefore, I chose a close reading to analyze the small story to discover the ways in 
which they were trying to manipulate the larger one.  In Brown v. Board the Court set 
out to create an argument for a new identity.  The Warren Court inserted itself into the 
American narrative as a direct rhetor, and addressed the audience of ―Americans‖ via 
their opinion.  Joe McCarthy‘s entire career was based on ferreting out the un-American 
from the American.  His exchange with Welch was significant because he completely 
lost control of his own rhetoric and Welch was able to wield the kind of blow that can 
ruin a career.  McCarthy meant to be the arbiter of what was American, but in his zeal he 
sowed the seeds of his own downfall and Welch destroyed the narrative that McCarthy 
was trying to establish.  The Pledge of Allegiance provided one of the most direct and 
clear definitions of ―American‖ in the nation, but in 1954 lawmakers felt it needed even 
more clarity.  Their arguments to add two simple words are indicative not just of popular 
opinion, but the epic nature of the Cold War.  And finally, Hugh Hefner, whose life 
began as a simple mid-Westerner, would go on to be one of the most iconic Americans 
of the century.  And throughout his career he strove to create in his readers‘ minds the 
image of a particular, ideal American. 
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A Note on Historical Research 
Though historical in nature, this work should not be categorized with projects 
like those of Vanessa Beasley or Kathleen J. Turner.
91
  Rhetorical history aims to re-
create or re-imagine in its analysis.  This work is specifically a work of criticism and not 
rhetorical history.  The attempt is not to re-construct or interpret a particular view or 
rhetorical framing of history, but to critique the manner in which we argue our own 
definitions of who we are.  In his work Justice as Translation White argues that we are 
―made‖ by our language.  The difficulty in pinning down a particular meaning is that 
both identity and language are constantly in flux.  While we use language to create 
identity, we use the same language to massage that identity.
92
  Sam B. Girgus takes these 
ideas and applies them very specifically to the notion of American identity.  However, 
his work does not position itself as rhetorical scholarship.
93
 
Edwin Black claims that the ―determination of social identity is not an everyday 
affair, but it is recurrent enough in human experience to tempt rhetorical 
interpretation.‖94  That is, we discover how we create identity through criticism.  Black‘s 
explanation points directly to the goal of this project.  Black and White explain that 
through rhetoric we construct a national identity – so it is through the criticism thereof 
we discover how that construction takes place. 
 Ultimately this project serves as an exemplar.  I argue that using White‘s 
understanding of constitutive rhetoric in conjunction with other rhetorical scholars; one 
can analyze specific moments in time and artifacts of rhetoric to see how rhetors attempt 
to create identity.  I have chosen four incidents dealing with national identity all 
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produced within months of each other so they share a similar political, historical, 
economical, and cultural background. Yet they have very different comments on 
American identity, and each responds to the mounting tension between modernity and 
postmodernity in their own unique way.  As White explained, if the smallest words can 
make a difference then is seems sensible to pay attention to small moments of rhetorical 
action.  Each chapter shows how constitutive theory and rhetorical criticism can work 
together to discover the various ways in which rhetors create American identity. 
Contribution to Scholarship 
I do not intend to show what the definition of ―American‖ was in 1954, but to use 
that year as a case study for a rhetorical criticism of the ways in which we constitute the 
term American.  The goal is to understand some of the ways in which we get to the 
definition of ―American,‖ which is a broader question than just what that meant in a 
specific year.   
 One could write volumes upon volumes on defining American and never reach 
the end of the topic because the definition is constantly in flux; it is massaged by 
politicians, pop culture, the media, the courts, and a host of others.  However, the means 
used to make these slight alterations to an intangible is valuable knowledge. By focusing 
on rhetorical criticism as a means of analyzing constitutive rhetoric, one can analyze 
how an audience tries to include itself in ―America‖ while another tries to keep that 
group on the outside.  Also, some attention to the rhetor and the rhetoric as opposed to 
focusing entirely on the audience will help us to understand constitutive rhetoric as an 
active process, in which the speaker, speakers, or writers have agency which they use to 
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manage identity.  And while the definition of American may change, many of the 
methods of constructing that identity remain the same.  For this reason, such a study is 
fruitful in providing a foundation for the ―what‖ question by addressing the ―how.‖ 
 This is why I feel the method of this project is important.  Understanding how we 
create identity is key to understanding politics, religion, and ethics on every level.  
However, leaving constitutive rhetoric at the level of theory risks making it impractical 
in the sense that it is difficult to apply in specific circumstances.  By meshing White‘s 
understanding of constitutive rhetoric and his method of assessment with Charland‘s 
theory, then we have a means to analyze specific moments – those specific speeches or 
even just phrases that get to the heart of American identity. 
 My goal is to provide a method of assessing specific rhetorical events as 
constitutive.  Identity is not something that simply happens or that the audience just 
accepts; it is created.  By taking White‘s ideas about the law as constitutive and applying 
them as rhetorical criticism on a more universal level, we can assess specifically how 
that happens.
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CHAPTER II 
NEW SCHOOL: DESEGREGATION AND THE WARREN 
COURT’S OPINION AS CONSTITUTIVE RHETORIC 
 In the 5
th
 grade my closest friend was black.  It never occurred to me to think of 
her as my ―black friend‖ and I certainly did not see this relationship as anything out of 
the ordinary.  At the time, I lived across the alley from my grandparents on my father‘s 
side, and would often drop by their house after school or on weekends.  On one of those 
occasions my friend came with me.  The next time I visited my grandparents, this time 
without friend in tow, my grandmother asked me if anyone gave me a hard time about 
hanging out with the young lady I had brought by.  I did not understand the question. 
 My grandmother was born in 1921 and learned to understand life in segregated 
terms.  My grandfather on my mother‘s side was born in 1916.  He was almost 40 before 
the notion of desegregated schools made it before the Supreme Court, and many more 
years passed before integration came to the public schools in rural Texas where he lived 
and worked.  Growing up in a world that was so strictly organized by race and then 
watching me blithely ignore those entrenched rules made for some awkward 
conversations.  But such was the effect of segregation, even decades after its supposed 
elimination.  Times had changed.  And with them, our ideas of what kind of 
relationships were acceptable. 
 I was in college before I truly began to comprehend the ramifications of 
segregation.  I began to understand the difficulties that curfews and separate eating 
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spaces and bathrooms imposed on the victims of segregation.  I began to understand how 
difficult it would be to better one‘s situation without the ability to read so the segregation 
of schools suddenly struck me especially egregious.   
 I also realized that I saw education as something different than the generations 
before.  I understood that a certain amount of education was required for all children, so 
any imbalance in the quality of that education struck me as against the spirit of the law.  
As my college studies took me further and further into history and politics I began to 
understand that many of the beliefs I had thought of as hard, fast, and without flaw were 
new.  Not only were they new, but these beliefs were a radical departure from former 
assumptions that shaped law, practice, custom, and societal norms.  The reason that my 
fifth grade friendship was so unsettling to my family was because I was the first of the 
family to actually be raised in a world where I was told that equality of opportunity and 
access was normal. 
 It was my inability to understand the arguments for segregated schools that led 
me to include this chapter.  My understanding that an education was a right for all 
Americans had not been universal in the years before the Cold War.  The lawyers of 
Brown v. Board had to make an argument that education was imperative to being a full 
―American.‖1   Secondly, if one‘s only concern was for the material part of education 
itself, then ―separate but equal‖ poses no real problem.  The Brown lawyers realized that 
if they put the equality of the schools on trial the simplest solution would be to require 
they be materially equitable.  So instead, they argued that it was the separation itself that 
created inequality.  The Brown team, led by Thurgood Marshall, began with the premise 
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that all segregated schools were equal (which they were not) in physical quality so they 
could effectively try the ―separation‖ part of ―separate but equal‖ instead of focusing on 
the material resources.  This shift led to a case that was new and surprising to the Court.  
The plaintiffs brought in social scientists and academic experts to support their claims.  
Physical evidence and legal precedent became enmeshed in a discussion of psychology 
and sociology.  Marshall et al. continually argued that separation itself created a group of 
second class citizens who would never be able to realize their complete selves and would 
never understand equal rights.  For the leader of Brown, et al.‘s case education was a key 
component to fully reaching the status of ―American.‖ 
This study differs from a study on citizenship because whether or not African-
Americans were citizens was never in dispute.  The case argued that all Americans have 
a right to education, and that right was being denied.  Kansas never claimed that certain 
groups were somehow less deserving.  They simply claimed that the doctrine of 
―separate but equal‖ was established and no one had broken it.  The idea of being an 
American was not at issue, but what all Americans have access to by right was at the 
heart of the matter.  In short, Kansas argued that separate but equal was legal according 
to law and precedent. Brown, et al. argued that ―separate but equal‖ created a second 
class version of ―American‖ that could only be remedied by eliminating separation along 
racial lines. Part of the argument that the plaintiffs relied on was that education was a 
right of all citizens.  This may seem dangerous territory as it opens up the question of 
citizenship theory.   For Marshall et al. citizenship was assumed.  Nobody argued that 
African-Americans were not citizens.  It was accepted that they were.  They did, 
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however, argue that certain Americans were being treated differently than other 
Americans.  Really, this addresses the question of ―American,‖ not citizenship.  The 
plaintiffs were arguing that the country had differentiated between citizens, denying 
some of them particular rights, thereby creating a division in citizenship. So, the opinion 
had to address the construction of American in the public discourse, since the issue of 
citizenship was not truly in question.  At this juncture a citizenship theorist might claim 
that this study would be an excellent opportunity for a discussion of republicanism or 
liberalism, as well.  However, such a discussion is beyond the scope of this project.  This 
research focuses on using an understanding of constitutive rhetoric and close textual 
analysis to discover the means by which a rhetor creates American identity.  In future 
manifestations and expansions the project may well include theories of citizenship, but 
for my current purposes it seems wise to keep the focus narrow and refined. 
 For this chapter I will begin with a brief review of other works that have dealt 
specifically with the Brown v. Board case.  To be fair, the lit review is in no way 
comprehensive.  A complete review of works that cover Brown v. Board would be 
inordinately lengthy so I will simply mention those books that were particularly useful 
for this study.  Instead of analyzing all of the arguments, I focus on the opinion.  Given 
that it is the opinion that had lasting legal ramifications it seems the most reasonable text 
for analysis.  Finally, I will explain how the court uses this specific decision as a piece of 
constitutive rhetoric. 
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Literature Review 
 Simple Justice, by Richard Kluger, is a detailed account of the history of the case.  
It contextualizes Brown v. Board by exploring Jim Crow as a legal and cultural 
phenomenon.
2
  Kluger‘s background information is useful in understanding the 
controversy surrounding the decision itself, primarily because it denies years of 
precedent.  Also useful in understanding the social context of Jim Crow laws is Robert J. 
Cottroll‘s, Raymond T. Diamond‘s, and Leland B. Ware‘s Brown v. Board of Education: 
Caste, Culture, and the Constitution.
3
  Danielle S. Allen specifically addresses how this 
case affected ideas of American citizenship in Talking to Strangers: Anxieties of 
Citizenship since Brown v. Board of Education.
4
  However, Allen‘s book focuses largely 
on the aftermath of the decision, whereas this project is interested in the text of the 
decision itself.  For a general treatment of the case that addresses the decision itself, Jack 
M. Balkin‘s  What Brown v. Board of Education Should Have Said  presents of a 
collection of essays in which legal experts address the decision and how it might have 
been communicated or decided differently.
5
  Another general collection of essays that is 
useful background and commentary is Mac A. Steward‘s The Promise of Justice: Essays 
of Brown v. Board of Education.  
6
 Charlotte Grimes celebrates the historical nature of 
the decision by bringing together a group of journalists and collecting their reflections on 
the incident in her article ―Civil Rights and the Press,‖ which makes for interesting 
reading in terms of historical perspective as well.
7
  Their memories round out the story 
by providing first person narratives of the controversy. 
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 Paul Wilson, in A Time to Lose attempts to contextualize the argument and 
explain it from a legal standpoint.  Wilson was one of the lawyers that represented the 
Topeka Board of Education in the case before the Supreme Court, so his account takes a 
particular perspective – and one which is largely missing from other works.8  Wilson‘s 
understanding of the case at the time was that it was a very simple legal matter – the 
laws concerning separate but equal had been tested and those he represented were not 
breaking them.  Wilson writes with a great deal of respect toward his opponents, and his 
account addresses his personal responses to the law and the arguments.  Wilson‘s rather 
simple prose and straightforward approach to the law highlights part of the focus on this 
study.  Wilson approached this case as a simple matter of legal argumentation and was 
unprepared for the unprecedented social scientific evidence that seemed to sway the 
Court.  Ultimately he is not displeased that he lost; he found the racism of some of his 
supporters frankly embarrassing, but felt the case was swayed by extra-legal 
argumentation, which was echoed in many of the essays in Jack Balkin‘s collection.  
Oliver Brown, in Argument: the Oral Argument before the Supreme Court in Brown v. 
Board of Education of Topeka, 1952-1955 dissects the decision, as well.
9
  However, 
Brown‘s is a more all-around approach.  He looks at the arguments for and against, then 
also at the opinion of the court.  Like most of these works, he focuses on the winning 
argument, not the losing one.  A similar work that focuses on the argument that is 
helpful in understanding the tricky legal rhetoric of the case is Leon Friedman‘s Brown 
v. Board: The Landmark oral Argument Before the Supreme Court.  The book provides a 
good deal of insight into the context and the nature of the arguments before the court.
10
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 The field of communication has paid special attention to Brown v. Board with 
scholars from a variety of specializations using the arguments and opinions as a piece for 
analysis.  Nancy Dunbar and Martha Cooper presented a paper at NCA using the case to 
study theories of argumentation, specifically looking at the situation perspective for the 
study of legal argument.
11
  Kurt Nutting also uses Brown v. Board as a starting point for 
a discussion of legal argumentation.  He argues in favor of a Kuhnian account of legal 
reasoning and questions legal reasoning that is not critically examined.  His work, a bit 
like mine, uses Brown v. Board as a theoretical and methodical example.
12
 
Clarke Rountree provides a specifically rhetorically oriented collection in Brown 
v. Board of Education at Fifty: A Rhetorical Perspective.
13
  Rountree looks at the 
rhetoric of race during and since the case.  Martin A. Bartness also takes a rhetorical 
approach, but his interest is in the way in which the justices used disparate philosophies 
to come to a unanimous decision in ―Achieving Unanimity in Brown v. Board.‖  He 
argues that rhetorical collaboration led to the unanimous decision that added to the 
power and credibility of the Court‘s opinion.  However, the work does little analysis of 
the opinion as a piece of rhetoric in and of itself.
14
  John Jackson‘s work on the case, 
Science for Segregation, is interesting because it uses Brown v. Board as a jumping off 
point to discuss the complicated intersection of race, science, and politics.
15
  While these 
works provide an excellent background and explanation of the legality of the decision, 
none of them view it as constitutive rhetoric.  This project intends to fill that gap. 
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History 
To understand Brown v. Board it is helpful to go back one hundred years prior to 
Scott v. Sandford, which is more commonly called the Dredd Scott case.
16
  While my 
claim is that Brown v. Board dealt with being ―American‖ and not citizenship, the 
history of race in Supreme Court rhetoric is more complex.  The Scott case dealt with 
citizenship, but it dealt specifically with legal citizenship and not theories of citizenship.  
The Court concluded in 1856 that ―A free negro of the African race, whose ancestors 
were brought to this country and sold as slaves, is not a ‗citizen‘ within the meaning of 
the Constitution of the United States.‖  The Court based this conclusion on a very strict 
―original intent‖ reading of the Constitution.  The Court did not try to burden themselves 
with rationalizing issues of morality, racism, and historical ideas on race the way an 
―original intent‖ reading requires today.  To the majority of the Supreme Court it was 
simple: 
When the Constitution was adopted, they were not regarded in any of the States 
as members of the community which constituted the State, and were not 
numbered among its ―people or citizens.‖  Consequently, the special rights and 
immunities guarantied to citizens do not apply to them.
17
 
 
 The Court saw the Scott issue as a simple matter of whether the progeny of 
property is a citizen and therefore privileged to the legal right to sue.  And the answer 
was a simple, ―no.‖  The Court made the argument in a number of ways.  They claimed 
that the words ―people of the United States‖ and ―citizens‖ are interchangeable, but since 
originally Blacks were deemed an inferior class of beings they did not fall into either 
category, and were not protected by the Constitution in the same fashion. 
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 Perhaps the most telling portion of the opinion was the Court‘s treatment of the 
Declaration of Independence.  Instead of trying to rationalize how the Founding Fathers 
could have claimed all men were created equal, but then allow such unequal treatment, 
the Court used that very phrase as proof that they were simply carrying out the wishes of 
our forbearers. 
The general words above quoted [Declaration of Independence] would seem to 
embrace the whole human family and if they were used in a similar instrument at 
this day would be so understood.  But it is too clear for dispute that the enslaved 
African race were not intended to be included, and formed no part of the people 
who framed and adopted this declaration, for if the language, as understood in 
that day, would embrace them, the conduce of the distinguished men who framed 
the Declaration of Independence would have been utterly and flagrantly 
inconsistent with the principles they asserted….Yet the men who framed this 
declaration were great men – high in literary acquirements, high in their sense of 
honor, and incapable of asserting principles inconsistent with those on which 
they were acting.
18
 
 
The Court went on to explain how, because of the principles and high moral fiber 
of the Founding Fathers, the public must assume that they knew the document would be 
interpreted in such a way as to exclude the ―negro race‖ which had been delegated 
property, and had in no way been included in the category of ―citizen.‖  The other 
option, that they were hypocrites, was unthinkable.  Therefore, in following the original 
spirit and meaning of the Constitution, the Court decided that a descendant of slaves in 
America did not have the privilege of citizenship. 
In 1861, just five years later, the Civil War began.  Two years later Abraham 
Lincoln signed the Emancipation Proclamation, and two years after that, in 1865, the 
13
th
 Amendment radically changed the landscape of the United States by abolishing 
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slavery.  However, it was not until the 14
th
 Amendment in 1868 that the Scott decision 
was truly nullified.  The 14
th
 Amendment proclaimed that 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
19
 
 
The Scott decision was neutered in a relatively short, if bloody, amount of time.  
Legal citizenship was no longer a question for African Americans born in the United 
States.
20
  This lead to a transitional period in Court opinion, as illustrated by Plessy v. 
Ferguson.
21
  The notorious Plessy case established ―separate but equal‖ as a decidedly 
constitutional doctrine that dominated in America until 1954.  The Plessy case did not 
create ―separate but equal,‖ but just affirmed that there was nothing wrong with it.  In 
fact, the opinion spent a good deal of time discussing how segregation was already 
practiced throughout the United States, specifically in education.   
The Court noted that, as was brought to their attention in the Slaughterhouse 
Cases, the purpose of the 14
th
 Amendment was to ―establish the citizenship of the negro, 
to give definitions of citizenship of the United States and of the States, and to protect 
from the hostile legislation of the States the privileges and immunities of citizens…‖  So, 
the question of legal citizenship was no longer in play.  What was at stake was whether 
the rights of citizens could be protected when those citizens were divided along racial 
lines.  The Court decided that they can.  Their primary example of how this could be 
done was in the schoolhouse.  The Court pointed to the supposed success of schools 
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separated by class, sex, and race all over the country and claimed that these had not 
shown to cause any harm to students or their communities. 
The Plessy opinion was precisely the opposite of what Brown and the Brown 
team would argue decades later.  The Court specifically argued that segregation was not 
a denial of due process or equal protection and was not ready to accept any evidence to 
the contrary.  Most interestingly, the Court of 1896 completely rejected the claims that 
segregation created a social stigma that Brown would try to prove using social science 
58 years later.   
We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff‘s argument to consist in the 
assumption that the enforced separation of the two races stamps the colored race 
with a badge of inferiority.  If this be so, it is not by reason of anything found in 
the act, but solely because the colored race chooses to put that construction upon 
it.  The argument necessarily assumes that if, as has been more than once the case 
and is not unlikely to be so again, the colored race should become the dominant 
power in the state legislature, and should enact a law in precisely similar terms, it 
would thereby relegate the white race to an inferior position.  We imagine that 
the white race at least, would not acquiesce in this assumption.
22
 
 
The racist arrogance of the Court is almost overwhelming.  The Court claimed that if 
blacks felt maligned by segregation it was their own fault.  The white race would never 
stoop to such levels. 
 The basic story of Brown v. Board itself is not that complicated.
23
 In 1950 the 
Topeka, KA branch of the NAACP set out to construct a legal challenge to an 1879 law 
that segregated elementary schools.  NAACP lawyers knew they needed to create a class 
action suit and not focus on just one family, so they used 13 different families, including 
20 children.  The NAACP encouraged these families to try to enroll their children in 
―white‖ schools, and as they anticipated, all of these attempts were denied.  Accordingly, 
  
66 
as the case made it through the legal system and eventually came before the Supreme 
Court, the Court chose to consolidate a number of other cases dealing with similar issues 
under the Kansas case.  In February, 1951, the Topeka NAACP officially filed their 
case, naming it after plaintiff Oliver Brown.   
 On May 17, 1954 the Supreme Court decided unanimously that segregation in 
schools was unconstitutional, beginning the long and often painful process of federally 
mandated desegregation.
24
 The case flew in the face of mounds of precedent, and legal 
scholars have debated the outcome of the case ever since, many concluding that the case 
was decided incorrectly.
25
  The arguments these critics levy are based on the most 
fundamental understanding of Constitutional law.  The decision took a radical departure 
from decades of legal precedent.  
The Supreme Court‘s decision is based on one simple syllogism: 
Major premise: Education is a right guaranteed by the 14
th
 Amendment. 
Minor premise: Segregation denies education to black Americans. 
Conclusion: ―Segregation of white and Negro children in the public schools of a State 
solely based on the basis of race, pursuant to state laws permitting or requiring such 
segregation, denies to Negro children the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the 
Fourteenth Amendment even though the physical facilities and other ‗tangible‘ factors of 
white and Negro schools may be equal.‖26 
This is the crux of my study.  Since Plessy v. Ferguson in 1896 ―separate but 
equal‖ had been not just acceptable, but deemed perfectly constitutional.   The Plessy 
decision had been measured, argued, and weighed by the courts more than once and 
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never found wanting, so in order to once again ask the Court to re-assess the situation the 
case had to be framed in a new and provocative way.  Marshall and his cohorts did this 
by a) arguing that education was a right, b) focusing on the ―separation‖ itself as being 
unequal, and not the physical resources allotted to segregated schools, and c) adding 
social science to the argument about law in order to address the ramifications of 
separation, leading to a discussion of equality among all Americans.  The most 
controversial study was the report by Swedish scientist Gunnar Myrdal usually referred 
to simply as An American Dilemma.  Myrdal headed up a nine year study on race 
relations in the United States that was actually released in 1944, but got limited attention 
because of the World War.  Ten years later, however, it became a piece of evidence in 
Brown v. Board.
27
  In essence, Myrdal saw race relations in the United States as a 
vicious cycle.  Whites had pre-conceived notions about blacks, oppressed blacks because 
of them, and then pointed to poor performance in the black community as justification 
for their pre-conceived notions.  However, while that analysis sounds dire, Myrdal was 
ultimately hopeful for the Unites States.  Myrdal believed that eventually we would have 
to deal with the cognitive dissonance of the situation.  If we believed, as he thought we 
did, in liberalism and equality, then a society stratified along racial lines would 
eventually fracture.  Myrdal believed that eventually American would recognize that 
treating people differently based on race was against the very way in which we defined 
―America.‖ 
Hence, Brown v. Board gets to the heart of my research question.  The Court‘s 
decision was a conscientious effort to re-construct our ideas of what being ―American‖ 
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means.  Specifically, how the law can be used to maintain inequality and equality.  And, 
if one accepts Jefferson‘s proclamation of American beliefs, the court was in essence 
using their rhetoric and the rhetoric of law to refine the very definition of American.   
Analysis 
 Like most Supreme Court opinions, it begins with the conclusion, and the 
syllabus that follows is an overview of the opinion at large.  While the syllabus is added 
to the opinion later and not written by the Court, it is useful as an introduction to the 
entire opinion.  The first thing that jumps out at a reader is the complete lack of pathos.  
A Supreme Court opinion is not a ―hearts and minds‖ campaign.  It is simply an 
explanation of the Court‘s interpretation of the law.  Ethos is assumed as the Court is the 
highest legal authority of the land, leaving logos as the Court‘s modus of invention.28  
There is no emotive or poetic language, just plain style designed to reason through the 
decision as clearly as possible.
29
 
 The very first sentence is simple and declarative and covers the entire conclusion.  
It stated that separate public schooling based on race, even though the facilities may be 
equal, denied Negro children the equal protection guaranteed by the 14
th
 amendment: 
Segregation of white and Negro children in the public schools of a State solely 
on the basis of race, pursuant to state laws permitting or requiring such 
segregation, denies to Negro children the equal protection of the laws guaranteed 
by the Fourteenth Amendment -- even though the physical facilities and other 
―tangible‖ factors of white and Negro schools may be equal.30 
 
The rest of the syllabus is broken into points a-f, each explaining how the Court arrived 
at their decision.  At the heart of it, an opinion, syllabus included, is the simplest form of 
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Aristotelian argument.  These steps are simply a matter of defining terms and explaining 
the major and minor premises that lead to the conclusion. 
 Of course, much attention was paid to the 14
th
 Amendment.  This term in the 
argument was at the heart of the syllogism and required a very specific definition.  First, 
the syllabus admits that the amendment is ―inconclusive as to its intended effect on 
public education.‖  This seems a mis-step on the Court‘s behalf.  If they planned on 
using the Fourteenth Amendment as a crucial part of their argument, they needed it to 
include education.  The syllabus addresses this situation immediately however, by 
creating a sub-argument to validate their dependence on the 14
th
 Amendment. 
 Point ―b‖ states that the Court would be assessing Amendment 14, not in an 
―original intent‖ context, but ―in the light of the full development of public education 
and its present place in American life throughout the Nation.‖  This one sentence reveals 
quite a bit about the Court‘s thinking.  For one, the Constitution is a living document that 
requires constant interpretation.  For another, there is something inherently American 
about education.  To deny a citizen an education is denying something integral to their 
national identity.  In a few short sentences the Court connected education with American 
identity.  So, the syllabus continues in point ―c‖, if a state was going to offer education 
to its citizens, it must be offered on equal terms.  Here was where the Kansas case made 
their argument.  Kansas simply argued that segregation was Constitutional because the 
Court had decreed it so; as long as the tangibles were equal, schools could be separate.
31
 
 The Court, however, did not accept Kansas‘s argument.  The Court simply stated 
that ―segregation of children in public schools solely on the basis of race deprives 
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children of the minority group of equal education opportunities,‖ regardless of 
―‗tangible‘ factors.‖  Instead of legal precedent the Court reached outside the law and 
into science for sources of logos and invention.  However, in the context of the syllabus 
it is taken as an assumption.  If simply assumed as true, then the argument has no 
fallacy.  This leads the syllabus to proclaim in point ―e‖ that separate but equal cannot be 
applied to education.  The Court did not make a grand proclamation about life in general, 
but kept the decision within the confines of the case at hand – specifically education.  In 
doing so the Court has stayed well within the bounds of both the argument and its own 
limitations.  The Court‘s opinion was technically not designed to break down Jim Crow 
entirely, just to apply to education.  This limitation also made the case even more 
pertinent to this study.  Since Warren‘s Court saw education as an important part of the 
American experience, the 14
th
 Amendment applied because rights were being denied to 
those who were, in fact citizens.  By focusing so much on the 14
th
 Amendment the Court 
made it clear that they were arguing for education as a part of the American experience.  
The Court was explicit in stating that since education was an integral part of fully 
engaging as an American, that a complete educational experience could be denied to any 
group based on race.  
 After the syllabus, once a-f have been taken care of, Warren begins the work of 
the opinion.  He spends some time explaining the case as a cumulative, class-action case.  
He claims that while the cases that were combined into Brown were ―premised on 
different facts and different local conditions,‖ they shared a ―common legal question.‖  
This common legal question justified ―their consideration together in this consolidated 
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opinion.‖  While this explanation may seem banal on its surface, Warren has established 
that the Brown decision was meant to have a farther reaching scope than just Topeka, 
KA.  The Warren Court was not deciding the fate of the Board of Education in Topeka; 
the court was deciding a legal question that extends to segregated schools across the 
board.   
 The opinion is written in as clear a fashion as possible to avoid loopholes.  
Warren is aware that there are multiple claims that this case must prove.  Warren‘s 
opinion explains that the ―segregation was alleged to deprive the plaintiffs of the equal 
protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment.‖  The Fourteenth Amendment 
is the lynchpin in the opinion.  Here Warren leaves the Fourteenth Amendment as an 
assumption so he can establish his entire argument.  
 Warren explains that ―the plaintiffs contend that segregated public schools are 
not ‗equal‘ and cannot be made ‗equal,‘ and that hence they are deprived of the equal 
protection of the laws.  It was because of this claim, Warren explains, that this question 
fell under the authority of the Supreme Court.  Warren writes that these questions and 
claims had enough ―obvious importance‖ that the argument came before the highest 
court in the land.   
 In just a few sentences Warren has done a number of important things.  For one, 
he has made it clear that this is not a singular instance.  Because the argument of the 
plaintiffs, and ultimately the opinion of the Court, was grounded in a particular 
understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment.  This was also how the Court could 
manage to deal with the body of precedent that stood before them.  ―Separate but equal‖ 
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was constitutional, but had previously not been challenged under the auspices of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  Warren has created the rhetorical context for the Court to 
explain how the Fourteenth Amendment has been violated, and therefore reverse the 
decades of legal segregation that the Plessy v. Ferguson decision protected. 
 In the same space Warren notes that one of the cases, a case out of Delaware that 
fell under the Brown umbrella was markedly different than the others.  In Gebhart v. 
Belton the State Supreme Court followed the ―separate but equal‖ doctrine, ―but ordered 
that the plaintiffs be admitted to the white schools because of their superiority to the 
Negro schools.‖  It is important to note that the Delaware case was included because it 
pointed to another major argument that the Supreme Court is making: tangible equality 
is not enough.  Delaware may have followed the letter of the law, but the Supreme Court 
rejected their actions because what was really on trial was separation. 
 In the next paragraph Warren‘s opinion returns to the Fourteenth Amendment.32  
He states that understanding the history of the Amendment, which made up a large part 
of the re-argument of Brown v. Board, is not enough to satisfy the court: 
The Amendment ―covered exhaustively consideration of the Amendment in 
Congress, ratification by the states, then-existing practices in racial segregation, 
and the views of proponents and opponents of the Amendment. This discussion 
and our own investigation convince us that, although these sources cast some 
light, it is not enough to resolve the problem with which we are faced. At best, 
they are inconclusive.
33
 
 
This opens up the opportunity for the Warren to explain his argument for the application 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.  The Amendment does not specifically mention race, but 
Warren uses the historical contention surrounding the Amendment as a means to insert 
education into the equation. 
  
73 
 Warren turns to the history of public education in the United States to begin his 
argument.  His argument seems to be an explanation of why education was left out of the 
equal protection clause, not why it should be included.  The North cultivated a public 
school system before the South did.  At the time of the ratification of the Fourteenth 
Amendment a tax-supported school system, free to all citizens, was not in place in 
general.  Education was largely a private endeavor.  As a result, Warren explains, white 
children whose parents had the resources had private tutors or schools, whereas black 
education was virtually non-existent.  In some states it was even illegal to educate black 
children.  The cause of public education had advanced farther in the North, but was still 
incomparable to a 1954 understanding of education.  Warren describes the state of public 
education at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment as abysmal by present-day 
standards: 
The curriculum was usually rudimentary; ungraded schools were common in 
rural areas; the school term was but three months a year in many states, and 
compulsory school attendance was virtually unknown.  As a consequence, it is 
not surprising that there should be so little in the history of the Fourteenth 
Amendment relating to its intended effect on public education. 
 
Warren‘s Court seems to imply that had education been regarded with the same 
level of respect and importance then as it was in 1954, the question of whether the 
Fourteenth Amendment covered education would be clearer.  Warren is setting up a 
situation in which he can interpret the Fourteenth Amendment to cover education.  He 
argues that education simply was not an issue at the time of ratification.  Now that it is, it 
makes sense to include it under the Fourteenth Amendment as opposed to automatically 
assuming it has no place in the argument.  By arguing that education is essential to the 
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American experience in the 1950s, even though it might not have been at the 
Amendment‘s drafting, Warren connects the case not just to the Plessy doctrine, but 
American identity at large.  An entire group was not being allowed to take part in this 
essential part of American life, and as such their identity was incomplete. 
 Following the description of the state of education, the opinion addresses the 
body of precedence that affirmed the ―separate but equal‖ doctrine.  Warren notes that 
the 1896 opinion in Plessy v. Ferguson applied to transportation, but had been applied to 
education multiple times over.  He acknowledges that ―In this Court, there have been six 
cases involving the ‗separate but equal‘ doctrine in the field of education.‖  He points to 
the ways in which those cases had differed, but the biggest difference was that ―in none 
of these cases was it necessary to reexamine the doctrine to grant relief to the Negro 
plaintiff.‖   
In the instant cases, that question is directly presented.  Here, unlike Sweatt v. 
Painter, there are findings below that the Negro and white schools involved have 
been equalized, or are being equalized, with respect to building, curricula, 
qualifications and salaries of teachers, and other ‗tangible‘ factors.  Our decision, 
therefore, cannot turn on merely a comparison of these tangible factors in the 
Negro and white schools involved in each of the cases.  We must look instead to 
the effect of segregation itself on public education. 
  
In other words, Warren is not interested in the tangible factors.  The Supreme 
Court was interested in whether ―separation‖ itself caused inequality.  The Court was 
going to determine not whether the educational resources were equal, and therefore 
lawfully segregated, but whether ―separate but equal‖ itself was protected under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  This is why Warren is so careful to mention the Delaware case 
beforehand – he is making it clear that separation, not quality of resources was on trial. 
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 Warren admits that he cannot turn back the clock to 1868 or 1898.  He can only 
assess the case in front of him.  But, he states adamantly, the Court ―must consider 
education in the light of its full development and its present place in American life.‖  
That is, he feels one cannot leave education out of the Fourteenth Amendment simply 
because it was not as important in 1868 as it is in 1954.  The Court, he argues, is free to 
assess not just the past and precedent, but the present state of education.  Only then 
could the Court determine if separation by race deprived a group of their constitutionally 
guaranteed equal protection of the laws.  Education, the opinion emphasizes again, is not 
just some perfunctory process, but an important part of American identity.  It is where 
we learn norms and values.  Depriving a group of equal education is not just a matter of 
ignorance of certain facts, but it keeps a group of people in state that is something other 
than fully American. 
 The way in which he brings the Fourteenth Amendment and education together 
gets to the heart of my questions concerning American identity.  In two clear concise 
paragraphs the Court brings all of the components of the case together in a stunning 
statement on the nature of American identity: 
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local 
governments.  Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for 
education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our 
democratic society. 
 
The Court has proclaimed that education is not simply a privilege, but an 
essential responsibility of the government.  Warren feels he can make such a claim 
because we provide the proof of our value of education with attendance requirements 
and the amount of money spent on education at the state and local levels.  It is not just a 
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matter of private concern anymore, but as a nation, Warren claims, we have decided that 
education is essential to our democracy. 
It is required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even 
service in the armed forces.  It is the very foundation of good citizenship.  Today 
it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing 
him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his 
environment. 
  
Education, he continues, is not just valued in an abstract sense but it is absolutely 
necessary for the American experience.  Education creates a bond among us of 
normative, cultural values, and prepares a child to grow up and take part of the American 
experience.  Education helps us to adapt to our particular American environment, and 
helps us maintain it as well.  So, a child who does not have access to education is denied 
the opportunity to succeed in general.  It is a right, then, ―which must be made available 
to all on equal terms.‖  Warren has equated education to cultural norms, success, and the 
American experience at large.  This leads the Court to the question before them: 
We come then to the question presented: does segregation of children in public 
schools solely on the basis of race, even though the physical facilities and other 
‗tangible factors may be equal, deprive the children of the minority group of 
equal educational opportunities?  We believe that it does. 
  
The Court‘s opinion is as straightforward as rhetorically possible.  Warren asks a 
question, and then answers.  The Court‘s opinion could not be clearer: ―separate but 
equal‖ denies black children the rights that should be afforded to all Americans.  The 
Court continues to explain that the tangible factors were not the heart of the issue.  To 
separate children based on race created an inherent feeling of inferiority, and therefore 
education that was separate was innately unequal.  The Court is out to make sure that as 
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their decision addresses what they see as an egregious rift.  America was claiming that 
African-Americans were citizens, but denied them their rights as Americans. 
 The Court points out that they are not the only ones who felt this way.  Citing the 
Kansas case before Brown in which the state Court concluded that segregation had a 
detrimental effect on African-American children.  This effect, the court found, was 
compounded when it had the ―sanction of the law.‖  Segregation had ―a tendency to 
[retard] the educational and mental development of Negro children and to deprive them 
of some of the benefits they would receive‖ in an integrated school.  And yet, in that 
very case, the Court found against the black plaintiffs.  The state Court admitted the 
segregation psychologically harmed black children and that it harmed the educational 
process at large, but, they ruled, it did not violate ―separate but equal.‖  For, as long as 
the tangibles were equal, as had been the emphasis in all the cases prior to Brown v. 
Board, the doctrine from the Plessy case was intact. 
 The United States Supreme Court, however, put the ―separate‖ part of the 
doctrine on trial and assumed that the Fourteenth Amendment covered education since it 
was now a required, integral part of the American experience: 
We conclude that, in the field of public education, the doctrine of ‗separate but 
equal‘ has no place.  Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal.  
Therefore, we hold that the plaintiffs and others similarly situated for whom the 
actions have been brought are, by reason of the segregation complained of, 
deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
  
It is important to note that Warren‘s opinion stays within the bounds of the case 
and focuses on segregation in the educational system.  Warren‘s opinion only makes the 
argument that the Fourteenth Amendment covers education.  He is careful not to try and 
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apply his ruling to all walks of life, but maintain the strength of his argument by keeping 
it within the realm of the case.  Warren knew that this landmark decision would have 
repercussions across many more areas of public life than just education, but he stays true 
to his original syllogism.  The result is that the Court‘s opinion makes a case for 
education as a vital part of American identity, and to keep education segregated along 
racial lines created a second class of American, which, the Court believed, was expressly 
forbidden by the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The Connection to Constitutive Rhetoric 
 When the Court issued their opinion in Brown v. Board of Education they were 
making a rather grand proclamation about American identity.  First, the Court claimed, 
education was a large part of being an American.  It was the key to normalized culture 
and material success.  Education was a key element to the American experience, and so 
it was protected under the equal protection clause.  The Court‘s opinion indicated that 
the Court would no longer tolerate citizens of the United States not being able to fully 
partake in those things that were guaranteed to Americans.  The Court was building a 
constitutive case. 
 A student of James Boyd White‘s, L.H. LaRue, continues White‘s ideas and 
expands them beyond White‘s study of constitutional law to the process of judicial 
review.  LaRue‘s basic thesis is that the Supreme Court weaves narratives.  The law, as 
we understand it, is based on fact to a certain extent, but even more so on the stories that 
the Court tells.  He takes White‘s notion of constitutive law and very specifically applies 
it to Court opinions.  He is very adamant that when he writes Constitutional Law as 
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Fiction, he does not mean ―fiction‖ in a derogatory or false sense.  He echoes Tim 
O‘Brien‘s description of truth from his Vietnam novel The Things They Carried: that 
which is true may or may not be extrapolated from that which is factual.  A fictive 
narrative can be just as true as any list of factual observations.  As LaRue puts it, the 
ratio of fact to fiction is not necessarily the same as the ratio of truth to falsehood.
34
  
Therefore, when we read an opinion as controversial as Brown v. Board we must take 
into account that the Court is fashioning a particular version of what they see as the 
truth.  What is significant about White‘s and LaRue‘s approach that differs from 
Charland‘s and McGee‘s is that White and LaRue assume that the Court acts with full 
knowledge and intent.  That is, White and LaRue ascribe agency to the Court instead of 
putting the full responsibility of creating identity with the audience.  The process is 
active on behalf of the Warren court in this instance. 
 LaRue challenges his readers to ask themselves, ―What story is told in an 
opinion?‖  Opinions like that from the Dredd Scott case tell a specific narrative about 
ownership of property and person and the rights of particular groups of people.  It is 
necessarily interpretive, since slavery is not actually mentioned anywhere in the 
Constitution before the 13
th
 Amendment.  Yet the Court confidently decided that the law 
was clear on the issue of slavery and slave states.  This narrative that the Court wove 
stayed a part of the law and its understanding for decades afterward.
35
  And, as LaRue 
rightly points out, when that narrative became a part of the law it became a part of who 
we are as Americans. 
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 LaRue points out that the Court seems to be self-aware of this story of identity 
they are weaving in their opinions.  He points to a 1920 case, Missouri v. Holland, in 
which Justice Holmes clearly lays out the connection between the Court, identity, and 
law: 
When we are dealing with words that also are a constituent act, like the 
Constitution of the United States, we must realize that they [the words] have 
called into life a being the development of which could not have been foreseen 
completely by the most gifted of its begetters.  It was enough from them to 
realize or to hope that they had created an organism; it has taken a century and 
has cost their successors much sweat and blood to prove that they created a 
nation.  The case before us must be considered in the light of our whole 
experience and not merely in that of what was said a hundred years ago.
36
 
 
 In other words, the Court recognized that as they interpreted the law, they were 
both responding to and creating the way in which America was defined.  The language 
of the Court and its decisions are an important part of America‘s developing identity.  A 
nation, like any living thing, changes and grows, and the opinion of the court is both a 
record and a catalyst in our evolution. 
 As mentioned previously, the 1950s represent a tumultuous time in American 
understanding of ourselves.  We had just come from a war that left much of the world in 
shambles, whereas our economy was booming.  We were vying with the Soviet Union 
for the pole position as ultimate superpower, and in such a political climate it seems 
dangerous to be playing fast and loose with the definition of ―American‖ on the home 
front.  And yet, that is precisely what the Court was up to. 
 African Americans fought bravely alongside white soldiers, and many other 
ethnic groups during World War II, and yet America continued to treat them as if they 
were somehow ―less than.‖  The Brown case is illustrative of the identity tension that is 
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at the theoretical heart of this whole study.  The story America told about herself was a 
white story – a unified story about a white, nuclear family that lived in the suburbs and 
happily went about living out the particular roles that the American Dream had etched 
out for them.  The Brown case was a bit of a jolt to the system in that regard.  The case 
announced, loudly and unapologetically, that a whole group of Americans did not fit into 
that narrative, largely because they had been kept out of it.  The Brown case demanded 
that this larger American narrative be looked at under a harsher light than it had been in 
the past, and the result was a fracturing in American identity.  ―American‖ suddenly 
meant more than just the white, middle-class faces of suburbia.  It now had to contend 
with black school children from all over the South, as well. 
Conclusion 
The same year that I upset members of my family with my choice of friends I 
was going to an elementary school in a very old building.  There were three bathrooms 
that the majority of the student body used – a girls bathroom, and boys bathroom, and a 
bathroom specifically for kindergarten and pre-k students.  There was also a separate 
water fountain for each group.  Nothing about this struck me as odd until years later 
during a high school history lesson on segregation.  In our textbooks was a rather iconic 
picture of a black man drinking from a water fountain with a sign above it that said read 
―Colored.‖  Next to him was a larger, cleaner water fountain labeled ―Whites.‖  I 
realized that I could have been looking at a picture of my elementary school.  I reached 
the very unsettling conclusion that what had been the ―kinder/pre-k‖ water fountain was 
not built with children in mind, but segregation. 
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Today such a practice would never be acceptable to the public.  But the signs that 
America had very different notions of ―who counted‖ are everywhere.  Once upon a 
time, not that far back in American history, it took the Supreme Court to face our 
fractured identity and bring it too light.  Using the constitutive nature of their legal 
rhetoric as described by White and LaRue, the Court tried to address the silent nature of 
America‘s fractured identity.  While the opinion is definitively constitutive in that the 
purpose is to create identity, or ―the people‖ as McGee termed it, it is White‘s approach 
that helps understand how that identity was fashioned.  Using criticism as Leff describes 
and framing constitutive rhetoric with White and LaRue, the Court regains its agency in 
creating American identity. 
In an opinion such as this there is no doubt that the Supreme Court knew their 
decision would have far reaching effects.  Just on the surface their opinion touched on 
education, equal rights, and the legality of segregation.  The Court constructed an 
argument that purported a new understanding of ―American‖ which included education 
as an inherent part of the American experience, and the claim that African-Americans 
should have full access to that experience.  Their argument constituted a version of 
American identity based on the notion that the educated populous should include all 
parties, regardless of race. 
The Warren Court did not just issue an opinion, but provided a text that is a 
specific example of constitutive rhetoric.  By applying rhetorical to this one text we can 
see how a rhetor can contribute to the constitution of national identity in a particular 
instance.  While the audience and the narrative and the subject position certainly remain 
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important as Charland has described, here we see how one specific instance adds to the 
narrative that the audience uses to create their identity as they go.  White, with the help 
of LaRue, has given us an opportunity to address this opinion as constitutive and bridge 
criticism and theory.
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CHAPTER III 
JOE MCCARTHY’S LOSS OF CREDIBILITY: NO DECENCY 
The winter Olympics of 2010 happened to coincide with a visit from my mother.  
During one of the skiing events the Russian team, who was heavily favored, was not 
doing as well as expected.  The skier was struggling, and to be honest, so were we.  We 
had no idea what was going on, and since the American team was really kind of a lame 
duck, I did not really feel like I had particular reason to watch.  My mother, however, 
was more interested, so I left the television on for her.  It was not until I heard her 
grumble something rather unsportsmanlike about hoping he completely missed his mark 
and maybe took a tumble that I realized she was not watching to cheer for any particular 
team, so much as to cheer against someone.  I asked her to repeat herself, and she 
blushed a deep scarlet. 
 My mother told me that she knew very well we were not in a Cold War with the 
Soviets anymore.  She understood that the world had changed and we had new enemies, 
and that the enemy she was jeering at, the Soviet Union, did not even really exist 
anymore, but there was a part of her that would always hate Russians.  She was born in 
1954 and had been raised to see them as the enemy, and she half laughingly told me that 
even at that moment, in February 2010, when she heard the word ―Russian‖ she still 
stiffened and felt her stomach turn a bit.  She was taught growing up that there were two 
major forces in the world: Us and Them.  The ―Us‖ was America and those who 
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supported us.  It was her patriotic duty to hate the Russians because they were, and 
apparently always would be, ―Them.‖   
The rest of the night we made a running joke of it.  At regular intervals I would 
ask my mom if the Ruskies had made up any threatening amount of time or if we should 
consider going to the bomb shelter if they lost, but on some level it was a very serious 
reminder of how powerful Cold War rhetoric had been.  The Cold War had been over for 
more than 20 years, but for my mother it was a way of understanding herself and the 
world around her.  Part of being an American was hating Russia.  As I listened to my 
mother disparage these athletes she did not know, I was struck by how important it was 
to her understanding of herself and her place in the world to dislike the old Soviet Union.  
But, she had been born in the age of Joe McCarthy, so perhaps it makes more sense for 
her to feel that way than it would for her not to. 
The term ―McCarthyism‖ first appeared in 1950 in a Washington Post cartoon.  It 
did not take long for it to make its way into the vernacular.  ―McCarthyism‖ initially 
referred to relentless pursuit of Communists a la Senator Joe McCarthy (R-WI), but 
eventually came to mean any form of persecutory investigation (OED).  McCarthy 
waged his battles publically, making himself a household name.
1
  His crusade against 
Communism is synonymous with the Red Scare in general.
2
   
McCarthy, like Nixon, Reagan, and other politicians of his era, found fame and 
power by utilizing the anti-Communist furor that gripped the United States.  In 1950, 
during what should have been a relatively unremarkable speech in Wheeling, West 
Virginia, McCarthy announced he had a list of 205 confirmed Communists working for 
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the U.S. government, putting him at the forefront of the battle against Communism and 
catapulting him into the national spotlight.  Ultimately he was never able to conclusively 
prove that anyone he accused of ―un-American‖ behavior or party affiliation was a 
member of the Communist Party, but his claim that he could transformed him from a 
relatively non-descript Senator to one of the most famous politicians of the Cold War.  
Over the next four years McCarthy became the national symbol for the fight against 
Communism at home.
3
 
These hearings are more than just historically interesting.  As discussed earlier, 
the terms ―American‖ and ―Communist‖ were used as the god and devil terms that 
framed public discourse in the United States.  McCarthy was not only making his 
political name, he was using these hearings as a sort of American purity test.  He 
operated under the idea that one could not be Communist and be ―American‖ at the same 
time.  Certainly he was not alone in this assumption, but he was one of the most public 
and forceful in his efforts to cleanse the un-American from the public eye and from their 
supposedly secretive and nefarious machinations.  McCarthy‘s weapon of choice was 
conspiracy rhetoric; by using the form and function of conspiracy he tried to constitute 
an ―us‖ and ―them.‖ This lasted until he took on the Army.  The Army‘s representative, 
Joseph Welch, threw a monkey wrench into McCarthy‘s agenda by rhetorically 
disallowing McCarthy‘s chokehold on the hearings.  Welch, using wit, style, and 
narrative, illuminated the weakness of McCarthy‘s conspiracy rhetoric until it lost all of 
its potency. 
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McCarthy‘s work was broadly supported for quite some time, until Edward 
Murrow and the Army-McCarthy hearings.  In 1954 Edward R. Murrow made his 
infamous attack on McCarthy in the well-known television news show See It Now.  
Murrow took it upon himself to highlight what he saw as McCarthy‘s underhanded and 
unethical attacks on largely innocent parties, so he ran a series of exposés on McCarthy‘s 
activities.  McCarthy had been losing popularity amongst his fellow politicians for some 
time, and the Murrow incident was the start of a quick decline in McCarthy‘s public 
popularity.
4
  After what Robert L. Ivie calls his ―miserable‖ appearance in the Army-
McCarthy hearings, the Senate voted to censure him for ―‗contemptuous, contumacious, 
denunciatory, unworthy, inexcusable and reprehensible‘ conduct‖ leaving his career and 
his reputation in shambles.
5
  Scholars have given a great deal of attention to the 
exchange between Murrow and McCarthy, but the conflict between Welch and 
McCarthy has escaped much scholarly scrutiny.
6
   
Literature Review 
For works on the Murrow incident, which certainly provide useful background in 
understanding McCarthy‘s status as a soldier in the Cold War, John O‘ Connor‘s 
―Edward R. Murrow Report on Senator McCarthy: Image as Artifact‖ describes the 
McCarthy-Murrow interviews as the beginning of McCarthy‘s demise and the incident 
that left Murrow‘s indelible mark on journalistic history.7  Michael Murray directly 
approaches the See it Now broadcast, but like many others, ignores the Army-McCarthy 
hearings.  He focuses on how Murrow (and his colleague Fred Friendly) assailed 
McCarthy‘s questionable interrogation tactics.8  Brian Thornton takes a slightly broader 
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view and analyzes public response to Murrow including those who took offense to 
Murrow‘s selective approach to highlighting the worst of McCarthy‘s career.9  All 
together, Greg Vitiello hails the entire event as a testament to the power of television, 
calling the exchange ―Television‘s Finest Moment.‖10  
For studies of the Army-McCarthy hearings see ―Flickering Images: Live 
Television Coverage and Viewership of the Army-McCarthy Hearings‖ by Michael 
Gauger in Historian, 2005 or ―Are you Now or Have You Ever Been?  Opening the 
Record of the McCarthy Investigations‖ by Donald Ritchie in the Journal of 
Government Information, 2004.
11
  These studies deal with media and political issues, but 
do not address the event from a rhetorical perspective.   
There are works, however, that focus on McCarthy‘s powerful use of oratory and 
his status as a demagogue.  Fred Casmir, in ―The Power of Oral Communication,‖ uses 
Joe McCarthy as an example of how a powerful orator can become a powerful person 
through public discourse in American life.
12
  Barnet Baskerville, a contemporary of 
McCarthy, went so far as to call McCarthy the greatest of demagogue of the 1950s in an 
issue of Today’s Speech.13 
A good deal of the studies dealing with McCarthy in communication studies deal 
more with media theory than rhetorical theory because of the importance of television to 
the hearings.  For example, Pamela Brown‘s article in History of the Mass Media of the 
United States deals specifically with media coverage that the Army-McCarthy hearings 
received.
14
 Studies more pertinent to this paper include Paul Achter‘s ―TV, Technology, 
and McCarthyism: Crafting the Democratic Renaissance in an Age of Fear,‖ QJS, 2004, 
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and 1955‘s ―Views on the Army-McCarthy Hearings,‖ by Frederick Haberman.15  
Achter‘s study gives a brief history of McCarthy‘s career then analyzes the effect of 
television; however, Achter focuses on the Murrow exchange.  Haberman‘s paper is a 
contemporary analysis of the Army-McCarthy hearings.  However, neither focus on the 
moment as a rhetorically important moment or considers the importance of identity or 
conspiracy in the proceedings.  James Darsey‘s work, ―Joe McCarthy‘s Fantastic 
Moment,‖ is interesting in that he focuses on fantasy as opposed to conspiracy, but it 
seems we have both hit on thematic elements in McCarthy‘s rhetoric that made it 
particularly powerful. 
McCarthy‘s illustrious career inspired countless history books, both popular and 
academic, most of which are a truly fascinating read.  Richard M. Fried‘s Nightmare in 
Red: The McCarthy Era in Perspective is an overview of those few years in which 
McCarthy really did dominate the political scene, but more broadly focused on the 
history and politics as opposed to just the one man.  He gives accounts of many of the 
memorable characters that worked together to make the years between 1947-1954 so 
notable, making sure to contextualize them as responsive to WWII and the Depression 
before that.
16
  David Halberstam‘s The Fifties has a few chapters dedicated to McCarthy, 
as does Richard Curry‘s and Thomas Brown‘s Conspiracy: The Fear of Subversion in 
American History.
17
  William L. O‘Neill wrote a book called American High: The Years 
of Confidence, 1945-1960 that has been a popular book among amateur historians and 
academics alike in helping to frame the Cold War at large. It is helpful in understanding 
how McCarthy became such a powerful figure, but once again it is not a rhetorical study 
  
92 
and does not focus singularly on the McCarthy-Welch exchange.  Robert Shogan‘s No 
Sense of Decency: The Army McCarthy Hearings: A Demagogue Falls and Television 
Takes Charge of American Politics follows McCarthy‘s career in great detail, leading up 
to the very moment I choose to focus on in my own study.
18
  Shogan pays a great deal of 
attention to the McCarthy-Welch incident, but focuses on the role that television played 
in the demise of McCarthy‘s career, and not the rhetoric itself.  Perhaps the most 
surprising popular study I stumbled across was M. Stanton Evans‘s Blacklisted by 
History: the Untold Story of Senator Joe McCarthy which was an unapologetic defense 
of the Senator and his tactics that painted him as an American hero instead of the usual 
picture of him as an unscrupulous witch hunter.
19
  Of all the tales I read about McCarthy 
Evans‘s was the one that was most memorable for no other reason than it was the most 
different.  Evans‘s story takes the same information as all of the other stories and studies 
but the narrative is from a considerably more conservative view.  Reading Evan‘s book 
provides an interesting balance to McCarthy‘s story, even if it seems out of place in 
comparison to the myriad other books that paint McCarthy as the villain of the story. 
I mention these not to frame a chapter that is based on popular history books, but 
to make the point that Senator Joseph McCarthy, and even this particular moment from 
his infamous career as a Communist hunter, has captured the attention of the mainstream 
public as well as historians for over fifty years.  His meteoric rise to fame and his public 
downfall is the stuff of American legend.   
If anything, these popular histories indicate that Joe McCarthy, and what 
happened to him on that fateful day in 1954, is worth the attention of academics in many 
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fields because people recognize the instance as important.  The entire hearing took 
weeks and would not lend itself to a close reading; however this analysis focuses on one 
exchange in particular.   
In popular vernacular the Welch-McCarthy exchange I refer to is often labeled 
the ―Have You No Sense of Decency‖ incident.  That, in and of itself, is nestled within 
Welch‘s examination of G. David Schine, who had been working with McCarthy in his 
investigations into Communist infiltration in the government.  Welch and McCarthy 
begin to argue about Roy Cohn‘s testimony; Cohn was an assistant of McCarthy and 
worked closely with Schine and McCarthy.  Welch demands that if Cohn knows for 
certain that there are a specific number of Communists working in the government and 
he knows where, why doesn‘t he do something about it.  McCarthy mocks Welch and 
defends Cohn by claiming that the FBI is in charge of such things and McCarthy and his 
crew only aim to make things public.  The meat of their exchange begins when 
McCarthy turns on Welch by bringing up the young lawyer Fred Fisher.  McCarthy 
begins ―Not exactly, Mr. Chairman, but in view of Mr. Welch‘s request that the 
information be given once we know of anyone who might be performing any work for 
the Communist party, I think we should tell him that he has in his law firm a young 
man…‖ ending with Welch‘s infamous ―have you no decency?‖  The exchange is 
lengthy, but important in understanding McCarthy‘s career and his notion of 
―American.‖  I will include a summary of the full transcript, but focus my analysis on 
the McCarthy-Welch exchange.
20
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History 
McCarthy decided it was his personal mission to root out Communists and save 
the federal government from itself.
21
  He spent the next few years of his career finding 
ways to do just that.  It is easy to excuse McCarthy‘s outlandish public actions as the 
rantings of a madman, but we forget that the Cold War was a dramatic time.  Fear was 
pervasive, and Communism truly seemed a threat to the very existence of the American 
way of life.  In such dramatic times, men of melodrama thrive. Men like Louis Francis 
Budenz came forward with information that seemed to justify the antics of McCarthy 
and men like him.  Budenz claimed to be a reformed Communist himself, and not only 
announced that they were other Communists operating in America, but that there was, in 
fact, a plot to take over the United States, fueling the fear-driven anti-Communist 
furor.
22
  Americans were genuinely afraid of a vast conspiracy aimed at nothing less than 
global domination.  McCarthy‘s announcement that he knew where Communists were 
and he could name names was frightening on the one hand, because he announced there 
were so many and they were in high places, but comforting on the other.  The 
Communists were not a secret to McCarthy.  He could point them out, thereby 
neutralizing the threat.  America feared an unknown enemy at home, and McCarthy 
claimed he could remove the cloud of doubt by unmasking the enemy and making them 
known.  Many Americans flocked to him. 
Senator Joseph McCarthy became chair of the Permanent Subcommittee in Jan. 
of 1953.
23
  The committee had looked into tax issues and government contracts in the 
past, but it did have rather flexible parameters.  It was Eisenhower‘s first term, and the 
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Senator and the President would prove to be contentious bedfellows, regardless of the 
fact that they were both Republicans.  The job of the permanent Subcommittee was not 
specifically to root out Communism, but once McCarthy had the reigns, that changed.  
He began a series of investigations into various branches of the government in his never 
ceasing quest to purge American of Red influences.  Eventually his gaze fell on the 
Armed Forces.   
The impetus for the Army-McCarthy hearings, which were more like a trial than 
anything else, seemed to be the treatment of an Army private, G. David Schine.  Schine 
was McCarthy‘s unpaid assistant until he was drafted into the Army in the midst of 
McCarthy‘s probes into supposed Communist infiltration of army ranks.  The Army 
accused McCarthy and his aid, Roy Cohn, who had a reputation for being arrogant and 
rather strident, of demanding special treatment for Schine, while McCarthy and Cohn 
accused the Army of mistreating Schine in an effort to get back at McCarthy for having 
the audacity to look into their affairs.  
24
 
While McCarthy had been looking into the Army for reasons other than just the 
Schine scandal, by the time the hearing rolled around each side had a score to settle.  The 
Army needed a representative to pull their case together and stand up to McCarthy, 
which was no small task.  Joseph Welch, a lawyer from Boston, agreed to represent 
them.  He asked two junior associates to be his aides, but decided that one should sit this 
one out because of past associations that could be construed as questionable.
25
  This 
seemingly innocuous decision made in a cocktail lounge in a hotel would later lead to 
one of the most infamous moments of the Cold War.  Welch tried to nip the situation in 
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the bud by telling the New York Times that he and the young lawyer, Fred Fischer, had 
mutually decided he would not be involved in the case.  The Times thought the story 
relatively uninteresting, as did McCarthy, so while it was briefly mentioned in a story 
ultimately no one really paid any attention.
26
   
In the first few days of the trial McCarthy dominated, but as the trial went on 
Welch began to make calculated strikes.  He was a particularly witty man and using a sly 
remark here and there could highlight the bluster and blowhardiness that McCarthy 
depended on.  He began to chip away at the ―evidence‖ McCarthy presented and point to 
some of the more curious and fantastic instances of logic that McCarthy tried to use to 
make his case.  Slowly but surely he chipped away not only at McCarthy‘s case, but at 
McCarthy‘s credibility. 
McCarthy‘s reputation had already suffered some public damage because of 
Edward Murrow‘s attention.  His poor performance at the Army hearings did not do him 
any favors.  Welch was doing a particularly good job of making Cohn look bad, when 
McCarthy tried to divert attention away by attacking the young lawyer that Welch had 
excused.  Fred Fisher, who was not a part of the event at all, had been a part of a 
professional organization that McCarthy found particularly odious, and McCarthy tried 
to discredit Welch by association.  When a furious Welch asked McCarthy if he had any 
decency left it appeared to many as if the answer was an all too clear and resounding 
―no.‖  The Republican Party felt that, perhaps, McCarthy had become a liability and 
began to distance themselves from the Senator.  On July 30, 1954 Republican Senator 
Ralph E. Flanders asked the Senate to censure his colleague from Wisconsin.
27
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Analysis 
There are two rhetors, each making separate arguments, and an analysis of their 
arguments does a good deal to highlight the confusion and their cross-purposes. 
McCarthy‘s argument was multi-pronged.  In fact, part of McCarthy‘s rhetorical troubles 
stemmed from his inability to find a clear cut claim and stay with it.  In this particular 
instance he was claiming that there was a dangerous Communist influence in the Army, 
but he was also using his pulpit to argue that Schine had been mistreated.  His major 
claim dealt with Communism – that was initially why the hearing was organized.  But 
McCarthy let himself get sidetracked with other arguments, and it muddied the waters.  
Given the already complex nature of conspiracy rhetoric, he hurt himself by trying to do 
too much at once.   
In the Welch-McCarthy exchange we see McCarthy switching back and forth 
between a number of arguments: at first he is arguing that there are Communists in the 
Army.  But, he maintains, Schine and Cohn are honorable men and are doing an 
excellent job in the fight against Communism regardless of the fact that Communists 
have infiltrated their territory.  Already a persnickety listener might begin to question 
McCarthy‘s notions of what constitutes an excellent job.  He seemed to want his 
audience to believe that there was a vast Communist conspiracy at work, and be upset 
with the Army for letting it happen, but not be upset with his men.  They may have been 
the ones charged with addressing the problem, but they were doing an excellent job, 
unlike the Army, he claimed.  Then, he entered a new argument.  He claimed that Welch 
was a questionable figure because he had associations with men of questionable 
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character.  With varying claims, the burden of evidence is greater, and one can see from 
the proof McCarthy provided that the organization of his argument was tenuous at best.  
His support came from ―confidential‖ documents, anecdotes from witnesses, his own 
grand proclamations concerning the facts of the case, and those he called as ―experts.‖  It 
was difficult to verify, and much of it seemed to rest on McCarthy‘s credibility.  
Furthermore, all of this proof was used interchangeably for each different argument.  He 
did not separate out his arguments, but connected them in a vast web.  His argument was 
that they were all connected through the workings of the Communist conspiracy.  
Communists were everywhere and they were evil.  He used conspiracy to connect dots 
all over the place.  What we knew, did not know, and how it all fit together were covered 
by a very vague net. The conspiracy ended up being the crux of McCarthy‘s argument, 
and we were supposed to accept the conspiracy because of McCarthy‘s credibility as a 
public figure and Communist fighter.  Welch was eventually able to take McCarthy 
down by attacking McCarthy‘s ethos, and once McCarthy‘s credibility was shot, his web 
of evidence does not hang together. 
A Few Notes on Conspiracy Rhetoric 
McCarthy‘s career as we remember it was largely based on his fixation with 
Communist conspiracy.  When McCarty and Welch faced off McCarthy was, according 
to him, trying to uncover the scheme of the Communists within the Army to take down 
the US government.  In order to understand how McCarthy fit in rhetorically with his 
surroundings, it helps to have an overview of conspiracy. 
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Conspiracy, at its most basic, is the theory that a group is acting covertly to 
achieve malevolent ends.
28
  First there is an event that is considered strange – perhaps an 
accident, something illegal or a mistake with significant consequences; perhaps the event 
is some combination of any of those.  Regardless, there is some event that creates a 
stir.
29
  Secondly, this event is shrouded in a certain amount of secrecy.  This secrecy 
leads people to create a narrative that makes sense of the incident.
30
  Leroy Dorsey 
reminds us that the classic conspiracy theory, before it becomes complicated by 
postmodern tendencies to blur the line between good and evil, ―emphasize[s] an 
overarching force, benign in appearance but malevolent in actuality.‖  While the evil 
nature of this force is frightening, it also supplies a certain amount of relief to the masses 
because it explains the world around them and why ―bad things‖ happen.31 
In most conspiracy theories one may assume that nothing can be taken at face 
value, nothing happens by accident, and everything is connected.
32
  So while there may 
be an official explanation, it may not satisfy certain members of the public.
33
  The theory 
begins to loop around itself; the more evidence that is produced, the more there is to 
question.
34
  Earl Crepps III argues in his dissertation that conspiracies are a particular 
genre, and that their substance consists of four basic parts:  
1) The conspiracy argument claims that the community is being threatened by an 
evil force personified as a secret plot. 
2) The conspiracy argument makes a deductive, causal claim. 
3) The conspiracy argument evinces a strictly dichotomous view of morality. 
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4) The conspiracy argument is capable of co-opting or refuting virtually any 
criticism.
35
 
McCarthy claimed that Communism, a great evil, was threatening the very fabric 
of American life, and that he could claim so because of logic based on documented 
evidence.  There was no middle ground in this fight – there were only ―us‖ and ―them‖ 
and to stand up to ―us‖ meant you supported ―them.‖  Criticism of McCarthy or his 
methods simply put you at risk of being labeled a ―fellow traveler.‖36 
Senator Joe McCarthy was also the example par excellence of what Richard 
Hofstadter called the paranoid style of the conspiracy theorist.  The ―paranoiac,‖ as 
Hofstadter termed those who buy whole heartedly into conspiracy, who convinces 
himself of political conspiracy is not just a crazy person who believes the whole world is 
out to get him personally.  He believes that the conspiracy is ―directed against a nation, a 
culture, a way of life whose fate affects not himself alone but millions of others.  Insofar 
as he does not usually see himself singled out as the individual victim of a personal 
conspiracy, he is somewhat more rational‖ than what we might think of when we accuse 
someone of paranoia.  McCarthy, like Hofstadter explains, felt his mission was patriotic 
and righteous.
37
  What McCarthy feared, Hofstadter posits, was dispossession.  
Somehow America, her lifestyle or her values or something that made her American, 
was being threatened and McCarthy wanted to protect it.
38
 
This is the major connection to constitutive rhetoric and my research question.  
McCarthy‘s concern, as elucidated by Hofstadter, was not just political corruption but 
the loss of something inherently American.  He argued that as Communist influence 
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spread, the nation would lose its very identity.  Communist corruption was not simply a 
breach of security, but a threat to our very notion of self. 
Conspiracy theories generally do not need to be proven, for their adherents it is 
enough that they cannot be unproven.  A conspiracy theorist might reason that  
because the conspiracy is so powerful, it controls virtually all of the channels 
through which information is disseminated – universities, media, and so forth.  
Further, the conspiracy desires at all costs to conceal its activities, so it will use 
its control over knowledge production and dissemination to mislead those who 
seek to expose it.  Hence information that appears to put a conspiracy theory in 
doubt must have been planted by the conspirators themselves in order to 
mislead.
39
 
 
In other words, the system is closed.  McCarthy‘s spin on this was to present 
accusations and hint at proof, but then when it failed to pass muster, simply move on to 
the next charge, leaving the foul hint of evil in the air without any recourse to clear it.  
He used the conspiracy theory‘s intrinsic tendencies toward doubt and secrecy to create 
an atmosphere in which his role was not to prove but to create an ambience of fear.
40
 
Peter Knight argues that conspiracy rhetoric is important because we use it as a 
way to build identity for ourselves, much the way Lyotard describes smaller narratives 
as constitutive.  Specifically, the more clearly we can create a notion of ―them,‖ the 
more comfortable we feel being ―us.‖  And as we more clearly define ourselves it 
becomes easier to distinguish the ―good guys‖ from the ―bad guys‖ (with ―us‖ being the 
―good guys,‖ of course!).41  We need to make this kind of distinction.  The enemy must 
be twisted and strange, evil and smart, powerful and without pity.  Otherwise, Goodnight 
and Poulakis eloquently explain, we are at the mercy of a ―world gone mad.‖42  A 
tendency to use a conspiracy as a small narrative to help us construct meaning and 
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identity is why conspiracy rhetoric, which has long been with us, has been earmarked as 
particularly postmodern.  Conspiracy rhetoric is not new, but using it as a replacement 
for a grand narrative sets the paranoid style of today apart from that of the conspirators 
of ancient Rome or the Civil War.  The madness that Goodnight and Poulakis warn us 
about, in which the ―good guys‖ and the ―bad guys‖ are impossible to differentiate, is a 
symptom of postmodernity creeping its way across the American landscape, dismantling 
our major narratives as it engulfs us.  James Darsey describes the situation precisely and 
articulately: 
The horror of the Second World War, the second in as many generations, was 
certainly unsettling to American.  Everything was on a scale that made a 
profanity of human being – Hitler, the scope of the war, the new technologies of 
war, and the bomb‖  Weaver (1976), in his noteworthy post-war polemic, called 
it ‗a marvelous confusion of values‘ (p. 179).  If the war itself was unsettling, the 
aftermath was even more so.  There was no return to normalcy as there had been 
after the First World War.  For all our victory parades and celebrations of the end 
of the war to end war, there was inconclusiveness about World War II; we could 
not simply disarm and return to a peace-time economy when it was over.  
America had new responsibilities in a world that had gotten smaller since the 
First World War.
43
 
 
To those who supported McCarthy he did not just fight Communism; he was 
symbolic of the fight for right in a world gone terribly wrong.  His distrust of foreigners, 
intellectuals, the wealthy, and radicals struck a chord with small town, traditional 
conservatives who viewed the changing world with fear and trepidation.
44
  McCarthy 
valued a particular version of American identity, and his fight against Communist 
corruption was a fight against the encroaching changes America was facing in the post 
war world. 
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Postmodernism does not corner the conspiracy theory market, but the two do go 
well together.  Peter Knight sees the overload of partial information available to us in the 
postmodern world as leading to an opportunity for conspiracy to rear its head.  By partial 
information I mean that while in the postmodern era there is an infinite amount of 
information, it is still difficult to ever get a full story on any one topic.  There is always a 
part of a story that is left out or remains unseen.  Conspiracy offers a way for paranoiacs 
to tie together the vast amount of information that is available to them in a cohesive 
narrative.  Within that narrative there is inevitably a corrupt group or person who is 
infiltrating other parts of the world/society/social group, which is necessary to fill in 
those gaps caused by missing information.
45
  This also points to a key element of any 
good conspiracy theory: secrecy.  The missing information can‘t just be missing, as there 
is no such thing as accident, the information must be hidden somewhere; somebody is 
keeping a secret.
46
  If one returns to Dorsey‘s comments about classic conspiracy theory, 
it appears as if McCarthy is trying to straddle modern and postmodern ideas about ―good 
guys‖ and ―bad guys.‖  Dorsey notes that in the classic conspiracy the villains of the 
conspiracy theory are direct enemies of the state, but as time progresses this changes.  
He notes that beginning in the 1960s the state itself is suspect.
47
  McCarthy however, 
was ahead of the curve.  On the one hand, his goal was rooting out Communists for the 
good of America.  On the other hand, he claimed that the conspiracy was rooted within 
the government itself.  He was determined to find those enemies planted within the state, 
hence his attack on the army.  His enemies of the state are within the state. 
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One would think that since in a conspiracy theory facts are supposed to be 
slippery, things like McCarthy‘s inaccessible proof would help him.  But, since he is 
making multiple arguments and the information was not actually inaccessible, McCarthy 
had gotten himself into quite a pickle. What was evidence for one argument was 
background information for another.  For example, a story of Schine‘s suffering was 
meant to support the claim that Schine was being singled out by the Army, but also 
pointed to a larger problem in the way the organization was run.  As noted before, the 
arguments all meshed together.  A witness who claimed there were ―x‖ number of 
Communists at certain Army bases supported the conspiracy theory, but any conspiracy 
would lead to Schine being mistreated since his boss was one of the leading Communist 
hunters.  The conflation did little to help clarify McCarthy‘s position.   
However, McCarthy was quick to defend himself and his disciples from charges 
of any kind of wrong doing.  After every accusation he might as well have added ―except 
for me and mine.‖  Every bit of evidence, story, sketchy proof or invalid claim was not 
his problem.  He excused himself from all of the claims he made, from the conspiracy in 
the government, to the infiltration of the Army, and he was exempt from being kept in 
the dark when it came to ―classified‖ information for the sake of national safety.48  Since 
McCarthy had made such a convoluted argument  he left himself open to Welch for 
attack, and Welch made much cleaner work of the whole affair. 
Welch‘s job was to represent the Army, and his arguments were relatively 
straightforward.  Schine was not mistreated.  In fact, the Army posited, McCarthy and 
Cohn requested special treatment for their compatriot.  Also, Schine was not a 
  
105 
particularly good soldier. The Army‘s proof was reports from Schine‘s superior officers.  
Note that the Army‘s proof was simple and straightforward.  It was not classified in any 
way and did not require a huge leap of faith outside of trusting an officer to fairly assess 
a soldier.  The Army claimed that they simply treated Schine as they would have treated 
any soldier with his record.  Unfortunately, since he was not a particularly good soldier, 
he did not get treated particularly well, but that was not mistreatment.  It is a much 
cleaner syllogistic argument than McCarthy had provided.  Welch and the Army did 
qualify this – they claim that Schine actually got off a little easier because of his 
connection to McCarthy.  If anything, his treatment was preferential.  While the appeal 
to ethos was implied in such a situation, Welch and the Army were asking their audience 
to believe they are trustworthy enough to accept that their syllogistic argument held 
together, they were not using their credibility as a premise.  McCarthy‘s arguments beg 
the question: he claimed to know a thing to be true, he provided the evidence, therefore, 
it must be true.  Welch avoided that particular fallacy, depending on the evidence itself 
to bear out their arguments instead of relying on conspiracy.  McCarthy was depending 
on his conspiracy rhetoric to throw the validity of the Army‘s assessment of Schine into 
question.  McCarthy‘s aimed requires a larger leap of faith and reasoning than simply 
following the chain of evidence provided by Welch and the Army. 
Welch behaved as a defense lawyer in any trial.  He was not trying to prove that 
his client was innocent, he was pointing out that the opposition‘s argument was flawed.  
His overall claim was not that ―there are no Communists‖ or ―Fisher is innocent‖ but 
that ―the argument before us is unconvincing.‖  He had leave to defend himself and 
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Fisher when the time came because he was not encumbered with trying to prove too 
many things at once.  Welch‘s job throughout was to use McCarthy‘s own arguments, 
and, in some instances, even McCarthy‘s own words, and point out where they were 
lacking.  As noted before, much of McCarthy‘s case rested on his credibility.  When he 
attacked Fisher, Welch took the opportunity to dismantle McCarthy‘s ethos.  When 
Welch was able to effectively tear down McCarthy‘s shaky foundation of credibility, the 
rest of his case faltered as well.   
When confronted, Welch claimed that McCarthy had no business bringing up 
Fisher.  Welch claimed that Fisher was not relevant as he was not there to effect the 
proceedings in any way, and proceeded to provide the entire narrative of Fisher‘s 
removal from the case.  It was his attack on McCarthy‘s credibility that was most 
damaging.  He decried an outright lack of decency from McCarthy.  Decent people did 
not behave this way.  Decent people did not partake in un-necessary character 
assassination.  And it seemed to Welch that McCarthy had no decency.  With 
McCarthy‘s decency went his credibility, and with his credibility went his case. 
The moment in question began rather innocuously with Secretary of the Army, 
Robert T. Stevens, giving a brief account of the events leading up to the hearing.  He 
claimed that Roy Cohn, one of McCarthy‘s assistants, insisted that David Schine receive 
a commission.  Schine, Stevens explained, was unqualified.  But before he could get to 
any kind of substance, McCarthy interrupted.  He claimed ―Point of order,‖ which, at 
this point in the hearings, had become a bit of a gag with those watching the 
proceedings.  McCarthy continually clamored for this ―Point of order,‖ though nobody 
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really knew what that meant.  However, Senator Mundt, the head of the proceedings, 
was still willing to indulge McCarthy. 
Stevens claimed at this hearing it was his responsibility to speak for the Army, 
which, he reminded the listeners, was a vast number.  Senator McCarthy interrupted 
immediately – he argued that Stevens did not speak for the army, but for Stevens, John 
G. Adams, a Counselor for the Army, and H. Struve Hensel, General Counsel of the 
United States Department of Defense.  His claim was that since they were investigating 
Communists, which were a very small percentage, that most of the good honorable folks 
in the Army, the majority, were not represented by Stevens.  McCarthy‘s implication 
was pretty clear – Stevens, Adams, and Hensel represented the Communists in the 
Army.  McCarthy spent a good deal of energy on this not so subtle attack on Stevens.  
He claimed that the entire proceeding was meant to investigate ―some Communists in 
the Army, a very small percentage, I would say much less than 1 percent‖ so when 
Stevens claimed to speak for the Army ―he is putting the 99.9 percent of good, 
honorable, loyal men in the Army into the position of trying to oppose the exposure of 
Communists in the Army.‖  The intention was relatively clear: McCarthy wanted to 
attack Stevens‘s ethos by associating him with Communism, and McCarthy wanted to 
build up his own ethos by honoring the Armed services.  He finished with a flourish and 
an attempt to bolster his own image by coming to the ready for the Army.  He postured 
that he resented ―very, very much this attempt to connect the great American Army with 
this attempt to sabotage the efforts of this committee‘s investigation into Communism.‖ 
McCarthy‘s personal and argumentative style was very clear in this short exchange.  
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McCarthy‘s main mode of attack was to go after the credibility of the person in question, 
regardless of proof or circumstance.  And, by use of comparison, he tried to bolster his 
own credibility.  
The next section of the hearing was actually a conversation between Adams and 
Ray H. Jenkins, Special Counsel to the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on 
Investigations.  Adams describes a conversation with Cohn, concerning Schine‘s 
treatment, which did not paint Cohn or any of his peers in a good light.  Adams 
described Cohn as angry and abusive.  Cohn‘s vitriol even extended to McCarthy 
himself.  Cohn was livid that Schine was not getting the special assignment he had 
requested, and enraged that ―Senator McCarthy was not supporting his staff in its efforts 
to get Schine assigned to New York.‖  While it might seem as if this would be good for 
McCarthy because Cohn did not feel McCarthy was doing enough to get special 
treatment for a member of his team, McCarthy was still guilty by association.  Cohn was 
McCarthy‘s proverbial right hand man.  McCarthy himself was present for this 
exchange, and vacillated between silence and trying to calm Cohn down.  
The real blow from Adams testimony put McCarthy‘s conspiracy rhetoric in 
question, however.  Adams claimed to try and gently bring up the possibility that Schine 
would serve overseas instead of NY, because most men in his position did.  Cohn‘s 
response was a blatant threat.  He claimed they would remove the current Secretary of 
the Army and told Adams, forcefully, ―We will wreck the Army.‖  Cohn claimed that 
they would not even bother with attacking the Army themselves but set another 
committee of Congress on the Army. 
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While McCarthy was not the man accused of such machinations, he certainly 
appeared guilty by association.  In all of this McCarthy made no attempt to distance 
himself from Cohn.  He remained protective of and loyal to his partner. 
In the following exchange, where Jenkins questioned Cohn, Cohn categorically 
denied these accusations.  Cohn even called on another man, also supposedly present for 
the exchange, to deny that he ever made such threats against the Army or the Secretary 
of the Army.  He turned the accusations around.  He claimed that he did not believe 
Adams could believe he said such things; as such an idea was ―ridiculous.‖  Cohn was 
rather haughty in his responses.  He did not claim that Adams was mistaken or that there 
was a miscommunication, he just flatly denied everything he was accused of. 
Cohn added to the conspiracy theory that McCarthy had already been arguing for 
months.  Instead of trying to make sense of the situation as a misunderstanding or 
explain away his behavior, Cohn simply denied any of it ever happened.  It all came 
down to he-said/he-said.  Who one believed at this juncture was a matter of credibility 
and little else. 
Mr. Welch recognized the situation for what it was.  He began to question Cohn 
on a different subject, bringing the dialogue away from Schine and back to Communists 
in the Army.  This was more stable ground to navigate, as Welch could more easily 
demand actual proof instead of just listen to accusations fly back and forth.  Welch 
displayed his rhetorical sophistication by moving the conversation back to a topic he 
could control more so than just attacks on character. 
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Welch demanded to know how many Communists were working in defense 
plants, and he wanted an exact number because he didn‘t ―want the sun to go down 
while they are still in there, if we can get them out.‖  Welch demanded the information 
in detail.  He would not allow the conspiracy rhetoric to carry the day with vague 
aspersions.  He demanded verifiable and observable information. 
Cohn estimated there were about 130 Communists in 16 plants and Welch began 
demanding that somebody do something right then since we apparently had the 
information.  If we had the information, Welch reasoned, why hadn‘t we done something 
about it?  McCarthy, in an attempt to protect his protégée, joined the conversation.  But 
McCarthy chose to address the Chairman, Senator Karl Mundt (R-SD), instead of 
Welch, demanding that they not be ridiculous.  He claimed the Welch knew, because 
McCarthy had explained it to him, that the FBI had all of this information, and that all he 
could do at this point was to try and publically expose them.  McCarthy used a particular 
figure here – apostrophe.  Instead of addressing an audience that is absent, however, 
McCarthy used a third party to address his primary audience.  Apostrophe is common 
enough in hearings and is used to create some kind of neutral ground – the third party is 
the mediator.  This was meant to be a caustic reminder to Welch, but McCarthy chose 
not to even speak to Welch but to speak to the Chairman instead.  This provided a sense 
of formality, and it served to distance himself from his undesirable sparring partner.  
Ultimately, he implied that Welch was simply being obtuse.  Welch, however, did not 
take the bait.  He simply returned to demanding more and more exact information and 
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asking for Cohn‘s accountability in the fight against these supposed Communist 
infiltrators.   
Cohn and Welch went back and forth for a bit, with neither one really making 
great strides, until McCarthy stepped in again.  Once again, McCarthy employed the 
apostrophe.  He informed the Chairman, and all who were listening that he thought they 
should inform Welch that Welch was a part of the conspiracy.  Welch employed 
Communists.  McCarthy used Welch‘s own words against him, trying to get Welch to 
incriminate himself again and again, but Welch would not let McCarthy wrestle those 
words away and use them as a tool against him.  Just as Welch had asked Cohn to 
quickly and efficiently address the known Communist problem, McCarthy turned on 
Welch demanding the same thing.  McCarthy also tried to take over the encounter by 
sheer time of possession – McCarthy, as was his practice, tried to turn the hearing into a 
bully pulpit for himself and not let others get a word in edgewise.  His first argument 
was that Welch employed a man, Fred Fisher, who was a member of the ―legal 
bulwark,‖ a phrase he used repeatedly, of the Communist Party.  McCarthy equivocated 
on Welch‘s specific role in the conspiracy.  On the one hand he assumed that ―Mr. 
Welch did not know of this young man at the time he recommended him as the assistant 
counsel for this committee,‖ but within a matter of sentences called Welch a phony 
because of his demand to ―get every Communist out of government out before 
sundown.‖  McCarthy seemed to have forgotten his surroundings – in this hearing he 
was not giving a monologue, and his target was not a frightened victim.  Welch was a 
clever and quick-witted lawyer who was well researched and well-prepared and made 
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sure that each of McCarthy‘s mistakes were used against him in the narrative he gave in 
response. 
McCarthy made a number of errors in this rant, but one of the most damaging 
was to rely on his tendency to hyperbolize.  In this case a number of people had access to 
the same information that he did, so his conspiratorial interpretations were open to closer 
scrutiny.  So when he claimed that Welch tried to ―foist‖ Fisher on this committee he got 
himself into trouble.  In trying to implicate Welch in this far-reaching Communist 
conspiracy, he opened himself up to criticism from a number of parties, and to do so in a 
way that was personally insulting to Welch certainly did not endear him to those who 
recognize that he was trying to pull a fast one, so to speak.  McCarthy forgot that the 
secrecy element of his conspiracy theory is not as secret as it had been in the past.  As 
the architect of this particular manifestation of the ―us/them‖ Communist narrative, 
McCarthy‘s hold on the conspiracy loosened ever so slightly.  If a successful conspiracy 
theory depends on limited proof then McCarthy‘s gamble of bringing in outsiders with 
access to the same information as he had seemed ill-advised.  And if McCarthy‘s goal 
was to help America create a specific ―us‖ identity in relationship to ―them,‖ by using a 
conspiracy theory, jeopardizing that narrative was problematic at best. 
I am not asking you at this time to explain why you tried to foist him on this 
committee.  Whether you knew he was a member of the Communist organization 
or not, I don‘t know.  I assume you did not, Mr. Welch, because I get the 
impression that, while you are quite an actor, you play for a laugh, I don‘t think 
you have any conception of the danger of the Communist Party.  I don‘t think 
you yourself would every knowingly aid the Communist cause.  I think you are 
unknowingly aiding it when you try to burlesque this hearing in which we are 
attempting to bring out the facts, however.
49
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McCarthy‘s accusations got both more insulting and convoluted as he moved 
forward.  He claimed on the one hand that he was certain that Welch would not help the 
Communist cause, but he was clearly not on the up and up – he was an actor who was 
making a mockery of these hearings.  But his most serious accusation was that Welch 
was ignorant of the extent of the conspiracy.  Welch simply did not understand precisely 
how dangerous the enemy was, and he was therefore aiding the enemy by taking 
Communism too lightly.  The conspiracy, he argued, was so vast that Welch could not 
grapple with its seriousness.  Welch could not be trusted to competently deal with the 
conspiracy.  McCarthy not only brought the hearing back to the Communist conspiracy 
as opposed to Schine‘s situation, but also tried to cripple Welch‘s ethos.  Here the 
exchange became more heated.   
At this point both Chairman Mundt and Welch had enough of McCarthy‘s 
ranting.  Mundt bypassed McCarthy altogether and assured Welch that he knew Welch 
never recommended Fisher for this committee, and Welch tried respond to these 
accusations, but McCarthy tried to butt in.  Welch, clearly annoyed, began to borrow 
McCarthy‘s own tactics against him.  He used McCarthy‘s words, and the exchange took 
on an edgier tone: 
Mr. Welch: Senator McCarthy, I did not know – Senator, sometimes you say 
―May I have your attention?‖ 
Senator McCarthy: I am listening to you. I can listen with one ear. 
Mr. Welch: This time I want you to listen with both.
50
 
 
Welch tried to address McCarthy directly, but McCarthy ran pell-mell over him 
demanding that his aids provide proof that Fisher, whom Welch recommended, did 
belong to a branch of the Communist Party.  This was the last straw for Welch. 
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Welch provided all the ―evidence‖ McCarthy could possibly need.  He 
effectively took every bit of ethos McCarthy might have garnered from his claims of 
evidence and conspiratorial secrecy and obliterated it by making McCarthy‘s evidence of 
Welch‘s supposedly nefarious behavior public and moot.  Welch himself admitted that 
he initially asked Fisher if he might consider working on the case, but Fisher admitted to 
associations with the Lawyer‘s Guild, and though he was also secretary of the Young 
Republicans League, they recognized this could cause problems.  Together, Fisher and 
Welch decided he should not work on the case. 
Welch‘s narrative was interesting in that he seemed to switch in and out of styles 
in the beginning middle and end.  Welch was known for a rather old fashioned way of 
speaking and being eloquent and articulate in ways one might consider stylistically 
antiquated.  The beginning of his narrative was eloquent and his word choice was 
notable in that was it precise, accusatory, and created a very particular mood.  He 
sounded like a beleaguered headmaster: 
Mr. Welch: Until this moment, Senator, I think I never really gauged your 
cruelty or your recklessness.  Fred Fisher is a young man who went to the 
Harvard Law School and came into my firm and is starting what looks to be a 
brilliant career with us.
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His word order sounds eloquent and prepared, even old fashioned, but not to the 
point of anastrophe.  His word choice indicated a particular mental acuity that 
McCarthy‘s blustering had failed to communicate.  Welch‘s ethos was bolstered with 
every sentence, while McCarthy‘s dwindled at an equally alarming rate. 
The middle of the narrative was less notable for its style, and focused on content.  
It was as if Welch had it planned out like a speech from an introductory speech course – 
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there was a catchy intro, an informative body, and a memorable conclusion.  The body 
was a basic chronological order in plain style, not simple but straightforward.  His 
conclusion, however, had Dickensian flourish.   
Mr. Welch: Little did I dream you could be so reckless and cruel as to do an 
injury to that lad.  It is true he is still with Hale & Dorr.  It is true that he will 
continue to be with Hale & Dorr.  It is, I regret to say, equally true that I fear he 
shall always bear a scar needlessly inflicted by you.  If it were in my power to 
forgive you for your reckless cruelty, I will do so.  I like to think I am a 
gentleman, but your forgiveness will have to come from someone other than 
me.
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His use of anaphora and emphasis on recklessness and cruelty created a 
memorable end to a powerful monologue, and his ideas seemed to drip with a certain 
amount of reserved poetry that reminds listeners of the polarity of these two 
interlocutors: ―lad,‖ ―bear a scar,‖ ―gentleman,‖ ―fear,‖ and ―forgiveness.‖ 
McCarthy‘s response was less than convincing.  He tried to co-opt Welch‘s 
words and began to repeat his charge against Fisher.  McCarthy would not let the issue 
go. 
Mr. Welch: Senator, may we not drop this?  We know he belonged to the 
Lawyers Guild, and Mr. Cohn nods his head at me.  I did you, I think, no 
personal injury, Mr. Cohn. 
Mr. Cohn: No, sir. 
Mr. Welch: I meant to do you no personal injury, and if I did, beg your pardon.  
Let us not assassinate this lad further, Senator.  You have done enough.  Have 
you no sense of decency sir, at long last?  Have you left no sense of decency?
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While the exchange went on for quite some time, this was Welch‘s crowning 
blow.  It was a rhetorical question, but as in most rhetorical questions the answer was 
clear.  McCarthy‘s claims to inside knowledge of some vast conspiracy were laid to 
waste.  Even if he knew of some elements of a conspiracy, his overblown charges 
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against Welch and his lack of eloquence and skill, especially in comparison to Welch, 
had destroyed his credibility.  Television had just broadcast his bumbling performance, 
his inability to handle a reasoned response, his hyperbolic claims, and his ―cruelty‖ to a 
disappointed audience.  There was no conspiracy here.  McCarthy‘s attempt to shape 
some kind of identity in response to ―they‖ has failed because ―them‖ failed to 
materialize in any meaningfully threatening way. 
McCarthy tried to regain his ground with another lengthy monologue, but it was 
repetitive and added little to what had already been said.  He rehashed that Welch had 
demanded Cohn get the Communists ―out before sundown,‖ and then proceeded to 
explain that the Lawyers Guild is the ―legal bulwark‖ of the Communist Party once 
again.  He claimed again that Welch tried to ―foist‖ Fisher on the committee, with no 
objection from Welch or Mundt this time.  He claimed that he believed that Welch did 
not know about Fisher‘s Communist ties when he tried to force him on the committee, 
repeating himself from his earlier monologue, at which point Mundt broke in again to 
say that Welch never recommended Fisher for the committee to begin with.  McCarthy 
tried to question Welch on it – to demand that Welch brought him down for that specific 
purpose, at which point Welch made his final blow.  Welch summoned all he had to put 
a definite and melodramatic stop to this line of questioning: 
Mr. Welch: Mr. McCarthy, I will not discuss this with you further.  You have sat 
within six feet of me and could have asked me about Fred Fisher.  You have 
brought it out.  If there is a God in heaven, it will do neither you nor your cause 
any good.  I will not discuss it further.  I will not ask Mr. Cohn any more 
questions.  You, Mr. Chairman, may, if you will, call the next witness.
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In a dramatic move, Welch took control of the committee.  He put a stop to the 
conversation, and even deigned to give the Chairman permission to do his job.  It 
became very clear that McCarthy was no longer the man in rhetorical charge.  
Rhetorically, he lost the battle.  McCarthy failed to constitute a ―them‖ in this scenario, 
making it difficult for ―us‖ to materialize. 
McCarthy had depended on a conspiracy narrative to help him fashion his 
version of American identity.  Conspiracy narratives often work as constitutive because 
they create an ―us‖ and ―them‖ by which a group can identify themselves.  McCarthy‘s 
conspiracy unraveled with his ethos.  A successful conspiracy narrative requires a certain 
amount of credibility from those who provide the information, since so much of the 
information is ―secret‖ or ―corrupt.‖  Kathleen Hall Jamieson describes the end of 
McCarthy‘s career as being due not to his inability to produce communists, ―but rather 
by destructive moments of self-revelation in the thirty-six days of nationally broadcast 
Army-McCarthy hearing…he was arrogant, obstructive, and opportunistic.  His odd, 
loud, self-conscious laugh compounded the audience‘s discomfort with him as a 
person.‖55 Without McCarthy‘s credibility, his conspiracy, and therefore his attempt to 
fashion American identity, completely fell apart. 
Conclusion 
In a sense, I feel a certain amount of pity for McCarthy.  He saw his world 
changing drastically and it terrified him.  The American story of a unified people was 
showing cracks in the foundation, and to a nation already terrified of an encroaching 
enemy, it was simply too much to bear.  Conspiracy narratives were a haven.  They 
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allowed for a definite ―us‖ and ―them‖ and created a safe national identity.  Conspiracy 
narratives provided some kind of sense in a global environment that was losing 
confidence in long-established meta-narratives.  Americans were the good guys, and 
those who disagreed were the bad guys.  It was simple and comforting. 
Unfortunately, the simplicity of such a story could not hold.  As the conspiracy 
grew in scope and severity the ―them‖ became larger and more sinister, until ―they‖ 
began to include some of ―us.‖  And so identity began to fracture.  As McCarthy and his 
followers began to suspect their own of dispossessing American identity, the once clear 
lines of ―us‖ and ―them‖ began to blur irreconcilably.  By trying to depend on 
conspiracy to define identity, McCarthy lost his own game.  Welch did not single 
handedly bring down McCarthy – that process was longer than just this one exchange- 
but this incident was illustrative and in many ways the final straw.  McCarthy‘s 
conspiracy was unraveling, and as it did his credibility.  As went his credibility so did 
his control of the conspiracy narrative.  Ultimately, the question was could we still trust 
ourselves?  And if not, how could we even define ―us?‖  McCarthy told us that we could 
not trust ―us.‖  Even the Army was suspect.  But then McCarthy himself turned out to be 
untrustworthy, leaving any sense of unified identity in shambles. 
Welch was able to utilize a powerful narrative form to combat McCarthy‘s 
conspiracy.  Whereas McCarthy wanted to shroud his work in secrecy, Welch used a 
detailed and forthcoming, structured story to combat McCarthy‘s paranoid rhetoric.  
Welch spoke like a seasoned story-teller, making McCarthy‘s bluster and gale seem 
impotent in comparison. 
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The real strength of Welch‘s argument is highlighted by using White‘s 
understanding of constitutive rhetoric and analyzing, specifically, his response to 
McCarthy‘s attack on Fisher.  By taking note of how Welch used elements of style and 
narrative to combat McCarthy‘s conspiracy rhetoric we can see how he set himself up as 
a total foil to McCarthy.  McCarthy may have been trying to monopolize the 
conversation to define American, Welch‘s decorum and style broke McCarthy‘s 
stranglehold.  McCarthy made no bones about his obsession with what was ―American‖ 
and what was not, and he was certainly not alone in his crusade to cleanse the ―un-
American‖ from his midst.  The ―us‖ and ―them‖ dichotomy was pervasive, and using 
White‘s understanding of constitutive rhetoric to nuance an analysis helps illuminate 
how McCarthy, or men like him, were actively trying to create a particular identity.  In 
the end, criticism shows us that McCarthy‘s attempt to define American fell flat not just 
because of his ill-defined sense of decency, but because of his inability to control his 
own argument.  McCarthy may have had agency as he tried to craft American identity, 
but so did the other players in this drama.  And Welch proved to be the ultimate hero of 
the story.
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CHAPTER IV 
UNDER GOD: CONSTITUTING THROUGH EPIDEICTIC 
RHETORIC 
Like many schools across the nation, the middle school that my husband taught 
at began the day with the Pledge of Allegiance.  The school aided low income 
populations and had a diverse population of students of all cultures.  Because the student 
body was made up of such a patchwork group, there was not always social cohesion.  
Not all of the students felt compelled to pledge their allegiance, and of course it was 
difficult to separate those who were conscientious objectors, so to speak, from those who 
just chose not to out of some sort of rebellion.  Each year there was an unofficial debate 
amongst the teachers about whether it was appropriate to make students say the Pledge 
or if it was enough for them to stand with the others.  One year my husband had a 
relatively large group of students that would stand, but would not put their hands on their 
chest or join in the recitation.  As the year progressed he was able to put two and two 
together: either the students or their parents were not actually citizens of the US.  They 
never made trouble during the pledge or protested, but they did not feel comfortable 
pledging to the flag and so they simply stayed silent.  Even at that young age they 
realized that the Pledge was not just recitation, but some significant statement of identity 
or belonging.   
If the Pledge of Allegiance has that powerful of an effect on 7
th
 graders then it 
strikes me as being a piece of rhetoric worth some study.  The recitation and repetition of 
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the Pledge is one of the most blatant ways in which we express our understanding of 
who we are.  It literally provides a list of adjectives meant to describe our nation.  It is a 
potent piece of rhetoric and an important one in discussing national identity.  I am 
especially interested in the context in which something as powerful as the Pledge no 
longer seems to pass muster – what could possibly require a change to the Pledge of 
Allegiance?  But something did.  It is easy to forget that the Pledge of Allegiance has 
been through manifestations.  It was not born into stasis, but has changed with the times.  
The fact that something that seems so simple and is such a direct means to constructing 
identity has changed points to the malleable nature of American identity.  In this case, 
the means by which we affect change in that identity is epideictic rhetoric. 
On June 14, 1954 President Eisenhower signed a bill that added the phrase 
―under God‖ to the middle of the Pledge of Allegiance.  The Pledge had been a mainstay 
of elementary school children‘s mornings for years so there was a particular and 
expected rhythm to its recital; it was familiar and part of the morning routine.  And yet 
the change was almost completely without controversy.  In fact, Representative Charles 
G. Oakman commented that in his ―experience as a public servant and as a Member of 
Congress‖ he had never seen a bill ―which was so noncontroversial in nature or so 
inspiring in purpose.‖1   
Senator Homer Ferguson explained the reason that he felt this change was so 
necessary and agreeable: 
We now live in a world divided by two ideologies, one of which affirms its belief 
in God, while the other does not.  One part of the world believed in the 
unalienable rights of the people under the Creator.  The other part of the world 
believes in materialism and that the source of all power is the state itself.
2
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Ferguson, Oakman and other lawmakers seemed to believe that there was some sort of 
crisis of identity on a worldwide scale.  They believed the world as they knew it was 
aligning itself in one of two ways, and that their opposition, Communism, was not just 
―the other guys,‖ but a genuine threat to their way of life. 
 Representative Jack Brooks of LA believed that free nations were battling ―for 
their very existence,‖ hence his interest in changing the Pledge of Allegiance.  Brooks 
argued that ―In adding this one phrase to our pledge of allegiance to our flag we in effect 
declare openly that we denounce the pagan doctrine of communism.‖3  Brooks and his 
colleagues were terrified of what they saw as dangerous ideologies encroaching on their 
lives, so they set out to try and make as distinct a separation between America and its 
enemies as possible.   
For years before the Cold War people had been pledging allegiance to the flag.  
But the pledge was a specific response to a specific situation.  It was as much a by-
product of the Civil War as anything else, hence the emphasis on a unified Republic.  If 
one posits that the Pledge of Allegiance was a rhetorical product of a particular context, 
then we may hypothesize that a change to the recitation itself is a response to a change in 
context.  The rhetorical situation that came after the Civil War required a particular 
response, so as America changed the pledge followed suit.
4
  Instead of worrying about 
unifying the nation in the face of itself, a country that was threatened by disbandment, 
we worried about foreign threats.  The daily reminder of who we were and our pledge to 
be loyal to a particular nation needed refinement as the rhetorical situation changed. 
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This chapter highlights the remarkable intersection of theory and methodological 
criticism that the phrase ―under God‖ represents.  The epideictic and historical nature of 
the text suggests that those two words had a constitutive purpose.  In this analysis I 
bridge all of these ideas in order to show that the Pledge was a rhetorical tool that 
Congress used to respond to a changing historical, political, and rhetorical situation by 
harnessing the power of epideictic rhetoric as constitutive.   
While an expanded study might include such issues as the separation of church 
and state or a more complete history of the Pledge of Allegiance, the goal of this chapter 
is to focus on an application of White‘s understanding of constitutive rhetoric.  So, as I 
contextualized the words of the Pledge of Allegiance, I looked to the Congressional 
Record for the reasons for changing the Pledge, and overwhelmingly, those who wanted 
to change the Pledge argued from a somewhat surprising topoi.  I expected a discussion 
about the importance of religion in America, but what I found was a discussion of the 
dangers of not being anti-Communist enough, and there is a difference. 
Religion may be one of the overwhelming rhetorical challenges in American 
studies.  From the Puritans and their search for a closer relationship with God, to the 
Enlightenment philosophy of the Founding Fathers, and to the present, America has had 
an undeniable God problem.  We never know exactly what role he plays in our politics 
and philosophy.  While this may be one of the most important questions in American 
studies, I have chosen to focus less on church-state relations and the history of religion 
in politics for this project than I have on the rhetorical arguments for including ―under 
God‖ specifically.  These arguments tended to shift the discussion away from ―we are a 
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Christian nation,‖ to ―we are not a Communist nation.‖  While certainly there is overlap, 
the two are not precisely the same thing.  Future manifestations and expansions of this 
project will most certainly delve deeper into America‘s spiritual past, and God‘s 
relationship to our laws and philosophies.  However, for this singular chapter a narrow 
focus on the simple words ―under God‖ requires a focus on the arguments specifically 
for those words, which limits the rhetorical criticism to the Pledge of Allegiance itself 
and a history grounded mostly in the arguments that lawmakers presented for adding 
those specific words. 
Literature Review 
Most of the available literature on the Pledge of Allegiance comes at the topic 
from very different perspectives than my own.  There are countless articles and books 
dealing with the ―under God‖ challenge from 2002, for example.  This incident seemed 
to garner much more rhetorical attention than the original addition.  However, the 
writing that deals specifically with ―under God‖ in the year 1954 is limited at best.  The 
other area that has given a good bit of attention to the Pledge of Allegiance is the 
education field.  Books dealing either with how teachers can practically deal with 
classroom controversies or how they theoretically shape our understanding of education 
are myriad.  For example, Joel Westheimer‘s Pledging Allegiance: the Politics of 
Patriotism in America’s Schools covers a number of controversies dealing with the 
Pledge, but confines the discussion to the fields of education and politics.
5
  More 
pertinent to this study are the works of Anthony Hatcher and Ronald Bishop.  Both 
approach the issue from a media or media ethics standpoint.  They analyze the ways in 
  
129 
which the Knights of Columbus and the Hearst newspapers framed their arguments to 
add ―under God‖ to the Pledge.  Both found that the idea originated with the Knights but 
was championed by Hearst.  Interestingly, Bishop finds that the campaign had much less 
to do with religion than it did with patriotism in the face of the Communist threat.
6
 
Richard J. Ellis‘s history of the Pledge of Allegiance is an indispensable aid to a 
study of the Pledge because of its thorough history.
7
  Also, Patrick Allit‘s Religion in 
American since 1954: A History helps to understand the context under which the Pledge 
was changed.
8
  For a more contextual story of American religion in the Cold War 
specifically, Will Herberg‘s Protestant Catholic Jew: An Essay in American Religious 
Sociology is a provocative study of American spirituality.
9
  However, none of these 
works approaches the Pledge as a piece of rhetoric.  So using these works as a starting 
point I have focused on the Pledge of Allegiance as a specific, constitutive text.  This 
analysis bridges the two forms of rhetoric that the Pledge represents: epideictic and 
constitutive via a close textual analysis of the Pledge.  By approaching the Pledge in 
such a way I have a specific text that is analyzed with a particular method, but framed 
theoretically, providing a richer understanding of import and mechanics.  However, 
since this analysis focuses on the Pledge itself as rhetoric the bulk of the research comes 
from primary sources.  The literature about the Pledge was not as useful as records from 
Congress detailing the process that actually got ―under God‖ added to the Pledge, so that 
is the starting point for my analysis. 
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History 
In 1892 Fred Bellamy wrote the Pledge of Allegiance.  His original pledge was ―I 
pledge allegiance to my flag and to the Republic for which is stands – One Nation 
indivisible – with liberty and justice for all.‖10  The phrase ―under God‖ did not appear 
in the Pledge until 62 years later, in the early years of the Cold War.  The only real 
resistance that ―under God‖ faced was from teachers who felt it was too hard to 
remember and ruined the rhythm of the Pledge.
11
  Classrooms had grown accustomed to 
the original way of reciting the Pledge, and teachers feared changes would be an 
unwarranted disruption.  Given that school children are prone to say the Pledge of 
Allegiance more frequently than most other Americans it is no surprise that teachers 
would be the most concerned about the change.  That being said, disagreement from a 
group of teachers paled in comparison to the overwhelming support from other circles 
throughout the states. 
The movement to add ―under God‖ to the Pledge actually began with a resolution 
by the Knights of Columbus in April of 1951, when they began adding ―under God‖ to 
the Pledge they recited at the beginning of each meeting.  In 1952 they called for 
Congress to follow suit, but lawmakers did not immediately champion the cause.  In 
1953, on April 20
th
, Representative Louis Rabaut introduced the idea to Congress.   
Then on Feb. 7, 1954, President Eisenhower heard a sermon by George 
Macpherson Docherty.  Docherty warned that the Pledge of Allegiance was not truly 
American, and could be mistaken for a pledge to any flag, even a Soviet one.  Docherty 
claimed that adding the phrase ―under God‖ would be an affirmation of the American 
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way of life.  Docherty argued that since atheism was at the heart of Communism, 
proclaiming that America was united ―under God‖ would make it abundantly clear that 
the Pledge was an American one, and could not be mistaken for a ―Muscovite‖ oath.  
Eisenhower felt Docherty had a particularly good point and threw his support behind an 
already very popular piece of legislation. 
On May 10, 1954 the Senate unanimously passed the resolution.  On June 7
th
, the 
House did the same.
12
  Rarely does any bill receive such wide and bi-partisan support.  
But ―under God‖ united politicians from both sides of the aisle.  Arguments in both the 
House and the Senate never really showed much more creativity than what Eisenhower 
heard from Docherty.  The arguments largely just repeated themselves over and over 
again.  But there was no real reason to strive for a great deal of variety when there was 
no real opposition to the original arguments.  Repetition simply served to strengthen the 
resolve of lawmakers in both the House and the Senate. 
Representative Angell‘s arguments to the House provide a succinct and telling 
explanation of why he, and other lawmakers, felt the pledge needed immediate attention. 
The world is sick and in trouble.  The nations of the world are beset on every 
hand with problems which are taxing the brains of the wisest citizens of every 
nation to find a solution.  In our own generation the world has been devastated by 
two worldwide conflicts of arms which have cost millions in lives and billions of 
dollars in treasure and left many of the nations bankrupt, not only in material 
goods but in spiritual values as well....
13
 
 
Angell felt that the conflict between America and her enemies was indicative of a 
sickness that had beset the world.  The Pledge, he argued, could aid in addressing that 
international threat. 
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The Arguments for “Under God” 
Representative Frank Addonizio described the importance of the pledge as a 
declaration of a very specific version of American.  Addonizio argued that ―we who take 
the pledge of allegiance to the flag....should bear in mind that our citizenship is of no 
real value to us unless our hearts speak in accord with our lips; and unless we can open 
our soul before God and before Him conscientiously say, ‗I am an American.‘‖14  To 
Addonizio the Pledge was not just a simple recitation, but an oath to something greater 
than himself.  The Pledge was a public proclamation that the speaker was an American, 
and a proud bearer of the qualities that ―American‖ entailed.   
 That being said, Americans and their elected leaders were anxious to solidify 
their nation ―under God,‖ but leaders were not anxious to specify what kind of belief in 
God defined America.  For example, Senator Ralph Flanders tried to take things to the 
extreme and proposed an amendment that would proclaim that ―This nation devoutly 
recognizes the authority and law of Jesus Christ, Savior and Ruler of nations, through 
who are bestowed the blessings of the Almighty God.‖  The proposal never got out of 
committee.  In fact, when the proposal was presented only one other person showed up 
to even listen.
15
  Flanders‘s effort, which took place around the same time as the efforts 
to include ―under God‖ in the Pledge, indicate something significant about the 
understanding of ―God‖ and his importance to being American.  It was God that was 
important to lawmakers, not Christianity.  A more generic God was easier to use as a 
kind of rhetorical unifier, whereas a specifically Christian God or a proclamation that 
Christ was what defined American made our national identity too narrow. 
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Still, American lawmakers worried that the Rev Docherty‘s concerns might be 
well founded, and felt that public discourse was one way in which they could contend 
with the problem.  Representative Rabaut felt that if Congress made  
…the addition of the phrase ‗under God‘ to the pledge of allegiance the 
consciousness of the American people will be more alerted to the true meaning 
our country and its form of government.  In this full awareness we will, I believe, 
be strengthened for the conflict now facing us and more determined to preserve 
our precious heritage.
16
   
 
He believed that adding the phrase was not just a symbolic measure, but would actively 
and continually remind people of the ―true meaning‖ or their own nation. 
On four different occasions Congressmen referred to the words of George M. 
Docherty concerning the Pledge.  Only two of these cite Dr. Docherty, but they all 
questioned the ―American-ness‖ of the Pledge. 
Has it ever occurred to you that the former wording of the pledge could serve any 
republic claiming to be indivisible and to insure liberty and justice for all?  
Remember, when you heard your own children recite the pledge of allegiance, 
that these same words could have come from little Muscovite children standing 
before the Red hammer-and-sickle flag of Soviet Russia.  You know and I know 
that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics would not, and could not, while 
supporting the philosophy of communism, place in its patriotic ritual an 
acknowledgement that their nation existed under God.  In deed, the one 
fundamental issue which is the unbridgeable gap between America and 
Communist Russian is belief in Almighty God.
17
 
 
Rabaut et al. clearly stated that the phrase ―under God‖ was necessary to separate 
Americans from Communists.  Congress took steps to publicly identify the 
characteristics of ―American,‖ and the Pledge was a convenient place to make that 
argument.  America had an identifiable enemy, so she set out to separate herself from 
that enemy. 
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Senator George Ferguson re-emphasizes this stark contrast when he refers to 
communist countries as being under ―alien control.‖   
…seeing nations come into being and others fall under alien control.  We now 
live in a world divided by two ideologies, one of which affirms its belief in god, 
while the other does not.  One part of the world believes in the unalienable rights 
of the people under the Creator.  The other part of the world believes in 
materialism and that the source of all power is the State itself.
18
 
 
For Ferguson the idea of communism was strange and foreign; communism was nothing 
like ―American.‖  Foreign countries that practiced communism were something other 
than America, and America had to separate herself out as a different thing entirely.   
When the United States Flag Committee published their endorsement for adding 
the phrase ―under God‖ to the Pledge, they were very clear on their reasons why.  Hon. 
Louis C. Rabaut wrote that recognizing the spiritual origins of America was the ―real 
bulwark against atheistic communism.‖19  For Rabaut and his supporters, America‘s 
spirituality was the main difference from and protection against communism.  For 
America to be truly ―American‖ she must recognize her religious past, according to 
Rabaut, et al.  Since Communists had no such past and did not recognize any religion, 
they were clearly far from ―American.‖   
Hon. Angier L. Goodwin of Massachusetts re-affirmed this statement in his 
commentary ―‗Under God‘ Would Help Combat Pagan Influences.‖20  Goodwin hailed a 
local writer, Shirley Munroe Mullen, for her history of the Pledge and her support for 
this bill.  Most importantly to both Mullen and Goodwin, this bill was so important was 
because ―pagan philosophies‖ had been ―introduced by the Soviet Union,‖ so therefore it 
was ―a necessity for reaffirming belief in God.‖21  The issue of the addition to the Pledge 
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could not be separated from communism.  The Pledge, with the addition, made an 
argument for the identity of America.  If she was god-fearing then she could not be 
communist.  It was imperative to law makers that the Pledge aid in their efforts to 
carefully separate Americans from communists. 
Hon. John R. Pillion of the House of Representatives argued that the addition to 
the Pledge ―would serve to deny the atheistic and materialistic corruption of 
Communism.  It would condemn the absolute and concentrated power of the 
communistic slave state with its attendant subservience of the individual.‖22  He did not 
attempt to explain how subservience to God raises the status of the individual.  It would 
seem that he saw this as self-evident.  But part of the Cold War narrative was that in 
America we could be individuals, while in Russia the communists lacked personal 
identity.
23
  For reasons Pillion saw as clear, ―under God‖ effectively separated 
Americans from communists because being united under God actually affirmed our 
individuality. 
 Rep. Brooks, of Louisiana, went so far as to claim this was the primary thing that 
separated the two dueling philosophies.  The phrase ―under God‖ would publicly 
proclaim America‘s separation from the East.  The Pledge would be a specifically 
Western, American pledge with the addition of the phrase ―under God.‖ 
Free nations today battle for their very existence in many parts of the world.  
Communism with its siren voice of false appeal is heard round the world and 
many peoples and many nations fall prey to these false headlights of the shores 
of time.  One thing separates free peoples of the Western World from the rabid 
Communist, and this one thing is a belief in God.  In adding this one phrase to 
our pledge of allegiance to our flag, we in effect declare openly that we denounce 
the pagan doctrine of communism and declare ―under God‖ in favor of free 
government and a free world.
24
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But it was Senator William Langer, the Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, 
who made the argument most explicitly.  Langer explained that ―there was something 
missing in the pledge, and that which was missing was the characteristic and definitive 
factor in the American way of life.‖25  The American way of life was at stake, hence the 
need to unify Americans in their opposition to communism.  ―Under God‖ would be the 
deciding factor in defining that way of life in the face of communism. 
House Report 1693 overviewed the process of passing the ―under God‖ bill.  In 
the ―Statement‖ it unequivocally asserted that the political climate was a reason for the 
Pledge addition.  The Report claims that at that point in history the American way of life 
was under siege, and the addition of the phrase ―under God‖ ―would serve to deny the 
atheistic and materialistic concepts of communism with its attendant subservience of the 
individual.‖26  Again there was a connection between God and the individual.  Since 
communism was supposedly opposed to the individual and God affirmed individual 
liberty, inserting God into the Pledge of Allegiance rhetorically divided America from 
communism.  Supposed American values directly contrasted the perceived values of the 
U.S.S.R.  This addition to the Pledge verified something American, not just holy or 
religious, but the main separation between the U.S.A. and communist states. 
 Adding ―under God‖ to the Pledge of Allegiance was a very public and 
straightforward way to try and refine what it meant to be an American.  It is one thing to 
publically announce it, but adding it to the Pledge of Allegiance was a real stroke of 
genius on behalf of public figures.  The first time someone said that the Pledge was not 
American enough it became a matter of constitutive rhetoric.  The epideictic nature of 
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the Pledge of Allegiance offered the perfect way to continually re-affirm the separation 
from the perceived threat of Communism. 
Epideictic Rhetoric 
One of the functions of epideictic rhetoric is to re-affirm values and standards of 
the community.  In this sense it is constitutive, as constitutive rhetoric seeks to establish 
community identity.  Certainly there is a difference between re-affirming and 
constituting, but here the Pledge of Allegiance serves as a perfect example of overlap.  
While constituting as White describes it implies a creative act, that creative act assumes 
that an identity is already in place.  It operates to constitute while it implies re-
affirmation.  The assumed American identity is illustrated by the arguments that various 
Congressmen presented in favor of adding ―under God.‖   
The Pledge of Allegiance itself is a ceremonial speech in which we pledge to be 
faithful to the flag, which represents an America that is described in that very pledge.  A 
change in such an important ceremonial speech indicates that in 1954, Americans felt 
some tension in regards to their identity.  American lawmakers felt the need to 
emphasize they were ―under God‖ in order to separate themselves from their enemies, 
the ―godless Communists.‖  The Pledge of Allegiance not only fulfilled this need, but 
because it was repeated in almost all schools on a daily basis, it continually constituted 
this version of American identity.   
Epideictic rhetoric is performative and ceremonial and is a matter of ―display.‖27    
Aristotle emphasized epideictic‘s ―focus on values,‖ which the Pledge elucidates rather 
clearly.  It provides a list of characteristics for us to value and embody: ―indivisible,‖ 
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―with liberty and justice for all‖ are a public affirmation of accepted American values.  
Chaim Perelman notes that epideictic ―is uncontroversial because the values it brings to 
the forefront are not available to dispute.‖28  The Pledge highlights those virtues 
Americans hope to instill in those who recite it.  It reminds participants of allegiance, 
unity, and ―liberty and justice for all.‖  The Pledge unifies Americans in thought and 
deed; after all, the indivisibility of the Republic was its main focus originally.  Its very 
purpose is spelled out in the speech. 
A rhetor utilizing epideictic rhetoric ―delineates his task as one of advocating his 
own position in a manner that is fitting with the ‗norms‘ of the discourse at hand.‖29  In 
this sense, epideictic re-affirms social norms and helps those norms reproduce 
themselves.  The Pledge is an explicit list of norms and values: Americans value unity, 
liberty, and justice.  The performance of the Pledge is an act of constitution.   
Epideictic rhetoric facilitates ―the instilling of philosophically correct values‖ as 
they are presented by the rhetor.
30
  It ―must amplify belief in the values which inform 
decision in every sphere of human activity.‖  Part of the power of epideictic rhetoric, 
specifically in the case of the Pledge, is the ceremonial nature of it.  Since the Pledge is a 
ceremony that is repeated frequently, the Pledge continually performs a constitutive 
function.  The repetition of the Pledge creates its own narrative that gets told and re-told 
with every recitation.  Epideictic speech can ―cast aside the importance of reality and 
truth in favor of appearance and persuasion,‖ as in the case of the Pledge of Allegiance 
which describes a particular American identity.
31
  The Pledge has particular persuasive 
power because of its pervasiveness.  Children learn the Pledge at an early age and many 
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repeat it on an almost daily basis, and as noted in the Brown v. Board chapter, those 
things that happen at school serve more than just educational purposes.  School activities 
also teach us about normative ways of thinking and behaving.  The job of the Pledge is 
to publicly normalize attitudes toward America and define what America stands for. 
So, constitutive rhetoric as discussed in previous chapters is based on 
assumptions that an identity already exists, though the process of that rhetoric is to create 
and re-affirm that identity.  At particular moments, constitutive rhetoric can reposition or 
rearticulate subjects and their identity.
32
  Since the Pledge is ceremonial and so many 
people recite it daily it was the perfect way to address the notion of American identity.  
The Pledge was not only familiar and accepted as part of American tradition, but since it 
explains specifically what Americans should value, it was the perfect piece of discourse 
to use as a means to set up the opposition between America and communist Russia.  
More importantly, the Pledge evolved.  The Pledge was used as a response to changing 
world politics continually constituting.  Rep. Homer Angell told the House in his 
argument for the ―under God‖ addition that ―leaders of world thought‖ were more and 
more realizing that the conflicts facing the world were ones of values, and that ―bombs 
and guns have been tried and have failed‖ to quell the storm, so other weapons were 
needed, weapons like the Pledge of Allegiance.
33
  The weapon that Rep. Angell was 
proposing was the power of epideictic rhetoric.   
 The debates in Congress made it clear why the change was made.  The records of 
Congressional hearings provide a helpful way to contextualize the phrase ―under God‖ 
as a product of the Cold War and in response to a growing concern over our own 
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identity.  However, an analysis such as this would be incomplete without looking at the 
text itself.  Congressional discussion makes it clear that there was a problem that 
lawmakers felt could be addressed by changing the Pledge of Allegiance.  What remains 
is understanding the text itself.   
Analysis 
Growing up I recited the pledge on a daily basis.  Every day I would stand, put 
my hand on my heart, and announce that I pledged ―allegiance to the flag of the United 
States of America, and to the Republic for which it stands, one Nation under God, 
indivisible, with Liberty and Justice for all.‖  Years before my grandparents had done 
the same, but with the omission of any nod to a deity (and for some of them they had not 
put their hands over their heart until after World War II!).  Assessing not only what 
produced the change, but the change itself, leads us to a richer understanding of the 
identity that the Pledge is supposed to constitute.   
 When we recite the Pledge we proclaim our devotion to the flag first and 
foremost.  Our initial allegiance is given to that thing which represents America, not 
America herself.  At first glance this seems to confuse the issue – we technically give 
our allegiance to a piece of red, white, and blue fabric.  It is not until the next phrase that 
we mention the Republic itself, but then only in connection to the flag.  The sentence 
could just have easily read ―I pledge allegiance to the flag of the United States of 
America and to the Republic,‖ but the sentence continues to include the Republic itself, 
and ends with a reference to the flag.  This leads me to ask why is it so important to 
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ensconce the Republic in terms of the flag, when the Republic is what needs our 
allegiance? 
 The importance of the symbol over the country itself is part of the constitutive 
nature of the pledge.  The flag is a symbol – and a symbol can be more easily defined 
than ―the Republic.‖  Beginning with the flag gives us the opportunity to describe what 
that flag represents.  So, the Pledge defines the nation by defining those things that 
represent the nation.  By using a mediator such as a symbol the writer of the Pledge had 
more license to define his terms.  It is interesting to note that this is not a matter of 
synecdoche.  The flag is not used as a smaller thing to represent the Republic.  The flag 
is something in and of itself and should not be diminished.  The Republic was a related, 
but not interchangeable, entity.  The language is not particularly metaphorical or poetic, 
but rather straightforward.  The Pledge is organized in a list fashion: I pledge to the flag, 
then to the Republic which is represented by the flag The flag serves a dual purpose here 
– on the one hand it is physical and we can easily see and understand it as an object, 
solidifying in our minds a concrete image, but on the other hand it is symbolic.  We 
spend much of our energy in the Pledge defining what the flag stands for.  
 Next in that list is ―one nation under God.‖  The phrase ―one nation under God‖ 
acts as an appositive.  The Republic for which the flag stands is renamed in the Pledge as 
―one nation under God.‖  The use of the appositive adds to the constitutive nature of the 
phrase ―under God.‖  ―One nation under God‖ is not just a description; it is a re-naming 
of the preceding noun phrase.  So the Pledge of Allegiance has changed from a pledge to 
a flag and a Republic that is one, but a pledge to a flag and a Republic that is one under 
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God.  Appositives are usually defined as a single noun which follows immediately after 
another noun, identifying or supplementing it, not a noun phrase.  In the case of the 
Pledge, it is a complex version of the appositive.  It is attached to a statement or clause 
and functions as an explanatory mark.
34
 An appositional relationship is more than just 
the standard ―an appositive could replace its antecedent noun.‖  As Diane Blakemore 
points out, appositional structures can give the audience the opportunity to consider the 
differences and similarities between two things.  An appositive can also encourage the 
reader to ―explore the total set of contextual assumptions made accessible‖ by all parts 
of the sentence.
35
 Understanding that the appositive is actually the claim highlights the 
importance of those two words in that exact spot.  They were not minor additions; they 
were adding to the definition identity that millions of people performed regularly. 
 The phrase ―under God‖ is inserted between two descriptors: ―one nation‖ and 
―indivisible.‖  Together these might seem somewhat redundant, but separating them with 
―under God‖ changes the meaning.  The new sentence reads ―one nation Under God.‖  
That is, we are united through a common God.  Once again, viewing this as an 
appositive phrase emphasizes the constitutive nature of the change.  Being under God is 
one of the bonds we all share as Americans, according to the pledge to the flag.  
Continuing with another descriptive, we are ―indivisible,‖ strengthening some idea of 
unity.  When we say the Pledge out loud we are effectively renaming the nation with 
each new noun.  As if to say that the flag is the nation, which in turn means liberty and 
justice for all.  Adding under God does not change the nature of the appositive, but 
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strengthens the nature of our indivisibility.  We are not just one nation, but we are united 
through a specific idea.  In this case, God.    
When Bellamy wrote the Pledge of Allegiance the Civil War was still fresh on 
America‘s conscience.  The notion of being one nation that is indivisible was more than 
just romantic notion – it was a reminder that we had, in fact, forced ourselves to be a 
whole unit.  We had fought a war to decide whether or not we could call ourselves a 
unified Republic, and Bellamy‘s Pledge affirmed in writing and recitation that the 
Republic remained united.  The 1954 addition did not change that idea, but added to it 
that part of our whole-ness was a matter of a shared God. 
 The final part of the pledge assures us that the Republic will guarantee liberty 
and justice.  Liberty and justice rank high in the pantheon of American god terms, and 
like most god terms they have a completely malleable and vague definition, but 
regardless all other terms are defined in relation to them.  The Pledge reminds us that we 
stand whole and we stand for noble and glorious concepts, hard as they might be to 
define.
36
  Weaver makes a similar comment about Abraham Lincoln in his essay ―The 
Argument from Definition.‖  He describes Lincoln‘s tendency to argue from principle, 
but more specifically from definition.  This form of argument postulates that ―there exist 
classes which are determinate and therefore predicable.‖  That is, there is an assumption 
that something is so.
37
  Much like Charland‘s description of constitutive rhetoric the idea 
must be assumed to exist before one specifically defines it.  In doing so, the rhetor 
defines the terms that set the parameters for an argument.  The Pledge functions in just 
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this way – it defines a state which we assume exists so that we may argue from that 
definition of the Republic. 
This is why some authorities saw the Pledge as the answer to a muddled 
definition of American.  The Pledge actively constitutes, and does so with each recital.  
But the Pledge is simply supposed to be an expression of who we already are as a nation; 
not a new statement, but a ceremonial affirmation.  The Pledge of Allegiance articulates 
the ―always already‖ identity that constitutive rhetoric strives to create and re-create.  At 
the same time, lawmakers were taking a very active and purposeful role in constructing 
American identity.  There were not leaving it to organically produce itself, but putting 
the words there, in the Pledge, to constitute identity.  Changing the words to include 
―under God‖ was an elegant way to make that an ―official‖ part of an identity that 
supposedly already existed. 
Conclusion 
The story of Joe McCarthy from an earlier chapter indicated that some 
Americans were nervous, even fearful, about changes on the American home front.  The 
Communist threat in combination with cultural upheaval made some Americans very 
uncomfortable.  However, in this case the difference is that instead of American identity 
finding itself splintering, American identity found itself facing a whole new 
metanarrative from the other side of the world.  If Western modernity hinged on ideas 
like progress, capitalism, and religion, facing a new world power that had progressed 
just as much, but without the aid of God or capitalism had to be terrifying.   
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Communism was scary for myriad reasons.  First and foremost, they had the 
bomb.  Let us not pretend the Cold War was entirely rhetorical.  Certainly there was an 
actual, physical threat to deal with.  But they had achieved that kind of technological 
greatness by being nothing like us.  Our claims to superiority were weakening daily, and 
that was also frightening.  We had to find ways to maintain our rhetorically fashioned 
superiority for the sake of our own national well-being.  In future manifestations of this 
study I will take this theoretical analysis further.  There is a great deal of work to be 
done with war rhetoric, religious rhetoric, and theory, which is pertinent but outside the 
scope of this particular chapter, much to my dismay. 
While certainly this speaks mostly to America‘s inner turmoil and identity crisis, 
the Congressional records point to the looming crisis that was settling over most of the 
world, as well.  There was a clash of narratives beginning and it would define the next 
several decades of politics, economics, pop culture, and art.  The Cold War was not just 
an arms race, but a battle of ideas.  Those ideas played out on a rhetorical stage.  The 
Pledge of Allegiance, with its epideictic power, was one of the most powerful weapons 
in America‘s rhetorical Cold War arsenal. 
Changing the words to the Pledge of Allegiance very directly attempted to 
constitute American identity.  Congress wanted Americans and her enemies alike to 
know that America was united under God, and because we stood united beneath God, we 
were separate from our godless enemies.  Adding ―under God‖ to the Pledge of 
Allegiance drew the lines between ―us‖ and ―them‖ clearly and publically, and the 
epideictic power of its daily recitation made sure that people across the country were 
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reminded every day.  Adding ―under God‖ was an intentional, constitutive response to 
global politics.
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CHAPTER V 
I ONLY GET IT FOR THE ARTICLES: HUGH HEFNER 
ENDEAVORS TO SHAPE AMERICAN IDENTITY 
 I had a friend in college who, like many men his age, had a subscription to 
Playboy.  He kept stacks of the magazine in various places around his apartment and 
made no effort to hide them, probably because he felt no shame.  Half disapprovingly 
and half amused I made some comment about him only getting it for the articles.  To his 
credit, he never missed a beat.  Without even looking up from his video game he said, 
―Nope.  Only man in America who gets Playboy just to look at the dirty pictures.‖ 
 My friend‘s candor speaks to a very important fact about Playboy: it is different 
than run-of-the-mill pornography.  Playboy gives consumers that ubiquitous ―article‖ 
excuse that has become a cliché.  To be fair, Playboy has a reputation for providing not 
just titillating pictures, but surprisingly well-written and literate articles in one place.  
The writing is what separates Playboy from rags like Hustler, Juggs, or Penthouse.  
Playboy markets itself not just as a nudie but as a periodical for up and coming men with 
discerning tastes.  Playboy is supposed to be a magazine in which men, and even 
occasionally women, can find advice not just on sex, but on gourmet meals, 
sophisticated clothing, the newest technology, examples of quality literature and witty, 
light-hearted repartee about social issues of the day.  The creator of this unique 
magazine, Hugh Hefner, specifically wanted a magazine that spoke not just to the libido, 
but to the intellect, the spirit of individualism, and the pocketbook. 
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 This intentional focus on ideas other than just prurient interests is why this 
chapter focuses on text in the classical sense and not visual rhetoric.  Certainly there is 
much to be said about Playboy‘s mastery of visual appeal.  The ―centerfold‖ is as iconic 
as the magazine itself.  The centerfold was one of Hefner‘s strokes of genius – a fold out 
that gives the viewer a larger picture of the girl in question.  And while certainly the 
centerfold sets Playboy apart, that is not Hefner‘s only inspired move.  Playboy is 
remarkable not only for the images.  Certainly nobody would argue that Playboy would 
exist without the pictures.  However, the pictures are not the only story.   
 In 1957 the Supreme Court heard Roth v. United States, which became one of the 
most important obscenity cases until the Miller case of the 1970s.
1
  While there are other 
cases dealing with obscenity or lewdness, these are the cases that the court used to 
measure obscenity for decades.  Notice that Hugh Hefner was not involved.  Hefner has 
been able to keep his nose surprisingly clean for a man whose entire financial empire is 
based on pornography.  Competitors, like Larry Flynt, have not been able to avoid that 
kind of publicity.  Part of the reason may be that Hefner has been so careful to craft a 
product that is not just a porn.  Hefner‘s empire is built not just on provocative pictures, 
but on an image of a particular kind of man: the playboy.  Hefner‘s playboy is a suave 
sophisticate who is both hip to the current social scene and understands the life and times 
he lives in, but does not fall prey to fads.  His style is classic enough that it has staying 
power and stands the test of changing fashions.  This man, this playboy, is just as 
important as the girls in the magazine.  And this man is found in the pages of the 
magazine throughout the cartoons, the articles, the advertisements, and the editorials. 
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 Hefner has always had his enemies, and they are not surprisingly from social 
conservative and religious camps.  He has been sued and had the kind of legal issues that 
often plague celebrities, but Hefner has not really had much in the way of legal difficulty 
when it comes to charges of obscenity and lewdness.  Charges dealing with first 
amendment issues and public decency have by and large not made it before the high 
courts of the land.  In fact, it was not until 1999 that Hefner‘s empire faced real 
opposition from the federal government.  Playboy Enterprises appeared before the 
Supreme Court, not because of the original magazine, but because the Communications 
Decency Act demanded that the Playboy channel be scrambled, and the Playboy Empire 
claimed this was a violation of the First Amendment.  In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme 
Court ruled in favor of Playboy Enterprises.
2
 
 One way Hefner has managed to stay above the fray is the supposedly literate 
and socially hip writing found within the pages of Playboy.  As opposed to American 
Aphrodite, the publication behind the Roth case, Playboy has long endeavored to be a 
tastemaker via insightful interviews with respectable public figures, quality fiction, and 
guidance on fine food and music.  No less than literary giants like Kurt Vonnegut and 
political figures like President Jimmy Carter have graced the pages of Playboy 
Magazine.  Hefner has kept his original creation separate from other nudie magazines 
through tireless attention to the literal text as well as the imagery.  There are any number 
of authors who have commented on the pictures in Playboy, but my interest is in that 
which separates it from other pornographic magazines.   
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 Hefner eventually became known as just Hef, and is one of the most iconic 
figures in American popular culture.  The image of the octogenarian in his pajamas or a 
smoking jacket surrounded by scantily clad platinum blondes is the stuff of legend.  His 
symbol, the notorious Playboy bunny, is as recognizable as Mickey Mouse or the Golden 
Arches and just as synonymous with American culture. 
The first issue to address in a criticism of Playboy is what, exactly, should one 
analyze?  Playboy itself covers decades, so it is hardly appropriate for a close reading as 
a whole entity.  Even narrowing it down to the year 1954 leaves a critic with twelve 
different issues, and many articles within those issues.  However, I have chosen to focus 
on one particular article in one particular magazine. 
 My reasoning is relatively straightforward.  The first Playboy was published in 
December of 1953.  It was Hefner‘s big gamble.  He cobbled the magazine together in 
his apartment using money he had begged and borrowed from friends and family.  He 
had no real guarantee that there would be another issue after that one.  So the January 
1954 issue represents not only a huge accomplishment, but the beginning of his 
triumph.
3
  While January 1954 may not be the first issue, it is the first issue of the first 
year of publication, and the signal that Playboy had the potential to be a success. 
 As for the articles, I have chosen to focus on the first article in that particular 
issue.  The article is a work of humorous fiction, and is the opening piece of this all-
important issue.  If Hefner, the editor, thought the piece important enough to place it 
front and center in the first issue of his first full year of publication, then the article 
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seems worth some examination.  And, as it happens, the article addresses much of what 
all of these other instances I have examined address: what it means to be an American.   
Hugh Hefner and His Magazine 
 Hefner had a relatively non-descript childhood.  He described it as conservative 
and classically Mid-western.  In high school he showed an interest in writing and 
cartoons and began to try his hand at entertaining in various forms, including music and 
creative writing, but was all-in-all a fairly typical high school boy.  After high school he 
spent a few years in the military where he continued to write.  One of the most formative 
experiences of his life was during his military years (1944-46), though he did not know 
about it until later.  His girlfriend, who he later married, had a brief affair while he was 
in uniform, and she confessed it before they married.  Their relationship never fully 
recovered.  They decided to get married regardless of her indiscretion, and in an effort to 
salvage their relationship they tried an ―open marriage,‖ which Hefner took full 
advantage of, but his young wife never really embraced.  When the marriage ended 
Hefner was less broken up and more excited to live the life he had been trying to espouse 
in the magazine he had been working on during the first years of his marriage. 
 During these early years he worked for Esquire magazine for a time until 1953 
when he gambled his entire life – he mortgaged just about everything he had and begged 
and borrowed from friends and family to scrape together enough for a magazine he 
called Stag Party.  However, there was already a magazine called Stag, so the name got 
changed to Playboy just before publication.  Hefner pounded the entire magazine out on 
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a type writer in his apartment.  The first issue featured nude pictures of Marilyn Monroe 
from a calendar she had already done. 
4
 
 The first issue appeared in 1953.  It did not have a date on it because the creator 
was not sure there would be any other issues.
5
  But by 1959 millions of copies were 
mailed out every month, and countless more sold at newsstands across the nation.  In 
2008 the magazine was still the 12
th
 highest selling U.S consumer publication with an 
estimated 3.2 million copies sold monthly and another 1.8 million international editions 
sent out.  This is half its domestic peak it reached in the 1970s, but Playboy still remains 
one of the world‘s bestselling publications.6  
Playboy Ideology 
 First and foremost I think it best to address the ―gender‖ issue and clear up any 
misconceptions.  I want to be clear that this is not a paper on masculinity per se.  It is 
specifically a paper on American identity.  That being said, when discussing the version 
of American identity that Playboy was trying to constitute, gender is certainly part of the 
equation.  I make the clarification because I will address gender, but not dwell 
exclusively on it.  My primary goal is to understand American constitutive rhetoric via 
Playboy in 1954.
7
 
 What Playboy is all about is subject to interpretation.  Certainly there are 
apologists who see Hefner as the consummate romantic.  They describe him as an 
idealist and a romantic who wanted nothing more than to be in love and to able to 
exercise his feelings.
8
  In Hefner they saw a man who wanted to put love itself on a 
pedestal, which required putting Puritanical mores aside and indulging in the excesses 
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that love requires.  As for Hefner himself, he was rather open about the kind of woman 
he was looking for in his romantic forays.  He did not care for femme fatales.  Hefner 
preferred a woman who was simpler and did not look to be in charge.  He was not 
interested in equality between the sexes as much as affection.
9
 
 Of course, others were not so impressed.  Some critics saw him as a destructive 
force bringing ruin to the time-tested values that acted as the bedrock of American 
society.  And others charged him with sexist perversion – they decried his ―art‖ as a 
meat market.  They feared he was simply another purveyor of the flesh, and as he 
marketed his product he devalued women until they were nothing more than just another 
product to consume, like the hi-fi stereos that advertised alongside the pictures.
10
 
 In all the arguing about what Hefner was up to it is easy to forget that Hefner 
himself had a voice.  He wrote about the philosophy behind his brainchild, but like many 
works of philosophy it left itself open to interpretation.
11
  Still, trying to analyze his 
work without looking to his own explanation would be superficial at best.  Nine years 
after he issued his first Playboy he decided it was time to address the questions and 
criticisms that swirled around his publication.   
 First and foremost, Hefner denied that Playboy was behind the decline of 
Western culture.  One of his reasons for publishing his philosophy was to plainly and 
clearly explain that one of his major goals was to be a tastemaker, not a purveyor of 
smut.  Hefner saw Playboy as a guide to the new American male – one that enjoyed the 
good life.  And it just so happened that the good life included sex.
12
  A playboy was not 
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just any man from any walk of life – Hefner‘s definition of American masculinity was 
specifically not all-inclusive.  A playboy had to possess a particular point of view: 
He must see life not as a vale of tears, but as a happy time; he must take joy in 
his work, without regarding it as the end an all of living; he must be an alert man, 
an aware man, a man of taste, a man sensitive to pleasure, a man who – without 
acquiring the stigma of the voluptuary or dilettante – can live life to the hilt.13 
Hefner‘s playboys were not sexual deviants, according to Hefner; they were men 
who wanted to suck out all the marrow out of life, but in a tasteful and sophisticated 
fashion.  Playboys can enjoy spirits, wine, sex, good writing, fine dining, and witty 
debate without contradiction.   
 Hefner saw Playboy as the result of American history and ideology, not just 
sexual experimentation.  Hefner‘s understanding of American history of the first half of 
the 20
th
 century was a tug-of-war between those he dubbed the ―uncommon‖ and the 
―common‖ man.  The Uncommon Man was the best of the American dream – he was 
driven, individualistic, ambitious, and worked to pull himself up by his own bootstraps.  
This man believed in the promises of God and country – that nothing was impossible and 
that the technology of the industrial revolution would propel the United States into and 
age of unparalleled progress and prosperity.  And the Uncommon Man fully expected to 
be at the forefront of the trajectory.  This man was an unabashed consumer.  He 
confidently and comfortably took pride in his power to acquire.  After all, America is a 
capitalist nation – why should he be ashamed of his success?  This man was interested in 
the arts and science and unafraid of dissent.  He was willing to stand up for those things 
he believed in, even if it did not conform to the norms of the world around him.  This 
strength of character is part of what made him Uncommon.
14
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 The stock market crash of 1929, however, changed American life in every 
conceivable way.  As financial ruin spread to all levels of society, those things that 
defined the Uncommon Man began to seem suspect.  When Americans looked over their 
country and saw hungry men, women, and children on every corner those men who 
could acquire and had the leisure time and resources to busy themselves with art and 
science became the enemy.  The Great Depression was the age of the Common Man, 
according to Hefner.  The forces of the economy created an environment in which it was 
unacceptable to succeed.  Gains were perceived as ill-gotten, regardless of an 
individual‘s hard work, because in comparison to the rest of the country, a successful 
man was a suspect man. 
15
 
 This age of the Common Man might have gone on indefinitely were it not for the 
Second World War.  War requires a certain amount of uniformity.  Hefner realized that 
in order to effectively combat an enemy there must be a stark contrast between ―us‖ and 
―them.‖  As a result, America embarked on a decade of ―rigid conformity.‖  A clearly 
defined ―us‖ makes for a much more powerful front.  Sadly, this meant giving up 
whatever individualism Americans had left.  This was the era of the Invisible Man.  Men 
like Joe McCarthy and J. Edgar Hoover made careers out of stamping out deviancy 
wherever they thought they saw it.  Hefner‘s concern for the nation and American 
identity became abundantly clear as he wrote about the Invisible Man.  America was 
swallowing the individual, and the American man ―was judged not by what he stood for, 
but what he stood against.‖  America was not only a collective, but America was 
defining herself in the negative.  ―In 20 years of Depression, War, and Post-War 
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pressures,‖ Hefner lamented, ―we had very nearly managed to destroy the fundamental 
spirit and social, economic and political beliefs upon which this nation was founded and 
through which we had prospered and grown.‖16 But, he posited, 
[…] somewhere in the late 1940s a significant counterwave first began to be felt: 
a new generation was coming of age that seemed unwilling to accept the current 
shibboleths, chains, traditions, and taboos.  It was none too soon, for America 
was lagging woefully in education the arts, the sciences, and world leadership.  
There were and are pessimists who believe the nation drifted past the point of no 
return.
17
 
 
The writers and editors of Playboy were not said pessimists.  
 Hefner saw the rebellion of the Beats as a sign that America was not lost.  Their 
colorful defiance signaled that individualism had not been stamped out.  However, he 
saw their philosophy as particularly un-American.  Their nihilism and rejection of the 
markers of American success (taste, sophistication, and consumption) signaled a certain 
immaturity in Hefner‘s opinion.  Hefner‘s playboy was the re-birth of the Uncommon 
Man in his mind.  Hefner saw his vision of the playboy as a sign at America was healing.  
The age of the Common Man was over and America was re-claiming her identity as 
Uncommon.  He called this rebirth the Upbeat Generation.  He acknowledged the 
similarities with the Beats in that they were both rebelling against a particular American 
narrative, but that is where the similarities stopped.  Hefner‘s vision of America was a 
happier, light-hearted one where men were encouraged to enjoy life, marked by 
enthusiasm and optimism.
18
 
 This man, Hefner believed, had a great deal to adjust to, as well.  He was living 
in a peacetime that was tempered by the ominous shadow of the Atomic Age.  Mobility 
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was changing American culture in ways that rocked the imagination, from fast food to 
cross country travel.  ―Tradition‖ was, as Hefner saw it, losing its hold on America.19 
After 20 years of stultifying conformity, a new generation has awakened 
America‘s natural optimism, rebel spirit and belief in the importance of the 
individual.  A certain enthusiasm, a restless dissatisfaction with the status quo, a 
yearning to know more and experience more is typical of youth in any time, but 
America is unique as a county in having most successfully put this youthful vigor 
and attitude to work as a national dream.
20
 
 
Hefner‘s vision of America was a rich and sophisticated joyland where liberated 
men worked hard so they could play as they pleased.  Her citizens were witty and happy, 
perhaps even glib.  They lived life at full tilt and publically announced their 
sophistication with the kind of conspicuous consumption that American capitalism and 
success allowed.   
Hefner‘s ―Uncommon Man‖ was at the heart of Playboy.  The suave, 
sophisticated rake whose days in the office were just as successful as his exploits at the 
jazz clubs and in the bedroom leapt off the page from cartoons, articles, and 
advertisements.  So, the first article of the first issue of its first full year of publication is 
surprising.  The first pages are some of Playboy‘s famous fiction, but the story is hardly 
what one would expect. 
Analysis 
 The article is a first person narrative.  Harry Riddle, our hapless hero, begins with 
a very straightforward introduction of himself.  Because he tells the story, we see 
everything through his naïve eyes and discover Harry is rather thick.  His tendency to 
narrate in short and grammatically simple sentences underlines his mental simplicity.  
There is a lack of complexity in his story-telling, both in presentation and style.  There is 
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little to be said about Harry‘s use of metaphor or particular rhetorical devices, because 
Harry speaks and writes in as plain a style as possible.  For all intents and purposes, 
Harry‘s articulation skills are largely un-notable.  He does not narrate with any particular 
flourish, though the dialogue he provides seems to indicate that when he speaks aloud he 
tries to impress people with his verbosity more than in the unspoken narration he 
provides the proverbial reader.  Harry‘s dialogue, as evidenced in his passionate if 
pathetic attempt at a rousing speech in the trial scene, indicates a bifurcation in his 
character.  There is the man Harry believes he should be and that people want him to be, 
and the man who is telling us the actual story. 
His name is also significant.  His first name, Harry, is as common and 
uninteresting a name as possible.  His last name seems to indicate multiple meanings. A 
―riddle‖ is a puzzling question or person.  Harry is a confusing character in that he seems 
to get just about everything wrong.  He has every opportunity to figure the world out – 
he is good at school, apparently attractive as his teacher feels compelled to take 
advantage of him early in life, and he has a good heart and ambition, but he is 
completely unable to capitalize on any of it until the very end of the story when he 
suddenly snaps and attacks somebody.  
 Riddle‘s narrative is not the classic story line in which there is an intro and then 
the bulk of the story is rising action to a climax.  Half of the text is a string of anecdotal 
stories meant to characterize Riddle.  While certainly each of the vignettes he describes 
is helpful in understanding the trial scene, they indicate that the article is much less 
about the plotline and much more about Harry Riddle, the man.  By the time the reader 
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gets to the heart of the story, the trial, we have been through a number of other narratives 
that serve mostly to illustrate his character.  They do get us from point a to point b, but 
we could have gathered much of what we learn from those narratives from the last part 
of the story, the trial.  It is a personality driven narrative, not plot-centered.  So, an 
analysis should focus on what the story tells us about Riddle more than the story itself.  
And what the narrative tells us about Riddle is that he is not the kind of man Hefner 
thought America needed. 
While there is no explicit reason to think he is sexually impotent, the very first 
words out of his mouth imply a certain lack of traditionally masculine characteristics.  
Harry introduces himself by name, and immediately tells his audience that he is both shy 
and retiring.  He describes his childhood as a domestic one.  His friends asked him to 
join them in holding up a filling station, and he chose to stay home and read.  On the one 
hand, Harry can be commended for not engaging in criminal activity.  On the other, he 
does so not out of any expressed sense of morality, but because he prefers the quiet and 
tranquility of a book.
21
  Here he could have used his simple sentences to his advantage.  
But, instead of coming across as decisive and confident, he begins to add clauses here 
and there in an antiquated fashion that implies he is not really in touch with the boys his 
age.  The construction of the sentence is passive in that it utilizes a negative instead of a 
positive.  He is ―not unkind‖ as opposed to kind.  Harry has problems describing himself 
in a straightforward manner.  He is roundabout and ineffectual.  In the very first 
paragraph Riddle introduces himself as exactly the kind of man Hugh Hefner does not 
think the ideal American man should be. 
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Harry readily admits that the robust socialization of other boys his age did not 
appeal to him, and his lack of participation left him unready for the ―hurly-burly‖ of life.  
He realizes he was unready for the challenges of an adult life because of his inability to 
partake in the Strang und Durm of youth.  He tried, but was undone by an old, invalid 
woman.  In fact, Riddle was so ineffectual in his attempts to engage in what he referred 
to as ―robust‖ activities that the old woman was able to hold him by the collar for forty 
minutes until the police came.  His story illustrates once again that Riddle is not just shy 
and retiring, but exactly the opposite of what Hefner was looking for in an American 
man.  Riddle was looking to steal the woman‘s money, so while it was certainly 
dishonest and nothing like Hefner‘s ideal consumer, he at least was trying to engage in 
some form of American conduct.  Riddle at least understood that money was an 
important part of partaking in life.  Unfortunately, he was unable to achieve a basic level 
of consumption.  For his sins he was punished by his mother. 
There is little middle ground in Riddle‘s narrative.  The action of his childhood 
that he opts out of is not the hooliganism one often thinks of as classic boyhood, such as 
breaking windows during baseball or harassing older girls, but outright criminal activity.  
Riddle‘s description of childhood is strangely dichotomous.  There is a life of dangerous 
crime, like throwing heavy objects off of buildings in the hopes they break open without 
regard to pedestrians below, or there is the option of staying home and eschewing all 
boyish activity.  Riddle seems unaware of any active engagement like football or 
swimming that is often associated with boyish behavior, and knows only extremes.  
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Even as a child he is woefully unaware of the actual operations of the world and views 
the life he lives as starkly stratified.   
Riddle introduces us to his mother and father early in the narrative.  We learn 
that Harry takes after his father a great deal.  Mr. Riddle ran out of work in the 20s (the 
story takes place in the present day, 1954) and has been waiting ever since.  Mr. Riddle 
was a capmaker, and when caps became unfashionable, he stopped working instead of 
looking for other employment, and had waited 30 years for work to fall into his lap.  The 
ambition of the Uncommon Man or the Upbeat Generation is completely absent.  Mr. 
Riddle simply will not do things for himself.  Mr. Riddle is waiting for the world to 
change for him.  Harry, in turn, says that ―Dad and I are, as I said, a great deal alike…‖22  
If Hefner believes that the ideal Americans are those who engage in the laissez faire 
market place in order to create their own power to consume, then the Riddle family has 
not done their job.  They have not only failed in to be Uncommon, they have done so of 
their own accord.  They cannot blame circumstances for their failures since Riddle‘s 
description implies there was no effort to overcome their own difficulties.  Max 
Shulman, the author of the article, has created a narrative of the Common Man in a very 
short amount of space.  He has created an enthymeme for Hefner‘s national ideal.  If one 
believes in an ―American‖ work ethic, then one cannot believe in Riddle as a model 
American.  But, Riddle spends the majority of the story in chase of the American dream.  
The enthymeme creates an atmosphere of irony that permeates the entire story.   
Harry is very unlike his mother, who he describes as ―hale‖ and ―extroverted‖ 
with a dangerous temper.  His mother has all the qualities of the young men he avoided.  
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She is brash and quick to act.  She also loses patience with her feckless son and husband 
quickly.  She is prone to beat them when they upset her, which Harry finds amusing 
even though he has required stitches from her ire before.  He does not seem to 
understand that there is something amiss in this family dynamic where the father is 
ineffectual and underperforming and the mother is angry and abusive.
23
  Riddle views 
this as simply a matter of normal, everyday life.  He claims that life is peaceful and non-
violent in the evenings when his mother is away at work and he and his father are at 
home.  Here Playboy gives us yet another picture of dysfunction in the home.  Not only 
does the father choose not to provide, the mother does it for him.  She is still domestic in 
that she earns money by scrubbing floors, but Harry‘s father does nothing at all to 
provide. 
It was during these quiet times at home that Harry and his father would discuss 
their dreams and duties.  Harry‘s description of his conversations with his father while 
his mother worked is some of the most significant part of the article. Harry describes 
sitting and pondering the fate of the world.  Harry is a dreamer, and has a good heart 
with good intentions.  The thing that weighs most heavily on his mind is discovering 
―What can I best do to fulfill my destiny as an American and a human being?‖  His 
question tells us that he sees himself as an American first.  He recognizes that there is 
something specific about being an American – some identity to embrace or action to 
take, and he wants to make sure he does his best to do so.  His father‘s answer was clear 
and to the point – ―Get rich.‖ 
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The Riddles saw American identity as a matter of the power of consumption.  
Lacking that power himself, Mr. Riddle very pointedly tells his son that his duty in life is 
to get rich enough so that he can sleep whenever and behave however he chooses.  Harry 
thought on his father‘s words and realized they were sensible and straightforward.  Harry 
and his father have established a basic organization for the entire text.  Harry has posed 
the question, his father answered, and Harry spends the rest of the piece trying to fulfill 
what his father believes to be the American Dream.  ―Boy though I was,‖ he recalls ―I 
understood that.‖  While the article may be a narrative, on another level it is set up the 
way any intro level speech might be: pose the question, and then answer it.  The plot is 
the means by which the question gets answered.  Like Harry‘s first person narration, 
nothing is particularly complicated.  On both an organizational, syntactical, and stylistic 
level, Harry‘s tale is terribly simple.   
Harry tells us that he has considered making a volume of his father‘s maxims 
such as this one, because he always found them useful and provocative.  He is simply 
waiting for good vellum to become available again.  Like his father, Harry is waiting for 
opportunity to come to him instead of seeking it out.  His inability to make any real 
decisions or take any actions on his own are frustrating, and rightfully so.  A story about 
a character that does nothing is generally one that either inspires angst, or elicits laughter 
at the main character.  In this story, Riddle is sadly humorous.  He is a comic character, 
but the reader does not laugh with him, the reader laughs at him.  His naiveté and 
ignorant innocence make him a somewhat pathetic hero.
24
  Riddle is definitely 
―Common.‖ 
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The introduction of Harry‘s story ends as Mr. Riddle dozes off in conversation 
and Harry carries him back to bed.  Mr. Riddle does not even take himself to and from 
his own pallet in this story, but instead relies on his son.  Harry shuffles on to his own 
bed and falls asleep thinking of getting rich. 
At first blush this article may seem contrary to constitutive rhetoric in that the 
description and characterization of Harry Riddle are absolutely nothing like the kind of 
man Playboy‘s philosophy described as the ideal American.  But such a reaction does 
not give Hefner‘s publication enough credit.  Riddle is an ironic hero.25  At the very 
beginning of the page, before the article begins, it is labeled as ―humor.‖  A reader 
knows when perusing this article that Harry is not meant to be taken seriously.  Riddle‘s 
character is ironic in that he is working so very hard to fulfill his duty as an American, 
but he is precisely not what Playboy thinks American identity should entail.  He is 
exactly the opposite of the American man that Hugh Hefner admires and tried to create 
in himself and in his magazine.  Riddle is not being presented as some kind of example, 
but as a counter example.  As for the constitutive nature of it, the article is probably the 
most straightforward case in this project.  Riddle begins the narrative asking what his 
duty ―as an American‖ is.  His story is the ironic answer.  The article announces itself as 
dealing with American identity in the first five paragraphs. 
However, the story does not end there.  Riddle goes on to describe the moments 
of his life that he feels merit some mention.  Riddle was proud of his school career.  In 
school, he claimed, he was no longer a follower but a leader.  Such a proclamation only 
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adds to the reader‘s frustration with Riddle because he makes it clear that he knows his 
inability to take action in life is a foible.  He brags about how he  
…read better, drew better, sang better.  I knew all the answers to all the 
questions.  I got the highest marks.  All this was a great satisfaction to me and not 
one whit lessened by the fact that the other children took off my trousers and 
threw them on top of a passing bus every day after school.
26
 
 
His naiveté is almost endearing.  He is so proud of his accomplishments that the 
mistreatment by his peers, that rivals that which he gets from his mother, does not bother 
him.  What is most distressing about his success, however, is that it has the proverbial 
asterisk by it, for Harry was involved in an inappropriate relationship with his teacher 
Miss Spinnaker.  Riddle describes discussing a litany of academic subjects while 
engaged in various sexual acts both at her home (until his mother puts a stop to that) and 
in school.  The incident may seem gratuitous, but it sets up a pattern in Riddle‘s life.  
Throughout the narrative various schemers take advantage of Riddle‘s ―shy‖ and 
oblivious nature.  Miss Spinnaker is only the first in a long line of people who use Harry 
to their advantage.  Miss Spinnaker is not just a sexual encounter for the sake of a sexual 
encounter, but an indication that Harry can truly not take care of himself. 
 After graduating with some distinction Harry finds himself a job.  He is proud of 
his accomplishments, though his pride is somewhat misplaced and indicates once again 
that as a hero we should see him as ironic.  The only job Riddle can find is a position as 
a bus boy in a cafeteria, where he describes his salary as ―niggardly.‖  His duties are the 
kinds of low activities reserved for those held in least regard, and he describes doctoring 
bad meat so it could be sold.  From his description his place of employment is not 
exactly the Ritz.  Once again he has failed to become the Uncommon Man.  Though, 
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perhaps he is working his way up.  He has a job, after all.  As a reader, maybe we can 
hope for Riddle, yet.  Harry claims that while the job itself may not have been perfect, it 
allowed him to make the kinds of contacts that bring success through networking.  In the 
cafeteria he meets a lawyer and a scholar who change his life. 
Riddle describes the scholar as a worried and harried man.  He is bothered by the 
state of the world and learned in a number of subjects.  He immerses himself in the 
studies of ―the world, mankind, civilization, social justice, democracy,‖ and human 
rights.  He worries about the state of the world.  Harry, in his naive kindness, offers him 
the solution to all of these difficult issues: ―‗The thing to do,‘ I said ‗is to get rich.  Then 
sleep ‗till noon and screw ‗em all.‘‖ 
The scholar‘s response is less than kind.  He sarcastically thanks Harry for 
solving all of his problems, but Harry does not pick up on the fact that he is being 
insulted.  In fact, Harry is proud that he has been able to help his acquaintance.  It is an 
awkward and embarrassing exchange in which the reader feels sorry for poor Harry.   It 
continues for quite some time, with each bit of banter revealing more and more of 
Harry‘s inability to grasp the world around him.  The scholar illuminated Harry‘s limited 
grasp of what wealth truly is, and what one can do with it.  Poor Harry knows that he is 
supposed to get rich, but does not even understand what that might entail.  His plans for 
charities he might establish, such as ―relief tubes for indigent aviators,‖ illustrates his 
complete and total lack of understanding of the world outside of his own, Common self. 
The worst part of this conversation for Harry is the revelation that money can 
corrupt.  Harry, having never heard of such a thing, begins to lose sleep over the idea 
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that his ultimate goal might tarnish his ―sterling honesty.‖  Riddle is completely unaware 
that his honesty has already been tarnished by his duties at work, such as selling meat 
that is bad.  Once again, Riddle sees his world as neatly organized into strict categories – 
in this case, right and wrong.  Unfortunately, Riddle is not competent enough to know 
what actions fit into those categories.  He is completely unable to grapple with the 
complexities of the world, as the simplicity of the narration has indicated. 
So caught up in the problem is he, that he catches his hand in the meat grinder at 
work, which leads him to make the acquaintance of his other great influence, the 
disbarred lawyer, Obispo.  Obispo sues the establishment, and gives Harry $1000 
dollars, ―which he said was my share of the five-thousand-dollar settlement he had 
received for my accident.‖  Harry‘s admiration for his benefactor knew no bounds. 
If Miss Spinnaker was the element that took advantage of Harry sexually, Obispo 
is the next in line and he takes Harry for all the money he is worth.  Harry‘s idea is to 
become a lawyer so that he can help people and get rich.  Obispo convinces Harry that 
instead of going to law school Harry should give him the money, read the law books in 
his office, learn the trade from him, and Obispo would see that Harry passed the bar. 
Harry cannot even then see that he is being taken advantage of.  He knows he 
needs an education, but cannot differentiate between school and the scheming of a dirty 
lawyer.  As a result, most of Harry‘s education consisted of playing pool with Obispo 
and listening to tales of his sexual exploits.  When it came time for him to take the bar he 
passed with ―flying colors – that is to say, Mr. Weatherwax did.‖  Obispo hired a man to 
take the bar exam for Riddle.
27
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The irony is even thicker here than it has been throughout the narrative so far.  
Riddle feared getting rich for a time because he was afraid it might corrupt him.  And yet 
in order to practice his career he engaged not only in dishonest, but illegal activity.  Our 
hapless hero is corrupted even before he acquired any wealth.  He is completely unaware 
of what is honest and dishonest.  His own values are a mystery to him. 
He brags to his parents about his new accreditation, but his mother is cruel in 
response.  She threatens and physically abuses him, which Harry takes as a sign of 
affection, and his father tries to stand up to her.  She then insults his father as well, 
which he claims indicates how much she loves him, though ―she concealed it perfectly.‖  
Harry is so completely clueless when it comes to understanding people that he mistakes 
his mother‘s abuse for something akin to love.  Even here he is unable to categorize the 
world effectively or correctly.  In his mind, his world is neatly and tidily organized, but 
his inability to understand his own environment keeps him from categorizing and 
labeling things for himself.  If he cannot even organize his own perceptions of the world, 
how can a read expect him to succeed in it? 
Harry‘s next move is to procure an office.  He settles on an abandoned street car 
and handwrites on a shingle ―Harry Riddle Attorney at Law Specializing in City 
Ordinances of Winnipeg‖ to hang over the door.  And even Harry admits that the first 
five years of practice were less than successful.  He had two cases, which he lost so 
abysmally that the judge claimed only a lunatic would procure his services in the future.  
And yet, somehow, Harry never lost his hope – even after he had been evicted and his 
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furniture repossessed.  It was then that he received a summons from Judge Ralph 
Schram. 
The judge‘s request for his presence is really the beginning of the rising action.  
The stories up to this point have been a means for the reader to get to know and 
understand Riddle so that his behavior during the trial makes sense.  But it is the trial 
that is the real heart of the story.  That being said, the story is five pages long, but the 
judge‘s summons does not come until the end of the third page.  Harry himself is 
actually the important part of the story.  The trial is simply a display of Harry at his 
worst. 
Schram is blatantly rude to poor Harry.  He is a gruff man who enjoys taunting 
and abusing those beneath him and he tells Harry, ―‗I have to appoint a public defender 
in a trial that is coming up next Monday.  The defendant is so palpably guilty that no 
lawyer with an ounce of brains will touch the case.  So I called you.‘‖  Harry completely 
misses the fact that Schram has called him an idiot. 
Riddle‘s preparation for the case consists of asking his clients whether he is 
innocent or not, and then taking his answer at face value.  When Riddle gets to court he 
does not even know what his client, Sam Hiff, is accused of.  Hiff had been defrauding 
the State in various welfare and assistance scams.  Riddle, having confidence in his 
ability to think quickly, decides that he will simply gather from the opening statement 
what his client is accused of.  The prosecutor wastes little time. 
―Ladies and gentlemen of the jury,‖ said Swanson with a nervous glance at Judge 
Schram, who sat frowning over a stop watch, ―I will not waste your time with 
any long oration.  The state intends to bring this trial swiftly to its inevitable 
conclusion…‖ 
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―Come on, come on,‖ snapped Judge Schram. 
―We will prove,‖ continued Swanson, ―that the defendant Hiff has large 
deposits in several banks, that he has various sources of income, that he lives in a 
luxurious apartment filled with costly furniture.  At the conclusion of the State‘s 
case, you will have to choice except to find the defendant guilty as charged.  
Thank you.‖28 
 
Riddle concludes that his client‘s alleged crime is being a rich man, which he believes 
strikes ―at the very foundation of our republic.‖  Riddle is relying on his father‘s 
definition of American duty.  It is the job of an American to get rich, so Riddle sees his 
client as the epitome of an American.  What Riddle does not understand is the difference 
between wealth that is gained legally and ill-gotten riches.  In his outrage, he finds a new 
purpose in his life.  He claims that ―This was no longer merely the case of the State vs. 
Sam Hiff; this was Americanism vs. un-Americanism, totalitarianism vs. 
democracy…‖29  This story gets to the very heart of the issue that all of these other case 
studies have addressed, though not quite as directly.  For Riddle, this is a question of 
what it means to be an American. 
 Riddle proceeds to give a passionate opening statement in which he compares his 
client to George Washington and Thomas Jefferson.  Riddle proclaims loudly that yes, 
indeed, his client is a rich man, and it is this wealth that makes him a great American.  
When his client expresses his surprise that George Washington was a relief chiseler like 
himself, Riddle realizes he has made an egregious error.  The trial goes downhill from 
there.  The prosecution brings witnesses that testify that Hiff has been receiving 
thousands of dollars in relief checks and is indeed, as Riddle claimed, very wealthy.  It is 
difficult to reconcile that Hiff is a great American because he has been scamming the 
government. 
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 Riddle simply sits through the testimony and chooses not to cross examine any 
witness because he cannot think of any questions.  It is not until Miss Esme Geddes 
enters the courtroom that he shows any signs of life. 
 Geddes is a voluptuous blonde that works for the county welfare board.  Riddle 
describes her as shapely, but innocently lovely, with a carriage that spoke of ―good 
breeding, of honesty, straightforwardness, principle, and dignity.‖  She was ―an 
American princess.‖  Hiff simply describes her as ―a real piece.‖30  Her clothing is 
expensive but simple, and while Hiff describes her in the crassest terms, Riddle clearly 
has her on a pedestal, idealizing her as the perfect American beauty. 
 The prosecution establishes that she investigates relief clients and is familiar with 
Hiff.  She testifies he lived a luxurious lifestyle, nothing like what one would expect 
from a welfare recipient.  She tried to question him on his occupation and his financial 
situation, but found herself on the receiving end of what amounts to sexual assault.  
Upon hearing her story Riddle is finally goaded into his one truly heroic moment of the 
entire piece.  Shrieking, he swung a copy of Corpus Juris at Hiff, literally throwing the 
book at him. 
I threw him to the floor and leaped up and down on his head.  He scrambled to 
his feet and tried to run from the room, but I threw a small juror at him and 
knocked him down again.  I should have certainly killed him had I not been 
overcome by several bailiffs.
31
 
 
Riddle is restrained and carted away.  His parting thoughts return to his life as a busy 
boy.  He ruminates that it was at least an honorable position, and ―not entirely void of 
possibilities for future advancements.‖ 
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 Riddle spent the vast majority of the narrative being Hefner‘s quintessential 
Common Man.  His outburst in the conclusion is a bit too little too late.  He has 
established that while he might intellectually understand the American Dream exists and 
he can associate it with consumption and honesty, he does not have the ability to take 
part in it.  His final act is a desperate, but ultimately fruitless attempt to make up for his 
years of being Common. 
 Riddle spends the entire narrative trying to achieve the American Dream of the 
Uncommon Man.  Each attempt proves to be a more abysmal failure than the last.  The 
pinnacle of his career is an inept defense of that Dream.  By the time Riddle is inspired 
to any act of heroism or to rise above his allotted station, his Common Man status is so 
entrenched in his character that he cannot escape it.  His Commonality follows him all 
the way to the end of the narrative.  Riddle may have graced the pages of the magazine, 
but he is certainly no playboy. 
 What is most surprising about Hefner‘s Playboy, then, is that Hefner‘s comments 
on American identity strike me as the least controversial of all of these chapters.  In each 
study we have seen examples of the tension between an understanding of clear, 
understandable metanarrative and the fractured nature of an encroaching postmodern 
world.  In Brown v. Board the Court sought to include entire new groups in American 
identity, causing huge rifts in many people‘s understanding of who we were.  Joe 
McCarthy fought tirelessly against the waves of change that he feared were lapping at 
America‘s shores: he strove tirelessly to keep American identity a clear story that 
excluded changing he saw as threatening.  Similarly, lawmakers perceived the threat of 
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Communism, a competing metanarrative, as so menacing they felt they had to use the 
Pledge of Allegiance as a weapon in the fight against the spread of Marxism.  Playboy 
simply sought to re-affirm a few simple ideas that, in comparison, seem pretty 
uncontroversial.  Hefner wanted America to be a nation of men who were classy, 
confident, consumers.  He was not asking for any great change or fighting off 
international enemies.  Hefner saw his enemy as the lethargy of Americans themselves.  
But his constitutive ideology was ultimately not that challenging, even though his 
medium, the pornographic magazine, has been the source of controversy for decades. 
Of all of the chapters in the project, this analysis may seem the most simplistic.  
The material is rife with fascinating tidbits and larger than life characters, and yet the 
actual analysis seems almost lackluster.  I think this is because of all of the rhetorical 
artifacts I have chosen this one may be the most straightforward.  In the very beginning 
of this narrative the main character poses a very direct question: he asks what is his duty 
as an American?  He receives an equally direct answer, which he takes at face value and 
the rest of the article is a record of Riddle‘s antics as he tries to behave as a dutiful 
American.  It is organized in one of the most basic formats – question and answer.  And 
then answer comes in a narrative form, stated largely in simple, declarative sentences 
from a first person point of view.  The narrative follows a basic chronological timeline, 
and the style is meant to highlight the simplicity of the main character.  The structure 
and the tone of the essay all go to illustrate the Common nature of the ironic hero, Harry 
Riddle.  The analysis does not suffer from dealing with a dull subject; the subject simply 
lends itself so well to the analysis as to make simple work of it all. 
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 Hefner‘s America, like the ones highlighted in these other chapters, was a 
conflicted one. In his mind, America should base her identity on the idea that 
…each individual has a right to explore his own individuality – to discover 
himself, as well as the world around him – and to take pride in himself and the 
individuality that sets him apart from the rest of mankind, as fully as he takes 
pride in the kinship that links him to every man on earth – past, present, and 
future.  A society should exist not only for the purpose of establishing common 
areas of agreement among men, but also to aid each person in achieving his own 
individual identity.
32
   
Additionally, a successful society should be rational one.  Absolute truth, he 
claimed, came from logic and reason, not mystical, archaic beliefs.  He believed society 
should strive for intellectual improvement always, and feared what he saw as the anti-
intellectualism that had a chokehold on the Cold War.  Hefner saw resistance to rational 
thought, logic, and science as another part of the attempt to bring down the Uncommon 
Man.
33
   
Logic is what tempers his third belief of what America should be: logic should be 
used to limit freedom in a just way.  Man, he believes, is born free.  But society has the 
right, even the duty, to limit the freedoms of the individual, and it is the rational mind of 
man that allows us to do so justly and responsibly.  Man does this by being rationally 
self-interested.  By doing those things that are best for himself, man does those things 
that are best for society by extension.  Hence, the American liberal market and her 
tolerance for consumption will always be superior to other societal experiments.
34
 
 Hefner wanted to jettison one grand narrative, religion, in favor of another: 
science.  And while this is certainly not a particularly postmodern action, his 
individuation of society does not fit in with the idea of a grand narrative in general.  
Hefner believed in the significance of the individual above the group, hence his fixation 
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on the ―Uncommon Man.‖35  The purpose of a metanarrative is to unify and keep a 
people together as a united front – the thing Hefner wants us to unite behind is our own 
ability to interpret the world around us, setting up the potential for a much-fractured 
narrative.  He believed that a human who uses logic and reason to guide his individual 
approach to the world will come up with a rational approach to societal living that will 
fit in with other people doing the same thing.  His idealism smacks of a certain Modern 
naiveté – he claims he believes in individualism, so long as that individualism fits into a 
particular narrative he is constructing.  This is why Playboy is so illustrative of the 
identity crisis that America was suffering from in this transitional period from Modernity 
to Postmodernity – Hugh Hefner himself was trying to navigate his understanding of an 
old America with new ideas about the potential for new America – he was trying to 
contextualize what he called the ―Upbeat Generation.‖   
Conclusion 
 My college buddy who got Playboy for the pictures and did not read the articles 
apparently missed part of Hefner‘s point.  My friend was not paying attention to the 
sophisticated, taste-making, appeal to the consumer writing in the magazine that Hefner 
took so much pride in.  He was simply indulging in consumption of the basest variety.  
Had he paid more attention to the articles, he might have known that sexual indulgence 
was not all the Hefner claimed he had in mind, and that the articles were supposed to be 
a part of the Playboy experience. 
 The main character of the article in question, Harry Riddle, represents everything 
that America is not supposed to be, according to Hugh Hefner.  Riddle is timid, 
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ineffectual, without potential, and dimwitted.  He has ambition, but not the means to do 
anything about it.  It is not entirely his fault, as his parents are Common in Hefner‘s 
strictest sense.  Riddle is giving us a set of ―how not-to‖ directions, until his finale in 
which his passion drives him into a chaotic burst of action. 
 The analysis shows how the fiction article in Playboy specifically and 
purposefully sets out to constitute a particular version of American identity by 
portraying an ironic picture of a ―good American.‖  It weaves a cultural narrative in the 
most literal sense, in that is directly asks what it means to be American then answers 
with a narrative.  However, that literal response is not precisely what Charland and 
McGee described in their theories of constitutive rhetoric, so while certainly they are 
helpful in understanding how a work such as this operates as constitutive, bolstering that 
understanding with White allows for criticism that reveals the mechanisms of the text 
which actively construct identity at that moment.
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
 Michele Bachmann (R-MN) has been the subject of much speculation over the 
last few months.  The press has played a cat-and-mouse kind of ―will she or won‘t she‖ 
game with Bachmann and her supporters trying to ascertain whether she will make a run 
for the White House in 2012.  Bachmann is no stranger to the national spotlight.  She has 
courted media attention since well before she was a career politician, and simply a pro-
life activist.  Bachmann is the kind of political figure that brings out the best and the 
worst in people.  Her supporters truly believe she is a blessing from above, and her 
detractors see her as a buffoon.  One reason that Bachmann inspires such varied, and 
often strong emotional responses from the public is because she has on more than one 
occasion seemingly claimed to have a monopoly on the meaning for the word 
―American.‖ 
 In 2008 Bachmann told Chris Matthews during a Hardball interview that she 
feared Barack Obama may have had ―anti-American views.‖  Matthews pressed the 
issue, leading Bachmann to say that she would love for the press to do an exposé on 
Congress and show the American public which of their representatives was pro-America 
or anti-America.  Predictably, the exchange caused a bit of a stir. 
 On the one hand, people who disliked Obama and had serious ideological 
concerns with his policies rejoiced that another brave soul was willing to speak up about 
what they perceived as a rejection of all things ―American.‖  On the other, those who 
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liked Obama felt insulted.  Bachmann had effectively put Obama and his supporters into 
the ―Them‖ category.  Left leaning politicians and pundits clamored for an apology 
because they felt they had been slighted by a partisan and myopic understanding of 
―American.‖ 
 Ultimately, neither side had much of an argument one way or the other.  The 
problem was not in parsing out who was pro or anti American; the problem was in 
defining ―American‖ to begin with.  Bachmann made her proclamations with a particular 
definition in mind, and according to that definition perhaps Obama was anti-American.  
But she was mistaken to assume that the rest of the country shared her definition. 
 The incident was just one of many from the campaign season that highlighted our 
complete and total lack of consensus when it comes to ―American.‖  We talk about the 
American way or the American Dream as if we all understood what that word meant.  
And, to be fair, we do understand it, just not collectively.  Each of us more than likely 
has our own idiosyncratic way of defining ―American.‖  The fact that such an important 
word can be so ill-defined speaks to the power of constitutive rhetoric.  We fashion 
―American‖ as we go, changing the meaning as necessary, so the lack of a fixed 
understanding of ―American‖ becomes its strength.  We can use the idea ―American‖ in 
any number of situations and arguments because we create what it means as we need it. 
Project Development 
 This project began with an interest in the idea that one could be a ―good‖ or 
―bad‖ American.  If we posit that one person can be better or worse at being an 
American than another, as those words of comparison would imply, then we must also 
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be working from an understanding that ―American‖ is a particular identity outside of just 
a legal status.  It must be a collection of behaviors or attitudes that, for whatever reason, 
we can associate with the United States of America.  The problem lies in identifying 
specifically what behaviors and attitudes create ―American‖ so that then we can judge 
who is good at it and who is not. 
 National identity is nothing if not confusing.  It was clear to me at the outset that 
trying to ascertain what ―American‖ meant, even at a very specific moment in time, was 
a fool‘s game.  Even those words that people tend to use to try and define ―American,‖ 
like ―patriotic,‖ or ―just‖ defy definitions themselves.  A definition of the term 
―American‖ would be idiosyncratic at best, and at its worst, a caricature of a highly 
complex idea.   
 If then, I reasoned, we insist on using the word ―American‖ as a descriptor or 
identifier, we must at least be pretending that there is some agreed upon definition.  If a 
politician pounds her fist and pronounces her support of ―American values‖ or the 
―American way of life,‖ how did we get to the point where we all nod emphatically in 
concurrence?  This was where my project began to take root.  I reasoned there must be a 
process by which we construct ―American‖ as we go along.  I began to ask what that 
process looked like.  How do we constitute ―American‖ in public discourse?  I 
endeavored to answer this question by looking at specific rhetorical acts and analyzing 
them as constitutive rhetoric.  My project would be a work of rhetorical criticism with 
the goal of understanding how American identity is formed through public discourse.  
However, I ran into difficulty almost immediately. 
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 The theory of constitutive rhetoric as outlined by Maurice Charland was not 
intended to be used for rhetorical criticism.  Charland‘s work is a matter of constitutive 
theory and helps a person understand the ideas behind the act of constitution, but is not 
applicable to a single text.  James Boyd White‘s understanding of constitutive rhetoric 
lends itself better to rhetorical criticism, but White is a legal scholar, and his explanation 
of constitutive rhetoric focuses on the law as constitutive.  He argues that each word is 
important, bringing the discussion down to the particular as opposed to the theoretical, 
but he stays within the realm of legal rhetoric.  Charland‘s work had been applied to 
groups and historical periods, and White‘s work had been applied to forensic rhetoric 
outside of just the text of the law itself, but there was no real framework for criticizing a 
singular text as a piece of constitutive rhetoric.  My work, then, was to create such a 
framework. 
 I argue that specific, singular texts can be constitutive, and can be analyzed as 
such.  Using a close textual analysis one can effectively criticize the constitutive nature 
of a particular piece of rhetoric.  I have bridged the theoretical and the critical and shown 
how a close reading can highlight the constitutive elements of an argument.  This 
dissertation is an illustration of that methodology in practice, as I have taken four 
distinctly different constitutive artifacts of rhetoric and, using a close reading, illustrated 
how they aim to shape national identity. 
 Constitutive rhetoric, as Charland describes it, is the process by which a rhetor 
creates an audience, or calls an audience into being.  It is a complicated process in which 
the rhetor and the audience assume that the identity is already in existence.  It is 
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important that both audience and rhetor work together in assuming this ―always already‖ 
state.  An audience might react poorly to a public figure who proudly proclaimed that 
she was going to create an identity for them all.  Instead, the rhetor creates a scenario in 
which much of the argument is persuading that the identity she is creating has, in fact, 
always been the identity of the audience.  A rhetor only has leeway to effectively 
construct identity once she has the audience believing they ―already‖ are.  A rhetor may 
do this by relying on cultural norms, myths, or any number of collective assumptions, 
but it is essential to shaping identity.  The rhetor can then create identity through rhetoric 
as she goes.  The audience is accepting that this is who they are, so as the rhetor argues 
for a specific identity they are actively constituting themselves. 
 White‘s approach to constitutive rhetoric is a bit more pragmatic.  White looks at 
the law as a literal construction of the society we believe we are supposed to be.  When 
we fashion law we are making some kind of constitutive statement on the identity we 
believe we have.  Then, by making that belief the law, it becomes our identity.  It is 
beautifully cyclical.  We believe we should be a society that does not perform action X.  
So, we create rules and mandates that outlaw action X.  We are now a society that does 
not accept action X – it is a part of our legal identity that those who perform action X 
can be punished, and possibly removed from the larger group by either imprisonment or 
in extreme cases, execution.  By making law we constitute our identity.   
White‘s treatment of constitutive rhetoric deals with a specific text.  In this case, 
the text would be the mandate that outlawed action X.  Charland‘s treatment of 
constitutive rhetoric deals more with the process by which identity is constituted and not 
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one text.  For my project I wanted to look at texts the way White did, but with a 
contextual eye that lends itself to Charland‘s theory.  This lead me to a close textual 
analysis ensconced in constitutive rhetoric.  A close reading should include the story of 
the text – its history and what is known about the rhetor and the situation.  So the text is 
not removed from any rhetorical process, but at the same time, I could focus on small 
texts to show how they are constitutive, the way White sees the law.  The Cold War 
struck me as particularly fruitful ground for testing such a methodology.   
First, let me be clear that I am not claiming that the word ―American‖ was any 
more contentious during the Cold War than it was during other notable periods of our 
nation‘s history.  Loyalists and Patriots certainly did not see eye to eye on what the word 
meant, or whether the word should even be used at all when instead of ―Britain.‖  Each 
war signaled a renewed interest in trying to define the word in such a fashion as to make 
sure ―outsiders‖ were left on the outside.  The Cold War is simply one of many segments 
of American history in which the word ―American‖ took center stage in a good deal of 
public discourse.  Any number of other conflicts could produce the same kinds of 
questions and analyses.  
Secondly, I am not claiming that the Cold War is the easy thing to analyze.  The 
Cold War was an enormously complex rhetorical, economical, and political battle that 
spanned decades.  The players came from all walks of life and philosophies and many 
had larger than life personalities to match the outrageous politics of the drama.  I am not 
arguing that the Cold War was a simpler time in which to try and pinpoint the means by 
which we constitute identity. 
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The Cold War does, however, represent a combination of desirable attributes.  
During the Cold War America spent a good deal of energy trying to rhetorically separate 
―Us‖ from ―Them.‖  Any conflict requires a solid rhetorical establishment of who the 
allies and enemies are.  So public discourse provides ample anecdotes from which to 
draw.  Also, the Cold War is not so far removed that a complete paradigm shift is 
necessary to understand the discourse and its context.  An analysis of colonial American 
discourse would require a complete re-definition of any number of basic ideas simply 
because national and international philosophies and practices have changed so much 
since the days of the Founding Fathers.  Even history as recent as World War II requires 
a cognitive shift in the way we would discuss politics because prior to the end of WWII 
the world had no understanding of atomic warfare.  One reason the Cold War is so 
interesting is because part of our anxiety about ―us‖ and ―them‖ may well have been 
related to shifting understandings of what it meant to be a part of the modern world.  
In other words, the Cold War is interesting from a constitutive standpoint 
because it is a very public display of the tension surrounding the identity shift from a 
modern world to a postmodern world.  After the Allied Forces declared victory on all 
fronts the world looked very different than it had before the war.  The Soviet Union rose 
from the ashes along with Great Britain and the United States as one of the world‘s 
premier powers.  Americans were forced to contend with the fact that one of the other 
major players in the world of international politics was radically different in a number of 
ways.  It was difficult to make a clear cut argument for the supremacy of capitalism 
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when the other major power in the world was communist.  Large, metanarratives from 
disparate parts of the world were competing.   
At home things were no less complicated.  Tensions about race and sex 
inequality were threatening the classic, white, nuclear family version of normality that so 
many Americans took comfort in.  Television and music was getting racier and voices of 
dissent against normative confines of culture were popping up in the arts and politics.  
Pop culture was exploding in new, edgier directions as sex, drugs, and rock and roll 
moved from the fringe to the main stream.  Minority groups were clamoring for 
recognition, and many of the controversial figures of the day, like Allen Ginsberg and 
Jack Kerouac, are cultural icons, now.  Americans were sorting out who they were in the 
context of this large scale drama, and the process was sometimes painful.  The Cold War 
was most certainly a political, rhetorical, and economic saga that pitted country against 
country, but there were also small battles being fought at the ground level.   
The chapters in this dissertation are four examples of public discourse from the 
Cold War that illustrate America‘s attempt to constitute her identity in the face of a 
philosophically new and challenging landscape, and all four cases are from 1954.  Any 
other year from the Cold War could have been the sample year.  The year 1969 was a 
rich year for America because there was so much to respond to in the news.  That year a 
man walked on the moon, crowning America the leader of the space race after years of 
trailing after Sputnik.  That was also the year of Woodstock.  Counter culture in America 
was certainly nothing new, but Woodstock was counter culture on a whole new scale, 
and it gave fringe groups a renewed sense of vitality that carried their message well into 
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the seventies.  On the pop culture level, that was also the year of the Manson murders 
and the release of Abby Road, both of which spurred plenty of public conversation.  Or, I 
could have focused on the period between 1972 and 1974 and analyzed rhetoric about 
the Watergate scandal.  Certainly Watergate and Nixon‘s fall from grace lead to a great 
deal of public confusion about the state of the nation. I wrote on 1954 not because it is 
somehow special, but because it is exemplary.  That year is not special because it stands 
out from all other years of the Cold War, but because those things that happened that 
year are illustrative of the issues of the Cold War at large.  
In 2007 I began doing research for a lesson plan that involved the Pledge of 
Allegiance.  That lesson plan became a note in a binder about a possible paper idea, and 
that paper idea became a pilot study for a paper.  The paper situated the Pledge of 
Allegiance as a piece of Cold War political rhetoric, and not specifically religious 
rhetoric because of the arguments I read in Congressional records that testified to its 
importance as an anti-Communist text.  As I researched the Cold War I became more 
and more interested in that particular period of American history.  In my reading about 
the Cold War I inevitably came across works about Joe McCarthy, as he is so 
emblematic of the early years of the Cold War.  McCarthy‘s ―Decency‖ incident even 
became a part of a different lesson plan for a different course.  I noted that McCarthy‘s 
downfall happened the same year that ―under God‖ was added to the Pledge of 
Allegiance with some interest, but only as trivia.  Soon after I made the discovery that 
Brown v. Board was also that same year.  During this time, the campaigns and elections 
of 2008 had come and gone, leaving me with scholarly questions about the means by 
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which we construct identity.  My research interests had begun to crystallize, and I 
wondered if it would be possible to use a calendar year to set up parameters for a 
research project.  What I quickly realized was that, yes, it was possible, but that the year 
itself did not matter. 
Because constitutive rhetoric is an ongoing process and we are constantly 
molding our own national identity, a constitutive study is possible looking at any given 
period of time.  It is easier during a time of conflict because ―us‖ and ―them‖ is more 
important then than at peacetime.  But there is not really a time when we are not talking 
about who we are.  Public discourse is awash with our discussions of our values, our 
fears, and our desires.  I simply chose a year that is notable because in that year there 
were a few obvious and controversial examples.  But 1954 is not more important than 
another.  It is not inherently more constitutive.  It is, however, a year in which some 
awfully interesting constitutive discourse was occurring. 
The specific cases I chose for this project present a wide swath of life and 
discourse for analysis.  Brown v. Board addresses the burgeoning racial tension in the 
US that plagued the post WWII years.  This tension eventually grew into the Civil 
Rights movement of the 1960s, paving the way for some of America‘s most iconic 
figures of the 20
th
 century, like Martin Luther King, Jr., and Malcolm X.  Senator Joseph 
McCarthy, himself a kind of American icon, and the changes to the Pledge of 
Allegiance, represent the political tension of the Cold War.  The fear of communism 
permeated both politics and culture, leading McCarthy to wage his witch hunt and 
Congress to impose a new national unifier on the nation at large in an attempt to create a 
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solidified front in the face of the enemy.  Playboy is a unique example of culture in that 
while it could certainly be used to represent America‘s supposed pre-occupation with 
sex, Hefner seemed to have loftier goals.  The perceived misogyny of his life work is, 
according to Hefner, both a misreading and a by-product of his real goal, which is to be a 
taste and style maker for the ideal American consumer.   
Brown v. Board very specifically deals with how race affects our understanding 
of American identity.  We often think of the Civil Rights movement as being a product 
of the ‗60s, enmeshed with anti-Vietnam furor.  But roots of the movement go back 
decades.  The Brown v. Board case was a very public and very definitive comment from 
the Supreme Court on the idea of ―American.‖ 
Brown v. Board was the culmination of a drastic shift in the way the law viewed 
African Americans.  Before, the Dredd Scott case had dealt specifically with the idea of 
citizenship.  The Court made it clear in that decision that the law of the land dictated that 
black men and women could not expect the benefits of citizenship.  Most African 
Americans would not even be called ―citizens.‖  The Court pointed to no less than the 
Founding Fathers for their inspiration.  Their argument rested in the framework of 
―original intent,‖ and since the Founding Fathers did not intend for African Americans to 
enjoy the benefits of citizenship, then the Court would take no steps to change that.  Just 
a few years later, the Civil War tore the nation apart, during which the Emancipation 
Proclamation was signed.  After the Civil War the 13
th
 and 14
th
 Amendments were 
passed, largely rendering the Scott decision null and void. However, Plessy v. Ferguson 
made it clear that there were still some hurdles for equality.  The Plessy case established 
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that ―separate but equal‖ was constitutional and the decision stood for decades.  Brown 
v. Board finally struck down separate but equal in 1954. 
The Brown opinion indicated a transition in thinking over the decades.  It 
assumed that black Americans are citizens and did not spend any time arguing over 
whether their legal status was at question.  The Court was more concerned with whether 
Blacks were being treated the same as other citizens.  A close textual analysis of the 
opinion reveals that since the Court assumed citizenship, what was at stake was Black 
status as ―American.‖  L.H. LaRue, a student of James Boyd White, takes White‘s work 
on constitutive rhetoric and extends it to cover Supreme Court decisions, not just the law 
itself.  With LaRue‘s work in mind, a close reading is a useful tool in assessing the 
constitutive nature of the Brown decision.  Since the Court assumed citizenship they 
were able to focus on equal protection for all citizens, and they fashioned their opinion 
around the importance of education in the lives of Americans.  The SCOTUS also 
assumed that all schools were equal, so the trial focused specifically on the ―separate‖ 
aspect of ―separate but equal.‖  Analysis illuminates that ultimately the Court was 
making a relatively simple and straightforward argument about American identity.  The 
Court claimed that education was central to taking part in American life, and that 
separate facilities automatically instilled a sense of inferiority in black school children.  
Therefore, separate facilities denied black school children inevitably were left out of the 
American experience. 
While some were making such great strides to create a more inclusive version of 
―American,‖ others were fighting to keep is as narrowly defined as possible.  Senator 
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Joseph McCarthy had been crusading against Communists, fellow travelers, and those he 
saw as soft on Communism for years before his public humiliation during the Army-
McCarthy hearings of 1954.  McCarthy was emblematic of what Richard Hofstadter 
called a ―paranoiac;‖ he was terrified of losing something.  Particularly, he was afraid of 
losing a set of values or an identity that made him feel safe, and so he lashed out at 
anyone who he saw as a threat to his understanding of American. 
McCarthy‘s rhetoric was situated squarely in the trappings of conspiracy.  He 
believed that the Communists were not only an outside threat that were pressing in on 
us, but a threat from within because of infiltrators.  His argument, however, was based 
largely on his own claims.  He may have had evidence or even good reasons, but what he 
presented to the public was founded largely on his own ethos.  His constitutive rhetoric 
was based on conspiracy rhetoric, but since it was precariously based on his own 
credibility, when his credibility came into question, his entire argument began to 
crumble.  Joe Welch‘s challenge to McCarthy‘s credibility brought McCarthy‘s 
conspiracy rhetoric crashing down around him.  Granted, there were others in the public 
eye to carry the torch for him, but McCarthy‘s attempts to constitute American identity 
effectively came to a screeching halt. 
A close textual analysis uncovers just how McCarthy was attempting to shape 
American identity via conspiracy rhetoric, and how Welch was able to combat his 
attempts.  The analysis shows how McCarthy‘s dependence on his own credibility and 
his inability to keep his own claims separate fell to pieces in the face of Welch‘s well-
constructed narrative.  Welch used a classic narrative arc, and his own particular flourish 
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and style, to exploit the weaknesses of McCarthy‘s attempt at constitutive rhetoric.  
Using a close textual analysis highlights the ways ―American‖ truly drove McCarthy‘s 
career and his ultimate downfall. 
At nearly the same time that McCarthy was tangling with the Army, the House 
and the Senate were in the process of adding ―under God‖ to the Pledge of Allegiance.  
The Pledge of Allegiance is a very specific and deliberate attempt address what it means 
to be an American.  Congress was also worried about the threat of Communism, but 
instead of conspiracy rhetoric, they used the power of epideictic rhetoric.  The Pledge of 
Allegiance provides a description of what American is supposed to be.  A close textual 
analysis reveals the real power of adding those two simple words ―under God‖ to a 
powerful bit of text. 
―Under God‖ was a tool to separate America from her Communist enemies.  
American lawmakers associated Communism with ―godlessness,‖ so by adding ―under 
God‖ to the Pledge of Allegiance, they ensured that one could not recite the Pledge and 
be a Communist at the same time.  By adding ―under God‖ to the Pledge lawmakers 
were able to draw the lines between ―us‖ and ―them‖ even more starkly. 
Congressional records reveal much about the reasoning behind adding ―under 
God.‖  The most pervasive argument was a terrible fear that the Pledge was not 
―American‖ enough.  Lawmakers argued that without those two words the Pledge could 
be mistaken for a pledge to a ―Muscovite‖ flag.  Those words provide enough of a 
change that the Pledge is identifiable as an American promise.  The close textual 
analysis of the Pledge of Allegiance with the phrase ―under God‖ added reveals the 
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actual power of those two small words.  Viewing the Pledge as a piece of epideictic 
rhetoric and understanding the power of the appositive highlight just how constitutive 
the Pledge truly is. 
 The first issue of Playboy was in December of 1953, put together on a shoe string 
budget, and with no real assurance that there would be another.  The January, 1954 issue 
represented a victory for Hugh Hefner.  Playboy itself represented Hefner‘s dream of 
what the ideal American man should be like.  He idealized a suave man of taste, culture, 
and consumptive power.   
 The magazine shared many characteristics with other pornographic magazines.  
If anything it was a bit on the tame side in comparison to some other works available.  
However, Hefner tried to make his magazine different.  Hefner wanted his magazine to 
be a style guide, so he also put a good deal of effort into quality articles for his 
consumers to read.  His January ‗54 issue included a work of humorous fiction, a form 
that would become a staple of Playboy, which directly and explicitly addressed what it 
meant to be an American.  The article‘s ironic hero spent the entire article fumbling 
through various schemes trying to get rich, because he understood his duty as an 
American to be to ―get rich and screw ‗em all.‖  Unfortunately, the main character 
lacked all of the characteristics that Hefner felt made an American exceptional, so he 
continually failed in his efforts.  Hefner‘s magazine was very explicit in its attempts to 
join the conversation dealing with American identity.  The close textual analysis 
highlights how Hefner incorporated his philosophy into the text of the magazine.  
Analyzing the story illuminates the way in which the philosophy that Hefner claimed to 
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have founded his magazine on, a philosophy heavily based in what it meant to be an 
American, really has been a part of the magazine from the very beginning. 
Expansion, Future Projects, and the Scholarly Conversation 
Since the methodology was so important to this dissertation, I will most certainly 
engage in critical works that further employ a close textual analysis within a constitutive 
framework.  Rhetorical criticism is vital to the field to keep the study of rhetoric relevant 
and accessible.  And, because this project covered multiple cases, there are also 
numerous opportunities for further research and expansion on these case studies.  In the 
future I will expand not only on these topics I have begun to address here, but also apply 
constitutive theory and criticism to other historical periods and moments in order to 
create a richer, more varied understanding of the ways in which rhetors create identity..  
Each case study is the beginning of what could easily be a much larger and more 
extensive project.  These case studies provide a basic criticism, but could easily become 
a broader picture of constitutive rhetoric. 
 The Brown v. Board of education analysis could easily be expanded into larger, 
more extensive research works.  My first step in such a process will be to look into the 
rhetorical responses to Brown v. Board.  Simply because the SCOTUS deemed 
segregation unconstitutional, the parts did not all immediately fall into place.  George 
Wallace railed against what he saw as the unjust and unconstitutional infringements on 
Alabama‘s states‘ rights, proudly proclaiming that segregation would stand forever, and 
he was not alone.  The decision to de-segregate schools lead to hard-fought battles that 
were still raging in some places when Martin Luther King, Jr. began his fight against 
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segregation at large.  These rhetors were just as adamant in wanting to help shape 
American identity as the Warren Court.  A future study will only begin with the opinion 
of the Court, then go on to include rhetorical responses from across the political 
spectrum.  Such a study would be a much richer picture of the struggle to constitute 
identity.  It would include the differing ideas and voices, clamoring to put their particular 
spin on what it means to be ―American.‖  The Brown v. Board chapter will serve as the 
starting point for a wider picture of race and American identity in the post WWII era. 
 The politics of the early part of the Cold War provide an inexhaustible source of 
material useful in analyzing how we create American identity.  Joseph McCarthy was 
simply one character out of a whole host.  And his story, though certainly one of the 
more memorable, is not the only story of an attempt to reign in the cultural explosion of 
new ideas concerning race, sex, and culture.  One such example of attempts by 
governmental institutions to maintain the status quo is the rarely told story of attempted 
art censorship throughout the Cold War.  While censoring the arts, or trying to, is not 
particular to the Cold War, the reasoning behind much of the censorship is pertinent to 
my interests.  Many Americans are familiar with the antics of HUAC and their war on 
Hollywood, and some may even recall the attempts to ban questionable literature that 
reached a new level (this included an attempt to ban John Steinbeck), but less familiar is 
the war that some politicians waged not just against visual art, but against certain styles 
of art.  
 Content aside, there were certain styles of art that some Americans felt were 
subversive.  George Dondero (R-MI) decried expressionism, futurism, Dadaism, and 
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cubism, just to name a few, as dangerous.
1
  Dondero claimed that Modern art was 
Communist ―because it does not glorify our beautiful country, our cheerful and smiling 
people, and our great material progress.  Art which does not portray our beautiful 
country in plain, simple terms that every can understand breeds dissatisfaction.‖2  
Dondero‘s claims fed right into the anti-intellectualism that Hugh Hefner disdained and 
men like McCarthy cultivated.  The conversation about art was at the very heart of 
constitutive rhetoric.  People wanted visual media that represented what their version of 
America was.  In a future project I think I would like to begin to look into censorship 
and constitutive rhetoric beginning with this conversation on modern art, and moving 
into other efforts of censorship during that time period. 
 The Pledge of Allegiance chapter, the original study behind this entire project, 
could easily be expanded, as well.  My chapter touched on the larger history of the 
United States, and future works will delve into a broader history.  Such work would 
necessarily begin with a historical analysis of the original Pledge of Allegiance.  
Contextualizing the original Pledge and providing an analysis of the text like the one 
here would be the beginning of a much larger project dealing with American identity.  
Looking at the entire history of the Pledge and criticizing its manifestations, and changes 
in relation to historical context, would provide a means to analyze American constitutive 
rhetoric over time and assess the ways that stress about identity has changed. 
 Playboy magazine is unlike my other case studies in that it is not one text, but a 
series of them, so it provides its own historical narrative.  The question I will address in 
future Playboy projects is a matter of comparative critiques: does the philosophy I found 
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in the first magazine hold throughout the tenure of the magazine?  I will stay within the 
confines of the magazine, however, because I am interested in the magazine‘s emphasis 
on writing and text.  Playboy may have expanded into the television and movie 
industries, but the magazine has stayed true to its original formula of scintillating 
pictures and well written articles.  An analysis of those articles over time, in search of 
whether the Playboy philosophy remained at the heart of the magazine, would highlight 
any changes in Playboy‘s constitutive properties.  Such a study would bring my research 
questions out of the realm of historical studies and into the present day, thereby 
expanding the applicability of my projects. 
 The theory of constitutive rhetoric has been lacking a practical application.  My 
hope is that with this dissertation I can begin a conversation on the connection between 
understanding constitutive rhetoric and rhetorical criticism.  The theory of constitutive 
rhetoric is not particularly helpful in understanding particular constitutive, rhetorical 
acts.  Public discourse abounds with examples of people actively engaged in the 
construction of identity, national and otherwise.  A close textual analysis within the 
framework of constitutive rhetoric gives us, as scholars, the tools to deal with those 
constitutive moments on a text by text basis and ascertain not just what identity is being 
formed, but how it is being formed as well. 
 This project is not an attempt to re-invent the wheel, or take issue with any 
particular aspect of the work done in constitutive rhetoric.  On the contrary, because I 
see that work as so important, my goal is to expand the conversation so that we can 
make it applicable to singular circumstances.  Mine is a ―nuts and bolts‖ approach to 
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constitutive rhetoric.  My aim is to provide the tools so that others may enter into the 
conversation on both a critical and theoretical level so that the field can continue to 
analyze how groups, institutions, and even singular rhetors create identity through public 
discourse. 
Finally, I can foresee using the method I have established here to move my 
studies out of the Cold War and look at rhetorical artifacts of constitutive rhetoric.  
Constitutive rhetoric is not only a historical matter, it is present and active.  The method 
I have worked to establish here could easily be applied to post 9/11 rhetoric or studies in 
campaign speeches.  My interest in the idea of American identity began while listening 
to the rhetoric of current politicians because they are continually engaged in the act of 
constitution.  There is an assumption that we all agree on what an ―American‖ is, so 
speakers begin with that notion, and then begin to describe the characteristics of being 
American, be that from a small town, supportive of the armed forces, or having a deep 
respect for authority.  By assuming that identity, and then describing it, rhetors are 
actively constituting.  Rhetorical criticism would be useful in highlighting specifically 
how politicians today are trying to convince Americans of who we are. 
Concluding Remarks 
 I began this dissertation with a quote from Malcolm X.  I could have chosen a 
quote from Walt Whitman or Langston Hughes, or any number of other American 
intellectuals because the ideas behind much of their work are similar to each other, and 
pertinent to my own.  I chose Malcolm X because his speech ―The Ballot or the Bullet‖ 
describes very clearly and explicitly, with no need for interpretation, the problem that is 
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the genesis of my research question.  Malcolm X warned that being born in America 
does not make a person American.  He derides his own nation for denying the privilege 
of being ―American‖ to any number of her citizens because of ethnicity.  Malcolm X 
was well aware that there is something more to being American than just the place of 
one‘s birth, and he felt he and his Black brothers and sisters were being denied that 
experience. 
 However, as Malcolm X points out throughout the speech, because of differing 
ideas concerning race, sex, gender, class, and other ways we stratify ourselves, trying to 
consolidate all of our ideas and produce an exact definition of ―American‖ will never be 
possible.  In some sense, the idea of democracy is somewhat antithetical to that kind of 
succinct unified national identity, because the more groups and individuals that have 
voice, the more difficult it is to settle on one definition of ―American.‖ 
 And so I have endeavored not to try and formulate a definition of ―American,‖ 
but to provide a tool by which we might analyze our attempts in public discourse to 
manage and construct our own identity.  Constitutive theory has given us the framework 
in which we can discuss the constructions of our national identity, but not the tools to 
analyze specific pieces of rhetoric that attempt to be constitutive.  By bridging the gap 
between theory and criticism I hope to expand the constitutive conversation to include 
work that critically tackles the question of ―how‖ we create identity in public discourse. 
 Malcolm X‘s concern with who got to be an ―American‖ was important because 
the differences between ―American‖ and ―citizen of the United States‖ is the difference 
in civil rights, equal opportunity, and equal protection under the law.  When one group is 
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differentiated as ―other‖ in some way, as the Brown v. Board decision noted, the ―other‖ 
group is at a disadvantage.  The tension over who gets to be an ―American‖ drives 
protests, social movements, and political campaigns from all across the spectrum.  
Learning how we have managed to either include or exclude groups is essential in 
expanding democracy within our own nation.  Being aware of the rhetorical tools rhetors 
use to either establish or rend asunder an ―us‖ and ―them‖ mentality arms us to fight the 
next McCarthy or George Wallace.  This is why it is so essential to maintain the bonds 
between criticism and theory.  Theory helps us understand constitutive rhetoric, but 
criticism helps us understand its application.  And the application of constitutive rhetoric 
is how we create who we are as a nation.  Malcolm X posited that, ―if birth made you 
American, you wouldn‘t need any legislation; you wouldn‘t need any amendments to the 
Constitution; you wouldn‘t be faced with civil-rights filibustering in Washington, D.C., 
right now,‖ and his observation rings true.  All of these cases attest to the fact that 
―American‖ means something more than just where a person is born.  Constitutive 
rhetoric is the means by which we create our identity, and it is a powerful and important 
process to understanding our own nation.  Rhetorical criticism is the way we can 
understand how we wield that weapon. 
 
 
Notes 
1. Richard M. Fried, Nightmare in Red The McCarthy Era in Perspective (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1990):34-35. 
2. Fried, 35. 
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